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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines how offender and case attributes affect criminal perceptions, 
responsibility attributions, and recommended sentencing outcomes for occupational and 
organizational crimes. I use affect control theory and attribution theory to derive my predictions. 
I test predictions using online vignette experiments administered to: community college students 
in the South, students at a large southern university, and Amazon Mechanical Turk users.  
First, I examine how an offender’s occupational status, gender, and the word used to 
describe an offender’s crime affect the recommended monetary fine and recommended prison 
sentence that participants assign to offenders. Consistent with my affect control theory-derived 
predictions, I find that occupational status increases recommended punishment, that females are 
punished more leniently than males, and that offenders described as overcharging clients are 
recommended a lighter prison sentence but not a lighter monetary fine than offenders who are 
described as stealing from clients.  
Second, extending previous research, I examine the independent and mediating effects of 
negative and potent post-crime impressions of occupational offenders on punishment. As 
predicted, I find high occupational status increases punishment, and that this effect is mediated 
by post-crime impressions of offender potency and power. However, contrary to predictions, I 
find that post-crime impressions of offender negativity and status do not mediate the effect of 
occupational status on punishment.  
Lastly, I examine how the social role of offenders and the description of an offender’s 
offense as either following or departing from standard operating procedures affects attributions 
of responsibility and the recommended monetary fine that participants assign to offenders. I find 
support for attribution theory predictions on attributions of causality and coerciveness for both 
 x 
the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures. However, findings on attributions 
of intentionality for the social role of offenders, and findings on attributions of knowledge for 
standard operating procedures, are opposite of predictions. I also find that attributions of moral 
wrongfulness for the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures are contrary to 
predictions. Consistent with punishment hypotheses, participants recommended greater monetary 
fines for autonomous offenders and offenders described as offending against standard operating 
procedures than conformist offenders and those offenders described as offending by following 
standard operating procedures. In partial support of mediation predictions, I find that causality 
and coerciveness both mediate the effect of the social role of offenders and standard operating 
procedures on the recommended monetary fine participants assign to offenders.       
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Chapter 1: A Brief Introduction and Dissertation Overview 
 
Introduction 
 
Numerous studies examine the different factors that affect sentencing outcomes. Despite 
the extensive literature in this area, there are still a number of open questions. For instance, the 
effect of an offender’s occupational status on sentencing outcomes is unclear. Research also does 
not show how an offender’s gender affects sentencing outcomes for occupational crime or how 
differences in crime description for different crime types affect recommended punishment. 
Moreover, research does not clearly explain the factors that drive criminal perceptions of 
occupational offenders and how facets of organizational offending affect both perceptions of 
culpability and punishment outcomes. In this dissertation, I begin to address research gaps in the 
aforementioned areas and address weaknesses in previous research.  
I use affect control theory (Heise 1979, 2007), a mathematical theory of impression 
formation, to develop predictions for how offender attributes and perceptions of offenders and 
their crimes affect punitiveness. I use attribution theory (Heider 1958), a theory that explains 
how individuals attribute responsibility for events, to develop predictions for how facets of 
organizational crime affect attributions of responsibility and recommended sentences. I test my 
predictions with vignette experiments administered through an online survey to three different 
groups: students at a community college in the South, students at a large southern university, and 
Amazon Mechanical Turkers.  
The substantive chapters of this dissertation, chapters 2, 3, and 4, are organized as three 
separate and complete studies. Since each study includes a literature review, explanation of its 
theoretical framework and derivation of hypotheses, and a description of methods, analyses, and 
findings, I do not explain each study in great detail in this introduction. Although each study 
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examines criminal perceptions and punishment, each study considers different research 
questions. Chapters 2 and 3 extend and improve on some of my previous work using similar 
experimental designs and the same theoretical framework. Both chapters 2 and 3 use the same set 
of vignettes and both use affect control theory; however, each chapter has a different sample and 
different sets of analyses, including different predictor variables. Chapter 4 uses a different set of 
experimental vignettes than chapters 2 and 3, and a different theoretical framework, sample of 
research participants, and analyses that test other experimental conditions on different outcome 
variables. Below, I describe each of the substantive chapters and the final concluding chapter in 
more detail.    
Dissertation Overview 
 
Chapter 2 extends and improves on recent research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) and 
addresses gaps in past research by examining how three factors affect recommended punishment: 
an offender’s occupational status, the word used to describe the offender’s crime, and an 
offender’s gender. Although we know that offenders’ socio-demographic and socio-economic 
attributes affect sentencing outcomes, the effect of an offender’s occupational prestige is 
unknown. Research focusing on punitive attitudes and sentencing outcomes that compares 
different crime types also compares unequal crimes and shows mixed results; thus, the effects of 
crime type and crime description on punitive attitudes and sentencing are unclear. Additionally, 
although research consistently shows that female offenders are treated more leniently than male 
offenders when they commit street crimes, it is unclear if this effect persists for occupational 
crimes. Sentencing theories suggest that offender attributes differentially affect sentencing 
outcomes through stereotyped traits of offenders connected to perceptions of an offender’s 
criminality, yet these theories do not explain how all offender attributes should affect criminal 
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perceptions and sentencing. Therefore, I examine these relationships and address gaps in 
previous research by using a vignette experiment that varies the offender’s occupation, the 
description of the crime, and the offender’s gender. Following recent research mentioned above, 
I use affect control theory to generate theoretical predictions; however, going beyond this 
previous research: I examine a greater number of occupations with more varied status categories, 
compare two non-violent crimes (rather than comparing a violent crime to a non-violent crime), 
use a larger and more diverse research sample, use two measures of punitiveness, and examine 
processes across two different institutions. 
Chapter 3 further examines how an offender’s occupational status affects sentencing 
outcomes. Like chapter 2, this study uses experimental methods and affect control theory. This 
chapter also improves and extends on recent research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018), which tested 
theoretical predictions for how combined negative and powerful post-crime impressions of 
occupational offenders increase perceptions of criminality and, in turn, recommended 
sentencing. In this chapter, though, I improve and extend on previous research by examining the 
independent and mediating effects of negative and powerful post-crime impressions of 
occupational offenders to determine which perceptual factors mediate the relationship between 
an offender’s occupational status and recommended punishment. I also operationalize 
occupational status by using a more precise measure of occupational status than past research, 
and I also operationalize post-crime offender negativity and potency using the conceptually 
similar measures of status and power from other group processes work. Although this chapter 
uses the same experimental vignettes from chapter 2, it uses a different sample of participants, 
and it also includes a different focal independent variable and mediating variables and analyses 
not included in chapter 2. 
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Using a different set of vignettes than chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 examines how two 
facets of organizational offending, an offender’s social role and the description of an offender’s 
offense as either following or departing from standard operating procedures, affect both 
attributions of responsibility and recommended punishment for a financial crime. We know from 
past research that an offender’s social role in an offense (i.e., if they offend on their own, by 
following the direction of others, or in a context in which their peers are also offending) affects 
how observers attribute responsibility for offenses. And, we know that describing an offense as 
one that is either typical or atypical in a particular organizational setting and situation (i.e., an 
offense that occurs while either following standard operating procedures of an organization or 
offending against standard operating procedures) affects responsibility attributions. However, 
past research in this area fails to connect responsibility attributions to recommended punishment 
outcomes, uses inconsistent measures of responsibility across studies, examines non-
representative workplace crimes in vignettes, and fails to examine how organizational facets of 
offending affect punishment. Previous studies have also failed to determine if or how 
responsibility attributions mediate the relationship between organizational facets of offending 
and punishment. To address these gaps and improve on weaknesses in past research, I draw on 
and partially test a proposed model that integrates sociological and psychological approaches to 
understanding how responsibility attributions are made to offenders in organizational settings 
(Gailey and Lee 2005a). I also measure responsibility as a multi-dimensional concept, and I 
examine how responsibility attributions are made to offenders who commit financial crimes in 
the financial services industry. 
Finally, chapter 5 summarizes in textual and tabular form the findings from chapters 2, 3, 
and 4 and briefly discusses the overall significance and implications of these results.
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Chapter 2: Criminal Sentiments and Occupational Crime: How Occupation, Crime 
Description, and Offender Gender Affect Punitive Attitudes 
 
Research consistently finds that offender attributes (e.g., race, gender, and age) 
differentially affect sentencing outcomes for the same or similar crimes (e.g., Albonetti 1997; 
Bontrager, Bales, and Chiricos 2005; Brennan 2006; Bridges and Steen 1998; Demuth and 
Steffensmeier 2004; Johnson 2003, 2005; Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer 2008; Kramer and 
Steffensmeier 1993; Kramer and Ulmer 2002; Spohn and Holleran 2000; Steen, Engen, and 
Gainey 2005; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Warren, Chiricos, and Bales 2012; Wooldredge 
2010); however, this research does not explain the effect of all case attributes or how case 
attributes affect sentencing outcomes for white-collar crime. For instance, the effect of 
occupational status (Holtfreter 2013; Payne, Dabney, and Ekhomu 2011; Tillman and Pontell 
1992) and gender (Gottschalk and Rundmo 2014; Holtfreter 2013; Van Slyke and Bales 2013) on 
sentencing outcomes for white-collar crime is unclear. Moreover, research on sentencing and 
punitive attitudes either focuses on street crime, compares unequal crimes, or presents mixed 
results for the effect of crime type on punitive attitudes and sentencing outcomes. Thus, it is 
unclear if differences in punitive attitudes and sentencing across crime types exist because of 
differences in how people think and feel about these crimes, or because of differences in the 
specific crimes being compared, and it is unclear if attitudes differ and sentencing disparities 
exist when differences in crime description are controlled.  
Therefore, I use a vignette experiment that allows me to test the independent and joint 
effects of occupational status, offender gender, and crime description on participant 
recommended sentencing outcomes for occupational crime. I draw on and extend previous work 
(Kroska and Schmidt 2018), but I go beyond this work by: 1) testing a larger number of 
occupations with a more diverse range of status categories; 2) contrasting a white-collar crime 
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word (overcharge) with a non-violent (rather than a violent) street crime word (steal from); 3) 
using a larger and more demographically diverse sample; 4) utilizing two measures of 
punitiveness; and 5) examining these processes across two different institutions (health care and 
financial services).    
Occupational Status and Sentencing 
 
 As other research notes, the effect of occupational status on sentencing outcomes is 
mixed. Some research shows that high occupational status decreases punishment, for instance, 
research finds that auto thieves are punished more harshly than physicians who commit Medicare 
fraud (Tillman and Pontell 1992). Conversely, other research shows the opposite, that 
occupational status increases punishment, for example, that high occupational status health care 
professionals are given harsher sentences than lower level health care professionals (Payne et al. 
2011). Still other research shows that occupational status has no effect on sentencing outcomes. 
For instance, research finds no effect for manager status or education on incarceration or 
sentence length for white-collar offenders (Holtfreter 2013).  
The mixed findings on occupational status and sentencing may be due to a number of 
factors. Studies have used different definitions of occupational crime and different conceptions 
of offender status, which creates unequal comparisons across studies. Many studies on 
occupation and sentencing are also methodologically limited by the use of archival court data. 
Archival court datasets do not have controls for all of the factors that distinguish high status 
offenders from low status offenders; thus, the statistical models in these studies cannot establish 
non-spuriousness between an offender’s SES or occupational status and sentencing. Establishing 
non-spuriousness is crucial to understanding the effect of occupational status on sentencing, 
because an offender’s occupational status may be tied to other factors that impact sentencing. For 
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instance, high occupational status and high SES offenders are more likely than lower status 
offenders to be able to afford better legal representation, to better understand the legal process, 
and to gain the empathy of judges and other criminal justice officials that are from similar social 
backgrounds (Shapiro 1990). I address these methodological weaknesses by utilizing a vignette 
experiment that allows me to isolate the effect of occupational status and thereby establish non-
spuriousness. 
Although overall findings are mixed, recent research shows that high occupational status 
increases recommended punishment (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). This research finds that white-
collar offenders (executives and physicians) are recommended a greater prison sentence by 
research participants than lower status blue- or pink-collar offenders (handymen and shop clerks) 
when they commit the same crime (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). This research uses a vignette 
experiment and is able to control for differences between types of offenders and offenses. 
Findings from this research suggest that high occupational status increases recommended 
punishment for occupational crimes. I extend this research by testing a larger number of 
occupations with a more diverse status range (accountant, CEO, doctor, nurse, and receptionist) 
across two institutions (health care and financial services) and use two measures of punitiveness 
(a prison sentence and a monetary fine).   
Crime Description and Sentencing: Occupational Crime vs. Street Crime 
 
 Studies that compare occupational crime to street crime mostly compare unequal crimes 
and this research shows mixed results. For instance, research shows: no difference in 
punitiveness by crime type when comparing fraud and robbery (Schoepfer, Carmichael and 
Piquero 2007); that Ponzi schemes are viewed as more serious than auto theft, burglary, and 
prostitution, and that respondents indicate that Ponzi scheme offenders should be punished with a 
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prison or jail sentence compared to a monetary fine or probation (Dodge, Bosick and Van 
Antwerp 2013); and still other research shows that violent street crimes are perceived of as more 
serious and assigned harsher prison sentences by research participants than harmful white-collar 
crimes (Michel 2016). 
Studies that compare crime types may also confound the effect of crime type with crime 
description or other crime attributes, especially, as noted by other researchers (e.g., see Michel 
2016), when comparing crimes that result in different types of harm to victims. For instance, the 
2005 and 2010 National Public Survey on White-collar Crime, one of the primary studies on 
differences in attitudes that compares white-collar crimes to street crimes, asks respondents to 
compare a baseline crime of a person stealing a car worth $10,000 to: embezzlement, illegal 
toxic waste disposal, misrepresentation of pharmaceutical drug testing, selling private health care 
information, selling nuclear secrets and classified information, manipulating financial markets, 
and other large scale and serious crimes with wide-scale victimization and societal-level damage 
(Huff, Desilets and Kane 2010; Kane and Wall 2006). Questions then ask respondents about 
perceptions of comparative seriousness for these crimes. This research finds that all white-collar 
crimes when compared to the baseline scenario are rated as more serious by participants, and 
researchers conclude that most white-collar crimes are perceived of as more serious than street 
crimes and more serious than how they were perceived of than in the past. However, when 
researchers later group all crimes asked about in the survey by crime type (i.e., white-collar 
crime vs. street crime), on average white-collar crimes are only rated as slightly more serious 
than the other street crimes (burglary, assault, and robbery) asked about in the survey (a 
difference of .08 for the 2005 and .02 for the 2010 survey), and researchers do not report if this is 
a significant difference (i.e., all they report is mean scores). It is difficult to draw conclusions 
 9 
from this research, because differences in the magnitude, severity, type of victimization, and the 
reach of these crimes, and differences in how these crimes are described may confound the effect 
of crime type with crime description or other crime attributes. Thus, the effect of crime type and 
crime description on criminal perceptions, punitive attitudes, and punishment is unclear.  
However, research using experimental methods that can control for description 
differences by crime type finds that offenses which are described using a word associated with 
street crime (rob) are punished more harshly than offenses described with a word associated with 
white-collar crime (overcharge) (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) even though the crimes, other than 
the verb used to describe them, are exactly the same. The current experimental design follows 
that of Kroska and Schmidt (2018) but uses the words “steal from” rather than “rob” while 
holding constant all other relevant crime attributes. Thus, I improve upon this research by using a 
word associated with non-violent street crime, which allows me to eliminate the possibility that 
participant punitive attitudes are, at least in part, driven by exposure to a violent crime. 
Moreover, by controlling for description differences I also address weakness in previous studies 
that compare unequal crimes. Overcharging describes a type of billing or business scheme fraud 
associated with white-collar crime and stealing describes larceny/theft which is associated with 
street crime (USDOJ 2017). This research also helps to disentangle perceptions of the criminal 
from perceptions of the crime by crossing the type of crime with offender’s status. 
Gender and Sentencing  
Considerable research shows that females are sentenced more leniently than males for the 
same crime (Albonetti 1997; Spohn and Beichnner 2000; Spohn et al. 1985; Steffensmeier and 
Demuth 2006; Steffensmeier et al. 1993, 1995, 1998). For instance, research controlling for 
offense seriousness, prior criminal record, offender race, offender employment, and other 
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offender and offense characteristics finds that females in Kansas City, Chicago, and Miami all 
receive more lenient treatment than comparable male offenders (Spohn and Beichnner 2000). 
Likewise, other research shows lenient punishment for females, finding that offender gender 
even has a greater effect on sentencing outcomes than race (Steffensmeir and Demuth 2006). 
However, in part, because white-collar offenders are more likely to be male (Benson and 
Gottschalk 2015; Daly 1989; Wheeler et al. 1988), although arrest rates show this gap has 
narrowed over time (Heimer 2000; Steffensmeir 1993) and that gender varies by type of white-
collar crime (Holtfreter 2005), only limited white-collar crime research controls for offender 
gender, and this research shows mixed results. Thus, it is not clear from this research if female 
white-collar offenders, like female street offenders, are treated more leniently than male 
offenders.  
Early white-collar crime research, using sentencing data, found that female offenders 
were less likely than males to be incarcerated for an offense but no effect for gender on the 
length of imprisonment (Wheeler, Weisburd and Bode 1982). Although analyses in this research 
controlled for offender SES, criminal background, and role in the offense, they did not control 
for offender occupational status. Other research used this data to look at characteristics of white-
collar offenders and found that females in the sample were lower status offenders (e.g., clerical 
workers), while most of the males in the sample were higher level offenders (e.g., managers or 
administrators) (Daly 1989). These findings suggest that offenders may have not had access to 
commit similar crimes and that their actions may have been viewed differently by their 
occupational status, which possibly explains the lack of significant findings for gender on length 
of imprisonment. 
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More recent research presents mixed results. Recent research on women’s roles in fraud 
cases finds no effect for gender on the decision to incarcerate offenders or on sentence length 
(Holtfreter 2013). However, conclusions from this study are somewhat limited by measurement 
validity and recall bias issues, as it is based on a survey that asked fraud investigators to recall 
and report on past cases from memory. Similarly, other recent research shows no effect for 
offender gender on sentence length (Gottschalk and Rundmo 2014), but the findings from this 
research may not be generalizable, as they are based on a small sample of Norwegian offenders. 
Research using Florida sentencing guideline data from 1994 to 2004, though, does find that 
female offenders are punished more leniently than male offenders regardless of crime type, and 
that female street offenders receive the most lenient sentencing (Van Slyke and Bales 2013). 
This research suggests that the lenient sentencing found for female offenders who commit street 
crime extends to white-collar crimes, but that female street offenders are still punished less 
harshly than female white-collar offenders. I am able to control for occupational differences 
between offenders and differences in crime description and, in doing so, provide a more 
thorough test of the role of offender gender on sentencing outcomes. Thus, to address the mixed 
findings from current research and the lack of studies overall, I vary offender gender across 
vignettes.  
Theories on Sentencing 
As outlined in previous research, the two main theories of sentencing, the focal concerns 
perspective and the uncertainty avoidance perspective, do not provide clarity on how 
occupational status affects sentencing outcomes. These theories only clearly explain how more 
well studied extra-legal factors, such as race, gender, and age affect sentencing outcomes. Extra-
legal factors like race are more closely linked to stereotyped perceptions of criminality and 
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dangerousness, and, according to these theories, judges rely on these perceptions, in part, to 
come to sentencing recommendations (Albonetti 1991; Steffensmeier et al.1998). Empirical 
research supports this link between stereotyped perceptions of criminality and sentencing for 
race, age, and gender, finding that offenders who are young, black or Hispanic, and male are 
consistently given heavier sentences than offenders who are older, white, and female 
(Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Warren et al. 2012). However, it is not clear from these 
theories how occupation should affect sentencing, as occupation is not clearly linked to 
stereotyped perceptions of criminality. I address the aforementioned theoretical issues by using a 
theory that is more suited to explain impression formation processes, affect control theory 
(ACT). 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Affect Control Theory 
 
ACT (Heise 1979, 2007; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) explains the 
impression formation processes that underlie social interactions using a series of empirically 
derived impression formation equations. ACT holds that all social concepts have affective 
meanings tied to them and that these affective meanings influence how social interactions 
develop and are understood by both actors and observers. The affective meanings of social 
concepts vary along the three universal dimensions of meaning identified by Osgood, May, and 
Miron (1975) in their cross-cultural research: evaluation, potency, and activity (EPA). Evaluation 
represents how good or bad a social concept is, potency how powerful or powerless a concept is, 
and activity how lively or inactive a social concept is. EPA profiles have been collected by ACT 
researchers across several cultures using semantic differential scales that range from -4.3 to 4.3. 
These profiles are compiled in dictionaries.  
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In ACT, fundamental sentiments are culturally-held sentiments for how social actors or 
observers normally feel about behaviors, objects, or other actors (Heise 1979, 2007). Transient 
impressions are the momentary impressions of event elements evoked after viewing a situation. 
ACT’s central proposition is that individuals attempt to match their transient impressions to 
fundamental sentiments of events; when fundamental sentiments do not match transient 
impressions, deflection occurs. High deflection indicates that an event seems unlikely or odd, 
while low deflection scores indicate that an event seems likely or reasonable. Individuals can 
reduce deflection by constructing or cognitively reconstructing the elements of social 
interactions, such that their preexisting sentiments match their transient impressions of elements 
in the interaction.  
ACT’s impression formation equations are accessible through its computer program, 
Interact, which allows researchers to simulate social interactions (Heise 1995). Using Interact, I 
can simulate social interactions and quantify changes in impressions of event elements from 
fundamental sentiments, and I can predict future actions and processes that actors and observers 
use to make sense of an event. For instance, individuals see a physician as quite good (2.42), 
quite powerful (2.38), and neutral on activity (-0.15) (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016)1. When a 
physician (2.42, 2.38, -0.15) does something that is expected of him or her, like giving medical 
treatment (3.08, 2.80, 1.57) to a client (1.39, 1.27, 0.92), deflection is low (3.33) and transient 
impressions of the physician are similar to fundamental sentiments.  
                                                 
1 EPA profiles used are taken from the 2015 Georgia combined gender dictionary (Robinson and 
Smith-Lovin 2016) unless noted otherwise. EPA profile ratings are quantified as follows: -4.3 is 
infinitely bad/powerless/inactive; -3.0 is extremely bad/powerless/inactive; -2.0 is quite 
bad/powerless/inactive; -1.00 is slightly bad/powerless/inactive; 0 is neutral, neither bad nor 
good/powerless nor powerful/inactive or active; +1.00 is slightly good/powerful/active; +2 is 
quite good/powerful/active; +3.0 is extremely good/powerful/active; and, +4.3 is infinitely 
good/powerful/active (Heise 2007).     
 14 
However, when a physician does something unexpected, like brawls with (-2.04, 0.70, 
2.74) a client (1.39, 1.27, 0.92), deflection is high (15.59), and transient impressions of the 
physician are slightly bad (-0.58), quite potent (1.76), and slightly active (1.09). The decrease in 
evaluation for a physician who brawls with a client is an expected impression formation effect 
given that a good and powerful actor is doing a bad thing to a slightly good object (client 
evaluation = 1.39). However, when a more criminalistic actor, such as a loan shark (-1.72, 1.82, 
0.49), brawls with a client, deflection (4.56) is lower. Transient impressions show that a loan 
shark who brawls with a client is evaluated only slightly more negatively than normally (-1.87 
compared to -1.72) and is seen as slightly less potent (1.51 compared to 1.82) but more active 
(1.27 compared to 0.49). The larger deflection score for the physician who brawls with a client 
and the differences between pre-event fundamental sentiments and transient impressions shows 
how elements of events can shape actor and observer impressions of these events. 
The results from Interact in the simulations above illustrate ACT’s main proposition: that 
individuals will construct and reconstruct elements of events so that they align with fundamental 
sentiments. For instance, ACT predicts that after witnessing a physician steal from a client, the 
client should be relabeled as someone who is slightly bad (-1.42), slightly potent (0.75), and 
slightly active (1.09), such as a rival. Transient impressions of the physician also show a large 
decrease in evaluation (-1.33 compared to 2.42), a decrease in potency (1.97 compared to 2.38), 
and an increase in activity (0.42 compared to -0.15). ACT predicts an action that is extremely 
good, quite potent, and slightly active, because an action with that EPA profile should help the 
physician regain some of the positive evaluation lost after stealing from a client. Similarly, ACT 
predicts that observers will relabel the client whom the physician stole from as evaluatively 
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much worse than the client’s fundamental evaluation, because labeling a client in this way would 
make the action of the physician seem more reasonable or believable.  
I draw on Interact simulations, like those above, to develop hypotheses for how 
occupational identities, offender gender, and the words used to describe a crime are likely to 
impact impression formation and, in turn, sentencing recommendations. I expect that the 
transient evaluation and potency impressions of the occupational identities, offender gender, and 
the word used to describe the actors’ behaviors to mediate the relationship between the three 
manipulated elements of the event (offender’s occupational identity, offender gender, and the 
crime word) and the recommended sentence. In testing the effect of occupation, offender gender, 
and crime word on sentencing recommendations, I draw on previous work that uses transient 
impressions of evaluation and potency to quantify criminal sentiments (Kroska, Lee and Carr 
2017a, 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018). Kroska and Schmidt (2018), for instance, find that 
transient impressions of evaluation and potency for occupational identities and crime behaviors 
(criminality scores) predict the recommended prison sentences that research participants assign 
to offenders. Thus, based on predictions from ACT and previous work, I expect high transient 
impressions of actor and behavior negativity and power (i.e., criminality scores or criminal 
sentiments) to increase the recommended punishment assigned by participants. Further, this 
hypothesis, and the use of criminal sentiments, as noted in previous work (Kroska, Lee and Carr 
2017a, 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018), is based on the observance that the most outwardly 
criminalistic identities and behaviors from the Interact dictionary are also those that are 
consistently highly negatively evaluated and highly potent. For instance, a rapist is considered 
infinitely bad (-3.95) and quite potent (1.69), while murdering someone is considered infinitely 
bad (-4.15) and quite powerful (2.41). 
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Hypotheses 
 
ACT Impression Formation: Occupational Status, Crime Word, and Offender Gender 
Hypotheses 
 
I expect that occupational status, crime word, and gender will affect recommended 
sentencing through their effect on the transient evaluation and transient potency impressions of 
the actor in vignettes and his or her behavior (criminal sentiments). I use Interact simulations to 
develop hypotheses for how these case attributes affect impression formation processes and, 
resultantly, recommended punishment. 
[Table 2.1 here] 
Occupational Status Hypotheses 
 
Transient evaluation and transient potency of the occupational actors. Table 2.1 shows 
the transient impressions of the occupational identities of the actors used in the vignettes for 
Study 1. As seen in Table 2.1, the occupations in the vignette can be ranked based on cumulative 
transient evaluation and potency scores (criminality scores) (Kroska et al. 2017b; Kroska and 
Schmidt 2018), the two dimensions from ACT that I expect will affect impressions of criminality 
and sentencing. Following previous work (Kroska et al. 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018), I 
create criminality scores by reversing transient impressions of evaluation and summing them 
with transient impressions of potency (i.e., occupational actor criminality score = (-1 x transient 
actor evaluation) + transient actor potency), with higher cumulative evaluation and potency 
scores predicting greater criminal sentiments and recommended sentencing for offenders. I show 
individual rankings for criminal sentiments of occupations in tables, but I group similar 
occupations together in later analyses, so I also present averages in Table 2.1.  
Criminality scores show that the occupations used in the vignettes can be ranked in the 
following order, with higher scores indicating a greater criminal perception and predicted 
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recommended punishment: 1) CEO 2) doctor 3) accountant 4) nurse, and 5) receptionist. 
According to ACT, negatively evaluated behaviors decrease transient evaluation impressions of 
the actor and increase transient potency impressions (Heise 2007). The results from Interact in 
Table 2.1 suggest that the crimes of higher status offenders appear more powerful than the 
crimes of the lower status offenders, and the results show that evaluation differences between 
occupational statuses are greatly reduced. Thus, I expect that the higher transient potency 
impressions of higher occupational status offenders and the lower transient evaluative 
impressions, will result in high occupational status offenders’ offenses being viewed as 
criminally worse than lower occupational status offenders, and that these high criminal 
sentiments will increase the recommended punishment that research participants assign to high 
occupational status offenders:  
Occupational status recommended prison sentence hypothesis: Participants will 
recommend a greater prison sentence to high status offenders than they do to medium 
status offenders, and they will recommend a greater prison sentence to medium status 
offenders than they do to lower status offenders (i.e., CEO and doctor > accountant and 
nurse > receptionists). 
 
Occupational status recommended monetary fine hypothesis: Participants will 
recommend a greater monetary fine to high status offenders than they do to medium 
status offenders, and they will recommend a greater monetary fine to medium status 
offenders than they do to lower status offenders (i.e., CEO and doctor > accountant and 
nurse > receptionists). 
[Table 2.2 here] 
Crime Word Hypotheses 
Transient evaluation and transient potency of the occupational actors’ behaviors. 
Criminality scores for crime words are calculated in the same way as described for occupational 
actors above (i.e., behavior criminality score = (-1 x transient behavior evaluation) + transient 
behavior potency). Table 2.2 shows, regardless of who commits the offense, that stealing from a 
client is evaluated more negatively and considered more powerful than overcharging a client. 
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Thus, criminal perceptions are greater for offenders described as stealing from clients than 
offenders described as overcharging clients, and these offenders should receive greater 
recommended punishment: 
Crime word recommended prison sentence hypothesis: Participants will recommend a 
greater prison sentence for offenders who are described as “stealing from” rather than 
“overcharging” their clients. 
 
Crime word recommended monetary fine hypothesis: Participants will recommend a 
greater monetary fine for offenders who are described as “stealing from” rather than 
“overcharging” their clients. 
 
Gender Hypotheses 
[Table 2.3 here] 
 
Transient evaluation and transient potency of the occupational offenders’ gender. Table 
2.3 shows transient impressions for the different occupational actors used in the vignettes by 
gender of the actor. I use gender as a modifier, amalgamating it with occupational identities in 
Interact, so that I can test the predicted effect of gender on sentencing outcomes. Again, 
criminality scores are calculated in the same manner as described above (i.e., gendered actor 
criminality = (-1 x transient gendered actor evaluation) + transient gendered actor potency). As 
seen in Table 2.3, for every occupation and crime, criminal sentiments are greater for male 
offenders than female offenders. Together, these simulation results suggest that male offenders 
will be assigned a greater sentence than female offenders: 
Offender gender recommended prison sentence hypothesis: Participants will recommend 
a greater prison sentence to male offenders than female offenders. 
 
Offender gender recommended monetary fine hypothesis: Participants will recommend a 
greater monetary fine to male offenders than female offenders. 
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Methods 
Sample 
 
I collected data from three samples during the fall of 2017: (1) a sample of college 
students at a large southern university, (2) a sample of college students at a southern community 
college, and (3) a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) users. University student 
participation was incentivized by offering participants the opportunity to be included in a lottery 
drawing for one of nine twenty-five-dollar Amazon gift cards. Community college student 
participation was incentivized by offering class credit or extra credit to subjects for their 
participation. Mturk is an online service provided by Amazon that recruits users to fill out 
surveys for pay, and Mturk users were paid one dollar each for their participation. By including 
Mturk participants, this research improves on previous mock juror studies that utilize only 
student samples. Further, research shows the high-quality nature of Mturk data and suggests that 
including crowdsourced samples, like Mturk, increases the generalizability of findings (Shank 
2016; Weinberg, Freese and McElhattan 2014). This mock juror sample provides for a greater 
understanding of punitive attitudes and criminal perceptions, even though in the real world, 
judges, and not jurors, decide on sentencing outcomes.  
Experimental design 
 
I utilize a vignette experiment with two 3 x 2 x 2 designs that vary the occupation 
(accountant, CEO, doctor, nurse, and receptionist) and gender (male or female) of the actor in the 
vignette and the word used to describe the crime (overcharge or steal from) across two different 
institutions (health care and financial services).  
[Figure 2.1 here] 
The health care vignette describes a male or female doctor, nurse, or receptionist who 
works at a senior retirement community, while the financial services vignette describes a male or 
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female CEO, accountant, or receptionist who works at a financial planning and investments firm. 
The occupations were chosen because they are common occupations with which participants 
should be familiar. The vignettes explicitly tell the participants the age (35) and race (white) of 
the offender, and the names of the characters used in the vignette, Todd or Emily, are two of the 
most common names given to white boys and girls born between 1974 and 1979 (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004), close to the time the vignette character would have been born. The full 
vignettes are as follows: 
Financial services vignette: Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white 
female/male receptionist/accountant/CEO who has worked at a small private financial 
planning and investments firm for the last twelve years. The firm works with clients to 
develop financial plans for their future, including estate planning, retirement planning, 
insurance dealings, and portfolio investing. Emily/Todd is well liked by clients of the 
firm, and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even 
being given access to all of the organization’s billing systems. Emily/Todd is also seen 
by many clients and those in her/his company as someone who is meticulous and careful 
in her/his work, so she/he knows that her/his work will only be checked if a major issue 
arises and that neither the firm nor her/his clients are likely to question her/his work, 
because clients usually have many investments, and the firm processes too many 
transactions to check on prices of all investments and services sold. For the last eight 
years Emily/Todd has been able to steal from/overcharge clients by providing inflated 
costs on investments and by adding extra fees for services to clients’ accounts. 
Emily/Todd has been able to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. 
As a consequence, clients suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200 
dollars. The firm does not suffer as a direct result of Emily’s/Todd’s actions as increases 
in fees cover the losses.   
 
Health care vignette: Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white 
female/male receptionist/nurse/doctor who has worked at a small private senior 
retirement community for the last twelve years. The retirement community offers both 
independent and assisted living accommodations for residents and also makes available 
medical services to residents. Emily/Todd is well liked by residents in the community, 
and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even being 
given access to all of the organization’s billing systems. Emily/Todd is also seen by 
many in the retirement community as an advocate for residents, and many residents have 
entrusted her/him with access to their private health care and financial information. 
Emily/Todd knows that her/his work will only be checked if a major issue arises and 
that neither residents nor insurers are likely to question her/his work, because residents 
receive a lot of medical paperwork, and insurers process too many claims to check if all 
the claims are legitimate. For the last eight years Emily/Todd has been able to steal 
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from/overcharge residents and insurers by adding extra fees and services to residents’ 
bills and by charging these false claims to insurers. Emily/Todd has been able to 
personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, residents 
suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200. Insurance companies lose 
money from false claims, but yearly premium increases cover those losses. 
 
Condition Variables 
 
Medium status (nurse and accountant) and low status (receptionists) are dummy variables 
for the offender’s occupation that participants were exposed to in vignettes, and high status 
(CEO and doctor), is the omitted category. Overcharge is a dummy variable for the crime word 
that participants were exposed to, with steal from being the omitted category. Female offender is 
a dummy variable for the gender of the offender in vignettes, with male offender as the omitted 
category. 
Dependent Variables 
Prison sentence is the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to the 
offender in the vignette. Participants were asked what sentence they would recommend if 
Emily/Todd were to be punished with a prison sentence and only a prison sentence. Responses 
were arranged on a slider scale with “No prison” on the left and “25” on the right as anchor 
points. The title above the slider scale was “Prison Sentence in Years,” and there were tick marks 
above the scale at five-year intervals, but participants were also able to drag the slider to select 
an exact amount of years, which was displayed to the right of the scale.  
Monetary fine is the recommended monetary fine that participants assign to the offender 
in the vignette. Participants were asked how large a fine they would recommend if Emily/Todd 
were to be punished with a fine and only a fine. Respondents used a slider scale with “No fine” 
on the left and “$1,000,000” on the right as anchor points. Responses to monetary fine were 
divided by ten thousand to create a scale that ranges from zero to one hundred.   
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Skewness and kurtosis tests indicate that recommended prison sentence and 
recommended monetary fine are non-normally distributed. However, graphing residual results 
from ordinary least squares regression (OLS) shows that prison sentence and monetary fine are 
only slightly non-normally distributed, and alternative methods of analysis and dependent 
variable transformations were explored. Variable transformations did not make the distribution 
completely normal and make the results less easily interpretable and meaningful (i.e., analyses 
suggest using a square root transformation that does not produce a meaningful or logical metric 
for measuring punishment recommendations). Ordered logistic regression (OLR) residual results 
show the most normal distribution, but since the OLR results are the same as OLS, and OLS 
allows me to retain the use of continuous dependent variables, I use OLS. Table 2.4 below 
presents the descriptive statistics for all variables included in analyses.   
[Table 2.4 here] 
Control variables 
Medical vignette is a dummy variable that controls for differences between the two sets 
of vignettes, the medical vignette and the financial services vignette. 
Appropriate legal punishment control variables. Community service, monetary fine, 
probation, and imprisonment are dummy variables for the type of punishment that participants 
indicate is the most appropriate legal response to the crime they read in the vignette. Participants 
were instructed to choose all that apply.  
Controls for participant attributes. Female and gender non-conforming control for the 
gender of participants, with male omitted. Student is a dummy variable that is used to control for 
differences between Mturk users and student participants. The two student samples were 
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combined, because substantive differences were not found between the university and 
community college samples.  
[Tables 2.5 and 2.6 here] 
RESULTS 
 
Occupation and Recommended Punishment 
Table 2.5 shows the OLS regression results for the effect of all variables on 
recommended prison sentence, and Table 2.6 shows the OLS regression results for the effect of 
all variables on recommend monetary fine. Consistent with the ACT-derived occupational status 
recommended prison sentence and recommended monetary fine hypotheses, occupational status 
increases the recommended punishment participants assign to offenders. 
 As seen in Model 1 of Table 2.5, both of the groupings of medium and low status 
occupations, nurse and accountant (b = -0.571, se = 0.269, p = 0.034) and receptionists              
(b = -0.543, se = 0.270, p = 0.044), receive significantly lighter recommended prison sentences 
than those in the higher occupational status category (CEO and doctor). The same results can be 
found for monetary fine in Model 1 of Table 2.6, with nurse and accountant (b = -9.267,               
se = 1.633, p = 0.000) and receptionists (b = -8.437, se = 1.640, p = 0.000) recommended 
significantly lighter monetary fines than CEOs and doctors. The coefficients for occupational 
status remain negative and significant as participant demographic attributes and appropriate legal 
punishment variables are added (Model 2) but drop to non-significance for recommended prison 
sentence once interactions between offender occupation and offender gender are added in Model 
3.  
As seen in Model 3 of Table 2.5, the effect of occupational status on recommended 
sentence does differ by the gender of the offender but only for the lowest status occupation, and 
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the interaction just reaches the cut off for significance (p = 0.045). The difference in slopes is 
significant (b = -1.011, se = 0.503, p = 0.045), and as seen in figure 2.2 (below) the slope for 
female offenders is much steeper (b = -1.159, se = 0.353, p = 0.001) than the slope for male 
offenders (b = -0.148, se = 0.357, p = 0.679). I also examine the effect of occupational status on 
recommended monetary fine by gender of the offender, but neither of these interactions reach 
significance, and the main effect of occupation on monetary fine, as seen in Model 3 of Table 
2.6, remains highly significant (p<0.001) for both groupings of occupations. I also explore the 
interaction between occupation and crime word (not shown), but none of the coefficients ever 
reach significance for either recommended prison sentence or monetary fine. 
Thus, results in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 provide evidence to support ACT predictions on 
occupation and suggest that occupational status does affect sentencing outcomes but not in the 
exact ordering of individual occupations as predicted by criminal sentiments from ACT.  
[Figure 2.2 here] 
Crime Word and Recommended Punishment 
 As predicted by the ACT crime word hypotheses, participants recommend a greater 
prison sentence for offenders who are described as stealing from rather than overcharging their 
clients. Table 2.5 shows that this effect holds across all models. However, Table 2.6 shows that 
crime word is not a significant predictor of recommended monetary fine, as the crime word 
coefficient never reaches significance. Crime word is negatively related to monetary fine in 
Model 1, but once participant demographics and participants’ selection of the appropriate legal 
punishment are controlled for in Model 2, this relationship becomes positive. These results 
suggest that describing a crime with a word associated with white-collar crime reduces the 
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recommended prison sentence participants assign to offenders but not the recommended 
monetary fine. 
Gender and Recommended Punishment 
 Consistent with the ACT offender gender hypotheses, participants recommend greater 
punishments for male offenders than they do for female offenders. Models 1 and 2 in Table 2.5 
and Models 1-3 in Table 2.6 all show that participants recommend a significantly lighter prison 
sentence and monetary fine for female offenders than male offenders. I also explore the 
relationship between offender gender and crime word to determine if the effect of gender on 
recommended punishment varies by type of crime, but interactions between offender gender and 
crime word never reach significance (not shown). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Past research does not clearly show how occupation, crime description, and offender 
gender affect recommended punishment outcomes for white-collar crime. Further, the theories 
designed to explain differential sentencing outcomes, the focal concerns perspective and the 
uncertainty avoidance perspective, only offer predictions for how attributes that are more clearly 
linked to perceptions of offender criminality and dangerousness are likely to affect sentencing 
outcomes. I addressed these literature gaps and build on previous work (Kroska and Schmidt 
2018) by using a vignette experiment to test the effect of occupational status, offender gender, 
and crime description on recommended punishment outcomes for occupational offenses. I go 
beyond previous work by: including a greater range of occupations, using a non-violent street 
crime, utilizing a more expansive sample, including two measures of punitiveness, and by 
examining these processes across two different institutions. 
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  To develop my predictions, I drew on affect control theory. ACT explains the impression 
formation processes that underlie criminal perceptions. Moreover, this theory of group processes 
is more suited than theories from the sentencing literature to explain how all offender and case 
attributes are likely to affect crime perceptions and punishment outcomes, and findings from this 
research provide further support for the application of ACT to the study of crime.  
Results provide support for ACT-derived predictions that high occupational status 
increases recommended sentencing. These findings are also consistent with other work that finds 
that occupational status increases recommended prison sentences for white-collar offenders 
(Kroska and Schmidt 2018). Further, my results hold across a wide range of occupational 
statuses, two different institutions, and two different measures of punitiveness. Thus, the current 
research suggests that high status occupational offenders do not benefit from their high 
occupational status in the sentencing process and, additionally, that they may even suffer a 
greater punishment penalty because of their high occupational status. This finding is interesting 
given the advantages that high occupational status and high SES offenders are likely to benefit 
from in the criminal justice system and legal processes (Shapiro 1990), especially given the fact 
that white-collar offenders are less likely to be caught and prosecuted for their crimes in the first 
place, and that they are more likely to settle out of court or agree to a plea bargain before going 
to trial (e.g., see Huff, Desilets and Kane 2010; Simpson 2013). This finding suggests that 
participants either are more upset, worried, or offended by the crimes of high-status offenders 
and, as a result, assign them harsher punishment. Or, that participants may be aware of the 
benefits afforded these types of offenders in the legal process and judicial system, and that, 
because of this, participants assign them heavier punishment. Future work should explore what 
dimensions of criminal perceptions explain the relationship between occupational status and 
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punishment and if objective knowledge on crime or media consumption affects punitive 
attitudes.      
Findings for the effect of gender on recommend punishment for occupational offenses 
also support ACT offender gender predictions, with male offenders receiving a significantly 
harsher recommended punishment than females. These findings are also in line with findings 
from the sentencing literature more generally, which finds that males are more likely to receive 
harsher punishments than females (Albonetti 1997; Spohn and Beichnner 2000; Spohn, Welch 
and Gruhl 1985; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2006; Steffensmeier, Kramer and Ulmer 1995; 
Steffensmeier, Kramer and Streifel 1993; Steffensmeier, Ulmer and Kramer 1998) and limited 
findings that show more lenient treatment for female white-collar offenders (Van Slyke and 
Bales 2013). This finding is important though, given the overall lack of studies on female white-
collar offenders and the insignificant findings on gender in recent research on white-collar 
offending (Gottschalk and Rundmo 2014; Holtfreter 2013).     
Finally, findings for the effect of crime word on recommended sentencing also confirm 
ACT predictions that the street crime of theft/larceny results in greater recommended prison 
sentences assigned by participants than the occupational crime of overcharging clients. These 
findings also match the findings of Kroska and Schmidt (2018) on offense description and 
underline the important role that the word used to describe a crime has on crime impressions and, 
in turn, recommended sentencing outcomes. However, I do not find any effect for crime word on 
recommended monetary fines. The lack of findings for the effect of crime word on recommended 
monetary fine was unexpected, especially given the strong findings for crime word on 
recommended prison sentencing. This result, though, may indicate participants’ preferences for 
punishing occupational offenders with an actual prison sentence rather than just a monetary fine. 
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Questions asked participants how large of a monetary fine that offenders should receive if they 
only receive a monetary fine and how long of a prison sentence that offenders should receive if 
they only receive a prison sentence. Thus, a monetary fine might be seen as inconsequential to 
occupational offenders, especially if their crimes result in significant monetary gains, and this 
finding may be reflective of what other white-collar crime researchers suggest is a current shift 
to more punitive attitudes concerning white-collar crime (Cullen, Hartman and Jonson 2009). 
Limitations and future research       
 This research was limited in that it only tested five occupations using two different crime 
words across two different fields of work. Future research in this area should expand its scope by 
including a greater number of more diverse occupations that differ more significantly on 
transient impressions of evaluation and potency, and future work should also include crimes 
other than theft or billing fraud. Further, future work in this area may benefit from the use of 
ACT-derived deference scores (Freeland and Hoey 2018) in developing predictions for how 
occupational status considerations impact criminal perceptions. Similarly, more work should be 
done applying other theories of group processes to the study of crime, as group processes 
theories are particularly well suited to understanding the underlying processes behind punitive 
attitudes, perceptions of criminal acts, and how the framing of crime events matter. 
Future work should also explore how the cultural context and organizational nature of 
white-collar offending, as well as offense severity, affects perceptions and punishment outcomes. 
Finally, future work would also benefit from testing the effect of other offender attributes that are 
significant in the sentencing literature, like race and age, which have not been examined for 
occupational crime. Moreover, although this research is an improvement on past studies that 
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have only used student samples, this research would greatly benefit from a sampling of real-
world judges who are tasked with making actual sentencing recommendations.
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 2 
Figure 2.1 Experimental Vignette Design 
   Male  Female 
Financial Vignette  Overcharge Steal From  Overcharge Steal from 
  High status (CEO)  Condition 1 Condition 2  Condition 3 Condition 4 
  Medium status 
(Accountant) 
 
Condition 5 Condition 6  Condition 7 Condition 8 
  Low status (Receptionist)  Condition 9 Condition 10  Condition 11 Condition 12 
Health Care Vignette       
  High status (Doctor)  Condition 1 Condition 2  Condition 3 Condition 4 
  Medium status (Nurse)  Condition 5 Condition 6  Condition 7 Condition 8 
  Low status (Receptionist)  Condition 9 Condition 10  Condition 11 Condition 12 
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Figure 2.2 
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Table 2.1 Fundamental Sentiments, Transient Impressions, and Criminality Scores for Occupational Identities used in 
Vignettes 
    Transient Impressions   
  Fundamental 
Sentiments 
 
After Overcharging 
 
After Stealing From 
  
Occupational 
Identities 
E P  E P 
Criminality 
Score 
 E P 
Criminality 
Score 
 
Total 
Criminality 
Score 
High Status             
 CEO 
.98 3.29 
 
-1.17 2.47 3.64 
 
-1.64 2.55 4.19 
 7.83 
 Doctor 
2.73 2.94 
 
-.69 2.21 2.90 
 
-1.26 2.28 3.54 
 6.44 
Average (CEO 
and Doctor): 
1.86 3.12 
 
-.93 2.34 3.27 
 
-1.45 2.42 3.87 
 
7.14 
Medium Status             
 Accountant 
1.14 1.32 
 
-1.13 1.35 2.48 
 
-1.61 1.41 3.02 
 5.50 
 Nurse 
2.86 1.89 
 
-.66 1.70 2.36 
 
-1.24 1.76 3.00 
 5.36 
Average 
(Accountant and 
Nurse): 
2.00 1.61 
 
-.90 1.53 2.42 
 
-1.43 1.59 3.01 
 
5.43 
Low Status             
 Receptionist 
(health care and 
financial) 
1.29 -.25 
 
-1.09 .56 1.65 
 
-1.57 .61 2.18 
 
3.83 
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Notes: E is evaluation and P is potency. Evaluation and potency profiles were taken from the Georgia 2015 combined 
dictionary, client (1.39, 1.27, 0.92) is object (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016). Calculation of criminality scores: 
Criminality scores = (-1 x transient evaluation) + transient potency (Kroska et al. 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018). 
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Table 2.2 Fundamental Sentiments, Transient Impressions, and Criminality Scores for Crime Words used in Vignettes 
Crime Word 
Fundamental 
Sentiments 
 Transient Impressions   
 
CEO Doctor Accountant Nurse Receptionist 
 Total 
Criminality 
Scores 
Overcharge 
 Evaluation -2.66  -1.84 -1.77 -1.83 -1.77 1.82   
 Potency .89  1.56 1.46 1.24 1.29 .99   
 Criminality Scores:  3.40 3.23 3.07 3.06 2.81  15.57 
    CEO Doctor Accountant Nurse Receptionist   
Steal From 
 Evaluation -3.50  -2.40 -2.38 -2.40 -2.38 -2.40   
 Potency .78  1.61 1.49 1.29 1.32 1.03   
 Criminality Scores:  4.01 3.87 3.69 3.70 3.43  18.70 
Notes: Evaluation and Potency profiles were taken from the Georgia 2015 combined dictionary, client (1.39, 1.27, 0.92) is 
object (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016). Calculation of criminality scores: Criminality scores = (-1 x transient 
evaluation) + transient potency (Kroska et al. 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018). 
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Table 2.3  Fundamental Sentiments, Transient Impressions, and Criminality Scores for Male and Female 
Offenders from Vignettes 
 Fundamental 
Sentiments 
Transient Impressions   
Occupational 
Identities 
 After overcharging  After stealing from   
E P 
 
E P 
Criminality 
Scores 
 
E P 
Criminality 
Scores 
 Total 
Criminality 
Scores 
Male             
  CEO 1.00 2.36  -1.16 1.97 3.13  -1.64 2.04 3.68   
  Doctor 2.19 2.25  -.84 1.86 2.70  -1.38 1.93 3.31   
  Nurse 2.28 1.68  -.82 1.59 2.41  -1.36 1.65 3.01   
  Accountant 1.11 1.28  -1.14 1.35 2.49  -1.61 1.41 3.02   
  Receptionist 1.21 .43  -1.11 .92 2.03  -1.59 .98 2.57   
Total:      12.76    15.59  28.35 
Female             
  CEO 1.16 2.20  -1.12 1.89 3.01  -1.60 1.96 3.56   
  Doctor 2.40 2.09  -.78 1.78 2.56  -1.33 1.85 3.18   
  Nurse 2.50 1.52  -.76 1.51 2.27  -1.31 1.57 2.88   
  Accountant 1.28 1.33  -1.09 1.27 2.36  -1.58 1.33 2.91   
  Receptionist 1.38 .27  -1.06 .84 1.90  -1.55 .90 2.45   
Total:      12.10    14.98  27.08 
 36 
Notes: E is evaluation and P is potency. Evaluation and potency profiles were taken from the Georgia 2015 
combined dictionary, client (1.39, 1.27, 0.92) is object (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016). Calculation of 
criminality scores: Criminality scores = (-1 x transient evaluation) + transient potency (Kroska et al. 2017b; 
Kroska and Schmidt 2018). 
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Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Analyses (N = 1,399) 
    Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
  Prison 4.36 4.15 0 25 
  Monetary fine 29.59 25.37 0 100 
Independent Variables 
 Conditions 
  High status (CEO and Doctor) .34  0 1 
  Middle status (Accountant and Nurse) .34  0 1 
  Low status (Receptionists) (omitted) .33  0 1 
  Overcharge .51  0 1 
  Steal from (omitted) .49  0 1 
  Female offender .51  0 1 
  Male offender (omitted) .49  0 1 
  Health care vignette .50  0 1 
  Financial services vignette (omitted) .50  0 1 
 Appropriate Legal Punishment 
  Community service .33  0 1 
  Monetary fine .64  0 1 
  Probation .36  0 1 
  Imprisonment  .47  0 1 
 Participant Attributes 
  College students .67  0 1 
   Community college students .02  0 1 
   University students .65  0 1 
  Mturk (omitted) .33  0 1 
  Female .58  0 1 
  Gender non-conforming .004  0 1 
  Male (omitted) .42  0 1 
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Table 2.5 OLS Regressions of Recommended Prison Sentence on Conditions and Controls 
(N = 1,399) 
  Recommended Prison Sentence 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Conditions    
 Medium status (0 = high status) -.571* 
(.269) 
-.583* 
(.250) 
.357 
 (.358) 
 Medium status x female 
offender 
  
-.443 
(.502) 
 Low status (0 = high status) -.543* 
(.270) 
-.659** 
(.251) 
-.148 
(.357) 
 Low status x female offender 
  
-1.011* 
(.503) 
 Overcharge (0 = steal from) -.716** 
(.220) 
-.418* 
(.206) 
-.425* 
(.206) 
 Female offender (0 = male) -.812*** 
(.220) 
-.733*** 
(.205) 
-.250 
(.354) 
 Health care vignette (0 = 
medical vignette) 
.137 
(.220) 
.122 
(.204) 
.121 
(.204) 
Appropriate Legal Punishment    
 
Community service  
-.073 
(.247) 
-.102 
(.247) 
 
Monetary fine  
-.953*** 
(.248) 
-.968*** 
(.248) 
 
Probation  
-.197 
(.239) 
-.187 
(.239) 
 
Imprisonment   
2.468*** 
(.240) 
2.442*** 
(.240) 
Participant Attributes    
 
Student (0 = Mturk)  
-.034 
(.222) 
-.041 
(.222) 
 
Female (0 = male)  
-.462* 
(.211) 
-.487* 
(.211) 
 Gender non-conforming (0 = 
male) 
 
.252 
(1.726) 
.273 
(1.732) 
Intercept 5.436 
(.271) 
5.120 
(.392) 
4.925 
(.411) 
R2 
.021 .164 .166 
Adjusted R2 
.018 .156 .158 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 
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Table 2.6 OLS Regressions of Recommended Monetary Fine on Conditions and Controls 
(N = 1,399) 
  Recommended Monetary Fine 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Conditions    
 Medium status (0 = high status) -9.267*** 
(1.633) 
-9.013*** 
(1.605) 
-11.538*** 
(2.300) 
 Medium status x female 
offender 
  
4.940 
(3.222) 
 Low status (0 = high status) -8.437*** 
(1.640) 
-8.631*** 
(1.607) 
-9.717*** 
(2.291) 
 Low status x female offender 
  
2.117 
(3.229) 
 Overcharge (0 = steal from) -.212 
(1.338) 
.796 
(1.323) 
.838 
(1.323) 
 Female Offender (0 = male) -2.865* 
(1.337) 
-2.688* 
(1.312) 
-5.033* 
(2.273) 
 Health care vignette (0 = 
medical vignette) 
-1.788 
(1.338) 
-1.789 
(1.311) 
-1.775 
(1.311) 
Appropriate Legal Punishment    
 
Community service  
-2.044 
(1.582) 
-1.841 
(1.588) 
 
Monetary fine  
-.116 
(1.588) 
-.136 
(1.589) 
 
Probation  
.665 
(1.534) 
.587 
(1.534) 
 
Imprisonment   
9.861*** 
(1.541) 
9.922*** 
(1.543) 
Participant Attributes    
 
Student (0 = Mturk)  
-2.281 
(1.422) 
-2.295 
(1.423) 
 
Female (0 = male)  
.499 
(1.351) 
.596 
(1.354) 
 Gender non-conforming (0 = 
male) 
 
-3.720 
(11.075) 
-2.398 
(11.115) 
Intercept 37.925 
(1.647) 
34.403 
(2.516) 
35.476 
(2.640) 
R2 
.032 .078 .079 
Adjusted R2 
.028 .070 .070 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 
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Chapter 3: Why Does Occupational Clout Affect Sentencing Outcomes?: Exploring the 
Perceptual Mediators 
 
A white-collar offender’s occupation, and associated clout, provides an offender with 
opportunities to perpetrate crimes through legitimized opportunity structures (Benson and 
Simpson 2009; Piquero and Benson 2004; Prechel and Morris 2010). Despite the important role 
occupation can play in the commission of a white-collar offense, it is unclear how occupation 
affects sentencing as the effect of occupational status on sentencing outcomes is mixed 
(Holtfreter 2013; Payne, Dabney, and Ekhomu 2011; Maddan et al. 2012; Tillman and Pontell 
1992). Moreover, perceptions of offender dangerousness, threat, and culpability are clearly 
linked to certain offender attributes, like race (Albonetti 1991; Bridges and Crutchfield 1998; 
Bridges and Steen 1998; Farrell and Swigert 1986; Freiburger, Marcum, and Pierce 2010; 
Kramer and Steffensmeier 1993; Meithe and Moore 1986; Steen, Engen, and Gainey 2005; 
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998; Zatz 1984, 1985), and these linked attributes are shown 
to differentially affect sentencing outcomes for similar crimes (Albonetti 1997; Bontrager, Bales, 
and Chiricos 2005; Brennan 2006; Bridges and Steen 1998; Demuth and Steffensmeier 2004; 
Johnson 2003; Spohn and Holleran 2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Warren, Chiricos, 
and Bales 2012). Yet, this research does not suggest how occupation should affect sentencing, 
because occupation is not clearly linked to criminal perceptions. 
However, recent work using affect control theory (ACT), a mathematical theory of 
impression formation and impression management (Heise 1979, 2007; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-
Lovin and Heise 1988), establishes that theoretically simulated post-event impressions of 
goodness or badness (in ACT evaluation) and powerfulness or powerlessness (in ACT potency) 
for an occupational offender and the offender’s crime predict the recommended prison sentence 
that participants assign to offenders (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). This research combines the 
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ACT dimensions of evaluation and potency to create “criminal scores,” or criminal sentiments. 
These criminal sentiments are post-crime affective meanings attributed to different elements of a 
criminal event. This research finds that greater criminal sentiments for higher occupational status 
offenders correspond to greater recommended punishment for these offenders. However, this 
research does not make clear if both components of criminal sentiments – post-event impressions 
of evaluation and potency – are equally and independently predictive of punishment. For 
instance, it is possible that one component of criminal sentiments drives the relationship between 
an offender’s occupational status and recommended punishment. Additionally, this research uses 
theoretically simulated post-event impressions, an ordinal ranking of occupations, and a 
convenience sample of female college students.  
I extend and improve upon this research by: 1) examining how the different dimensions 
of criminal sentiments (post-event impressions of evaluation and potency) mediate the 
relationship between an offender’s occupational status and sentencing outcomes; 2) using post-
event impressions from research participants rather than theoretical simulations, as I explain 
more fully below; 3) using deference scores (Freeland and Hoey 2018), a more precise 
measurement of occupational status, or occupational prestige, rather than ordinal rankings of 
occupations, to operationalize occupational status; 4) additionally operationalizing evaluation 
and potency using concepts from other group processes theories that are proposed as 
conceptually similar; and 5) using a larger and more diverse research sample. I examine these 
relationships with an online vignette experiment administered to college students and Amazon 
Mechanical Turk users in which offenders of varying occupational statuses commit a crime via 
opportunities provided by their occupation. 
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Linking Occupational Status to Criminal Perceptions and Sentencing  
 
As mentioned above, this research is an extension and improvement of recent research 
(Kroska and Schmidt 2018). Therefore, I first briefly review the literature gaps and weaknesses 
outlined in that research and how researchers address those gaps. There are at least three major 
limitations of past research linking occupational status to criminal perceptions and sentencing: 
(1) previous work does not show a clear empirical pattern for the effect of occupational status on 
sentencing outcomes, (2) methodological issues in prior research prevent this work from 
establishing non-spuriousness between an offender’s occupational status and sentencing 
outcomes, and (3) current sentencing theories are unable to explain how occupation should affect 
sentencing outcomes. 
Occupational Status, Sentencing, and Establishing Non-spuriousness. The first two 
limitations of past research are likely related. It is unclear from the limited current empirical 
research how an offender’s occupational status affects sentencing outcomes. Some research 
shows that high occupational status increases punishment (e.g., Payne et al. 2011), and other 
research shows that high occupational status decreases punishment (e.g., Maddan et al. 2012), 
while still other research shows that occupational status has no effect on punishment (e.g., 
Holtfreter 2013). The lack of clarity for how an offender’s status affects punishment is likely due 
to differences across studies in how researchers define and model offender status and the data 
available to researchers.  
Much research uses archival court data and is unable to control for an offender’s 
occupation. Instead, this research uses other measures that are related to an offender’s 
occupation. This research groups offenders by SES or relative class position, education, type of 
white-collar crime, or other related measures, but even this research shows mixed results. For 
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instance, research shows that SES or class position both increases (Hagan and Parker 1985; 
Weisburd, Waring, and Wheeler 1990; Weisburd et al. 1991; Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode 
1982) and decreases punishment (Eitle 2000), while still other research shows that SES is 
unrelated to punishment (Benson and Walker 1988; Gottschalk and Rundmo 2014). 
Recent research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) addresses methodological weaknesses in 
prior research by using experimental methods to examine how occupational status affects 
sentencing. Using a vignette experiment, this research is able to isolate the effect of an offender’s 
occupational status, while controlling for other offender attributes and crime factors, and, in 
doing so, establish non-spuriousness between an offender’s occupational status and sentencing 
outcomes. This methodological improvement addresses weaknesses in previous studies that use 
archival court data and are unable to statistically control for differences between high and low 
status offenders and their crimes. However, this research operationalizes occupational status by 
grouping together white-collar offenders and blue- and pink-collar offenders and comparing 
these groupings. I improve on this study by using a more precise measurement of occupational 
status that I explain more fully in sections below. 
Criminal Perceptions and Sentencing. Theories that explain how offender attributes 
affect sentencing outcomes, the focal concerns perspective (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 
1998) and the uncertainty avoidance perspective (Albonetti 1991), do not clearly explain how an 
offender’s occupation is likely to affect sentencing. These theories suggest that perceptions of 
criminality are informed by evaluations of an offender’s dangerousness (Steffensmeier and 
Demuth 2006), and that when judicial decision-makers sentence offenders, they are primarily 
concerned with an offender’s blameworthiness, the possible threat the offender poses to the 
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community, the practical implications of their decisions (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 
1998), and how likely a sentence is to deter future criminality (Albonetti 1991). 
However, since judicial decision-makers have incomplete information and limited 
resources, they rely on past sentencing decisions and stereotyped traits of criminality when 
making sentencing decisions. Empirical research supports this link between stereotyped traits of 
offender criminality and sentencing (Albonetti 1997; Bontrager, Bales, and Chiricos 2005; 
Brennan 2006; Bridges and Steen 1998; Demuth and Steffensmeier 2004; Johnson 2003; Spohn 
and Holleran 2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Warren, Chiricos, and Bales 2012). 
However, since occupation is not clearly linked to criminal perceptions, sentencing theories do 
not suggest how occupation should affect sentencing. 
Recent work (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) addresses the lack of predictions from current 
sentencing theories regarding the effect of occupation on sentencing by using ACT, a theory that 
explains social interactions and impression formation processes. As I explain more fully below, 
ACT is based on a series of empirically derived impression formation equations that explain 
impression formation processes (Heise 1979, 2007; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 
1988). These impression formation equations and the affective meanings on which social 
concepts (i.e., actors, behaviors, and objects) vary are contained in ACT’s computer program, 
Interact (Heise 1995). Using Interact, Kroska and Schmidt (2018) simulate events in which 
offenders from different occupational statuses commit a crime. From these simulations, they use 
post-event impressions of evaluation (goodness versus badness) and potency (powerfulness 
versus powerlessness) for an offender and the offender’s crime to create criminality scores for 
how criminal an offender and the event seem (criminal sentiments). They reverse the direction of 
post-event impressions of evaluation and add them to post-event impressions of potency to create 
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criminality scores, so that post-event negative impressions of evaluation and post-event positive 
impressions of potency correspond to greater impressions of criminality. Using these 
theoretically derived predictions, this research tests the effect of occupational status on 
sentencing and finds, as predicted, that higher occupational status offenders are punished more 
harshly than lower occupational status offenders (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). 
However, it is unclear from this research if these dimensions are dually and equally 
related to criminal impressions for occupational offenders or if one dimension drives the 
relationship. In order to understand how post-event impressions of evaluation and potency are 
independently related to punishment, I keep the dimensions of post-event evaluation and potency 
separate, and I examine how post-event impressions mediate the effect of occupational status on 
punishment. I explain more fully how I do this below and how I improve upon this research, but 
first I more fully explain ACT, because it underlies the existing work in this area, the current 
study, and my hypotheses. 
Affect Control Theory 
 
ACT (Heise 1979, 2007; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) is a theory of 
impression formation and impression management. ACT is based on a series of empirically 
derived impression formation equations that are used to quantify and express changes in 
affective meanings that are tied to all social concepts (i.e., actors, behaviors, and objects). The 
affective meanings of social concepts influence how social interactions develop and how actors 
and observers understand and make sense of these interactions. Affective meanings in ACT are 
operationalized using three culturally universal dimensions of meaning identified by Osgood, 
May, and Miron (1975): evaluation (how good or bad a concept is), potency (how much power a 
concept has), and activity (how lively a concept is) (EPA). EPA profiles have been collected by 
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ACT researchers across several cultures using semantic differential scales that range from -4.3 to 
4.3. These profiles are compiled in dictionaries.  
The meanings normally associated with social concepts are termed fundamental 
sentiments, while transient impressions are the in-context meanings that actors or observers 
attribute to social concepts after an event (Heise 1979, 2007). The central premise of ACT is 
that, after an event, actors and observers attempt to make sense of event elements by cognitively 
reconstructing transient impressions so that they align with fundamental sentiments, or they 
behaviorally act in ways to maintain fundamental sentiments, such that actors and observers are 
able to maintain the usual meanings they associate with event elements (Heise 1979, 2007). 
Researchers can simulate social interactions and develop testable hypotheses using 
ACT’s computer program, Interact, into which its impression formation equations are 
programmed (Heise 1995). Using Interact, researches can observe how the affective meanings of 
elements of social interactions change and how actors attempt to maintain fundamental 
meanings. For example, individuals fundamentally see a mother as someone who is extremely 
good (3.10), extremely powerful (2.71), and slightly active (0.82) (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 
2016)2. When a mother (3.10, 2.71, 0.82) does something expected, like comforts (3.45, 2.61, -
1.46) a child (1.97, -1.17, 1.99), transient impressions of the mother (4.82, 1.93, 0.37) are similar 
to fundamental sentiments (3.10, 2.71, 0.82), because the mother’s actions are in line with how 
we would expect her to act towards a child; thus, impressions of the mother change little. 
                                                 
2 EPA profiles used are taken from the 2015 Georgia combined dictionary (Robinson and Smith-
Lovin 2016) unless noted otherwise. EPA profile ratings are quantified as follows: -4.3 is 
infinitely bad/powerless/inactive; -3.0 is extremely bad/powerless/inactive; -2.0 is quite 
bad/powerless/inactive; -1.00 is slightly bad/powerless/inactive; 0 is neutral, neither bad nor 
good/powerless nor powerful/inactive or active; +1.00 is slightly good/powerful/active; +2 is 
quite good/powerful/active; +3.0 is extremely good/powerful/active; and, +4.3 is infinitely 
good/powerful/active (Heise 2007).     
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However, when a mother (3.10, 2.71, 0.82) does something unexpected, like cheats (-3.33, 0.12, 
0.01) a child (1.97, -1.17, 1.99), transient impressions show that the mother decreases 
significantly in evaluation (-2.66 compared to 3.10), that she is also viewed as less potent (1.98 
compared to 2.71), and that she is viewed as slightly less active (1.13 compared to 0.82). The 
decrease in evaluation for a mother who cheats a child illustrates an expected impression 
formation effect, because an extremely good (3.10) and extremely powerful (2.71) actor is doing 
an extremely bad (-3.33) action to a quite good (1.97) and slightly powerless object (-1.17) – this 
is not a good or potent enough action for a mother interacting with her child to maintain 
fundamental sentiments. Results in Interact, in fact, suggest that after a mother cheats a child an 
observer may try to make sense of the event by labeling the mother with the criminal identity of 
a robber (2.38, 0.40, 0.18) or the child as a brute (-1.35, 1.56, 1.28). Simulation results also 
suggest a reparative action for the mother that is extremely good, quite powerful, and slightly 
inactive, such as cuddling or consoling the child. Relabeling the identities of the mother and the 
child by observers and the reparative actions suggested after an event for interactants are an 
attempt to maintain fundamental sentiments after an event.  
Changes in the affective meanings attributed to actors’ identities and the suggested 
behaviors in these results from Interact illustrate ACT’s main proposition: that individuals 
construct and reconstruct elements of events so that they align with fundamental sentiments. I 
draw on ACT predictions like those above for how high-status occupational offenders who 
commit a crime against a client are viewed. ACT suggests that highly powerful occupational 
offenders who direct a highly negative action onto a slightly good and slightly powerful object 
are viewed as bad actors; thus, I expect them to be assigned harsher punishment.     
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The Current Study 
 The current study draws on recent work outlined above (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) but 
improves and extends this research in a number of significant and important ways. As mentioned 
above, I use a larger and more diverse research sample, I use post-event impressions from actual 
research participants (rather than theoretically simulated impressions), I use deference scores to 
operationalize occupational status (rather than ordinal rankings), I keep criminal sentiment 
dimensions (post-event evaluation and potency) separate, and I also operationalize post-event 
evaluation and potency using additional measures from other group processes work that have 
been proposed as conceptually similar.   
Kroska and Schmidt (2018) utilize a convenience sample of all female college students. I 
use a sample of participants from a southern community college, a large southern university, and 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) users, and I include both males and females in my sample. 
My sample size is larger than Kroska and Schmidt’s (2018) (1,170 compared to 557); however, 
demographically, other than a higher average age by approximately five years (mean age = 30), 
my sample is similar to Kroska and Schmidt’s (2018). Mturk is an online service provided by 
Amazon that recruits users to fill out surveys for pay. By including Mturk participants, this 
research goes beyond Kroska and Schmidt (2018) and other mock juror studies, which utilize 
convenience samples of college students. Moreover, recent research shows that crowdsourced 
samples (e.g., Mturk) provide for high-quality data and should increase the generalizability of 
findings (Coppock 2018; Shank 2016; Weinberg, Freese and McElhattan 2014). 
Rather than using theoretical predictions from simulations in Interact, I use post-event 
impressions from participants in my study. Interact uses ACT’s impression formation equations 
and the affective fundamental meanings of social concepts contained in dictionaries that have 
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been rated by research participants to generate predictions. Predictions from Interact have shown 
to be reliable; however, they are theoretical predictions based on ratings from other research 
participants. I use actual post-event impressions collected from research participants after 
exposure to vignettes. The vignettes I use provide greater context for the actors and the actors’ 
crimes and collecting transient impressions from research participants who are asked about the 
particular actor described to them in the vignette should provide for a more accurate estimation 
of post-event impressions of the actors from vignettes. 
 Kroska and Schmidt (2018) use ordinal rankings of occupational status (white-collar vs. 
blue- and pink-collar), and I improve on this research by using deference scores (Freeland and 
Hoey 2018). Recent research uses ACT to create occupational status, or prestige, rankings that 
reflect the multidimensional nature of occupational status, termed deference scores (Freeland and 
Hoey 2018). Freeland and Hoey (2018) derive their conception of status from Weber’s (1946, 
1978) definition of status and take into account the cultural esteem afforded an occupation, the 
power associated with a position, and the class structure in which the occupation is situated when 
creating deference scores. They situate occupational statuses within networks of deference 
relationships using ACT impression formation equations to calculate the likelihood that one 
occupational status will defer to another. These measures of deference are compared to measures 
of occupational prestige from other research (e.g., rankings from the General Social Survey) and 
are shown to be more predictive of participant rankings for occupations from poll data than other 
occupational prestige rankings. I use deference scores that they calculated to operationalize 
occupational status for offenders in my vignettes. For a full explanation of how deference scores 
are calculated see Freeland and Hoey (2018).  
 50 
Drawing on ACT predictions and research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018), showing that high 
status occupational offenders are viewed as more criminal and assigned harsher punishment than 
low status occupational offenders, I expect that high deference scores will increase the 
recommended prison sentence that participants assign to offenders. 
Deference score hypothesis: High deference scores will increase the 
recommended prison sentence that participants assign to offenders. 
 
[Table 3.1 here] 
 
ACT predicts that high status occupational offenders who perpetrate a crime are viewed 
as bad actors, because they are highly potent actors (e.g., fundamental potency for CEO is 3.29 
and doctor is 2.94) directing a highly negative action (fundamental evaluation: overcharging -
2.66, stealing -3.50) onto a slightly good and slightly powerful object (object is client, client 
fundamental EPA: 1.39, 1.27, 0.92). Like recent work (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) suggests, I 
expect that occupational status affects sentencing through criminal perceptions. Thus, I expect 
that highly negative post-event impressions of evaluation and highly positive post-event 
impressions of potency will increase the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to 
offenders, and that these high criminal perceptions will mediate the positive effect of an 
offender’s occupational status on participant recommended prison sentencing.  
Group processes research suggests that evaluation is roughly conceptually similar to the 
theoretical concept of status and that potency is similar to the concept of power (Heise 1999:9; 
Kemper and Collins 1990:40; MacKinnon and Langford 1994:221; Rodgers 2015:71). Empirical 
work shows a relationship between affective impressions and performance expectations based on 
status (Dippong and Kalkhoff 2015) and a positive relationship between evaluation and status 
and power and potency (Rogalin, Soboroff and Lovaglia 2007). Based on the proposed 
similarities of these theoretical concepts, I expect that, like post-event impressions of evaluation 
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and potency, high post-event impressions of status and power will mediate the positive effect of 
occupational status on recommended prison sentencing. Thus, I offer the following mediation 
hypotheses: 
Evaluation and status mediation hypotheses 1-2: Post-event impressions of (1) 
actor evaluation and (2) actor status will mediate the positive effect of deference 
scores on recommended prison sentencing. 
 
Potency and power mediation hypotheses 1-2: Post-event impressions of (1) actor 
potency and (2) actor power will mediate the positive effect of deference scores 
on recommended prison sentencing. 
 
Methods 
Sample 
 
I collected data from three samples during the fall of 2017: (1) a sample of college 
students at a large southern university, (2) a sample of college students at a southern community 
college, and (3) a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) users. University student 
participation was incentivized by offering participants the opportunity to be included in a lottery 
drawing for one of nine twenty-five-dollar Amazon gift cards. Community college student 
participation was incentivized by offering class credit or extra credit to subjects for their 
participation. Mturk users were paid one dollar each for their participation. 
Experimental Design 
 
This research uses a vignette experiment with two 3 x 2 x 2 designs that vary the 
occupation (accountant, CEO, doctor, nurse, and receptionist) and gender (male or female) of the 
actor in the vignette and the word used to describe the actor’s crime (overcharge or steal from) 
across two different institutions (health care and financial services). I focus on the effect of an 
offender’s occupational status, via deference scores, on punitive outcomes in this research. I do 
not offer hypotheses regarding manipulations for the word used to describe the offender’s crime 
or the offender’s gender, but they varied across vignettes, so I control for them in the analyses. 
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Additionally, questions used to measure mediation variables ask about the specific character in 
the vignette, so participants’ assessments of these characters likely include considerations related 
to the offender’s gender and the specific crime of the offender from the vignette. 
The health care vignette describes a male or female doctor, nurse, or receptionist who 
works at a senior retirement community, while the financial services vignette describes a male or 
female CEO, accountant, or receptionist who works at a financial planning and investments firm. 
The occupations were chosen because they are common occupations with which participants 
should be familiar. The vignettes explicitly tell the participants the age (35) and race (white) of 
the offender, and the names of the characters used in the vignette, Todd or Emily, are two of the 
most common names given to white boys and girls born between 1974 and 1979 (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004), close to the time the vignette character would have been born. The full 
vignettes are as follows: 
Financial services vignette: Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white 
female/male receptionist/accountant/CEO who has worked at a small private financial 
planning and investments firm for the last twelve years. The firm works with clients to 
develop financial plans for their future, including estate planning, retirement planning, 
insurance dealings, and portfolio investing. Emily/Todd is well liked by clients of the 
firm, and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even 
being given access to all of the organization’s billing systems. Emily/Todd is also seen 
by many clients and those in her/his company as someone who is meticulous and careful 
in her/his work, so she/he knows that her/his work will only be checked if a major issue 
arises and that neither the firm nor her/his clients are likely to question her/his work, 
because clients usually have many investments, and the firm processes too many 
transactions to check on prices of all investments and services sold. For the last eight 
years Emily/Todd has been able to steal from/overcharge clients by providing inflated 
costs on investments and by adding extra fees for services to clients’ accounts. 
Emily/Todd has been able to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. 
As a consequence, clients suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200 
dollars. The firm does not suffer as a direct result of Emily’s/Todd’s actions as increases 
in fees cover the losses.   
 
Health care vignette: Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white 
female/male receptionist/nurse/doctor who has worked at a small private senior 
retirement community for the last twelve years. The retirement community offers both 
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independent and assisted living accommodations for residents and also makes available 
medical services to residents. Emily/Todd is well liked by residents in the community, 
and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even being 
given access to all of the organization’s billing systems. Emily/Todd is also seen by 
many in the retirement community as an advocate for residents, and many residents have 
entrusted her/him with access to their private health care and financial information. 
Emily/Todd knows that her/his work will only be checked if a major issue arises and 
that neither residents nor insurers are likely to question her/his work, because residents 
receive a lot of medical paperwork, and insurers process too many claims to check if all 
the claims are legitimate. For the last eight years Emily/Todd has been able to steal 
from/overcharge residents and insurers by adding extra fees and services to residents’ 
bills and by charging these false claims to insurers. Emily/Todd has been able to 
personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, residents 
suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200. Insurance companies lose 
money from false claims, but yearly premium increases cover those losses. 
 
Condition Variables 
Overcharge is a dummy variable for the crime word that participants were exposed to, 
with steal from being the omitted category. Female offender is a dummy variable for the gender 
of the offender in vignettes, with male offender as the omitted category. Medical vignette is a 
dummy variable that controls for differences between the two sets of vignettes, the medical 
vignette and the financial services vignette. 
Dependent Variable 
Prison sentence is the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to the 
offender in the vignette. Participants were asked what sentence they would recommend if 
Emily/Todd were to be punished with a prison sentence and only a prison sentence. Responses 
were arranged on a slider scale with “No prison” on the left and “25” on the right as anchor 
points. The title above the slider scale was “Prison Sentence in Years,” and there were tick marks 
above the scale at five-year intervals, but participants were also able to drag the slider to select 
an exact amount of years, which was displayed to the right of the scale. Tests of normality for 
prison sentencing show it is slightly skewed (1.98) and the distribution does have a high kurtosis 
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score (8.15); however, graphing residual results from ordinary least squares regression shows 
that prison sentencing is normally distributed. 
[Table 3.2 here] 
Focal Independent Variable 
Deference scores are occupational status rankings calculated by previous researchers 
(Freeland and Hoey 2018). I create a variable that matches the deference score for the occupation 
of the offender in the vignette (accountants, CEOs, doctors, nurses, and receptionists) that 
participants were exposed to with participants’ responses (see Table 3.1 for deference scores). 
So, for instance, if a participant was exposed to a doctor in the vignette, that participant would 
have the deference score of 9.83 assigned to him or her.  
Mediators 
 
Post-event evaluation and potency. After exposure to the vignette, participants were 
asked to rate Todd or Emily from the pre-sentencing report using semantic differential scales 
with nine radio button indicators. Post-event evaluation was anchored with “Bad, Good” and 
“Awful, Nice,” post-event potency was anchored with “Powerless, Powerful” and “Little, Big.” 
The radio button indicator in the middle of the scale was labeled as “neutral,” (coded as 0) and 
radio buttons on each side of the scale were labeled “slightly” (coded as -1/+1), “quite” (coded as 
-2/+2), “extremely” (coded as -3/+3) and “infinitely” (coded as -4.3/+4.3). I reverse the direction 
of post-event evaluation, so that high post-event evaluation scores indicate that an offender is 
viewed negatively.  
Post-event status. Post-event status was measured using five items: (1) “In your opinion, 
how valuable to society is Todd/Emily?,” which was anchored with “Of no value whatsoever” on 
the left and “Extremely valuable” on the right; (2) “What do you think is the social rank of 
Todd/Emily compared to other people in other occupations?,” which was anchored with 
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“Extremely low rank” on the left and “Extremely high rank” on the right; (3) “In your opinion, 
how much status does Todd/Emily generally possess?,” which was anchored with “Extremely 
low status” on the left and “Extremely high status” on the right; (4) “In your opinion, how 
competent is Todd/Emily?,” which was anchored with “Extremely incompetent” on the left and 
“Extremely competent” on the right; and (5) “In your opinion, how intelligent is Todd/Emily?,” 
which was anchored with “Extremely unintelligent” on the left and “Extremely intelligent” on 
the right (alpha = .74). 
Post-event power. Post-event power was measured using four items: (1) “In your opinion, 
how much direct control over the lives of others does Todd/Emily have?,” which was anchored 
with “No control at all” on the left and “Total control” on the right; (2) “How much power do 
you think Emily/Todd has to keep people from getting what they want or need?,” which was 
anchored with “No power at all” on the left and “A great amount of power” on the right; (3) 
“How likely do you think it is for Emily/Todd to be able to carry out his or her own will by 
overcoming the resistance of others?,” which was anchored with “Extremely unlikely” on the left 
and “Extremely likely” on the right; and (4) “How much authority do you think Todd/Emily has 
to enforce decisions against powerful individuals and organizations?,” which was anchored with 
“No authority whatsoever” on the left and “A great amount of authority” on the right (alpha = 
.70). 
Post-event status and post-event power are summed averages of the multiple measures of 
each respective concept described above. The items that comprise the composites were all 
measured using 101-point semantic differential slider scales and were divided by 10 to create 
scales ranging from 0-10. I also examined how each item for both respective composites loaded 
onto each construct using factor analysis, and all items loaded onto single factors. There were no 
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substantial differences between the factored and summed versions of the variables, and I use the 
composites created by taking the summed average of items. 
Control Variables for Participant Attributes 
Female and gender non-conforming control for the gender of participants, with male 
omitted. Student is a dummy variable that is used to control for differences between Mturk users 
and student participants. The two student samples were combined, because significant 
differences were not found between the university and community college samples. 
RESULTS 
 
Main Effects Model: Deference Scores 
 
 Consistent with the deference score recommended prison sentence hypothesis, results in 
Model 1 in Table 3.4 show that high deference scores increase the recommended prison sentence 
that participants assign to offenders (b = .173, se = .082, p = .040). This result aligns with 
findings from recent research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) and provides further evidence that 
offender’s occupational status increases recommended punitiveness. Below, I discuss the results 
of the mediation analyses. 
[Table 3.3 here] 
 
Mediation Analyses for Proposed Mediators 
 
Participants’ post-event impressions of evaluation, status, potency, and power of the 
vignette character were predicted to mediate the relationship between deference scores and 
participant recommended prison sentencing. For mediation to occur, four conditions must be 
met: (1) the independent variable must be significantly related to the mediator variable, (2) the 
independent variable must be significantly related to the dependent variable, (3) the mediating 
variable must be significantly related to the dependent variable when the independent variable is 
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controlled, and (4) the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable must 
decrease after the mediator is controlled (Baron and Kenny 1986; Holmbeck 2003).  
[Table 3.4 here] 
 
The effect of offender deference scores, the focal independent variable, on each of the 
proposed mediating variables, post-event impressions of offender evaluation, status, potency, and 
power, can be seen in Table 3.3. The first model in Table 3.3 for each of the respective mediating 
variables (Models 1, 3, 5, and 7) shows the effect of deference scores, conditions, and participant 
attributes on the proposed mediators, and the second model (Models 2, 4, 6, and 8) shows these 
same effects while also controlling each of the other mediating variables. As seen in models 1 
and 2, the first condition for establishing mediation is not met for post-event impressions of 
evaluation, because the effect of deference scores on post-event impressions of evaluation does 
not reach conventional standards of significance; thus, I do not include post-event impressions of 
evaluation in any of the models in Table 3.4. Results in Table 3.3 verify that the first condition 
necessary for establishing mediation is met for post-event impressions of status and power, as 
deference scores are significantly related to all of the proposed mediators. Potency only meets 
the first condition necessary for establishing mediation when the other mediators are not 
controlled.  
As noted above, the effect of deference scores on participant recommended prison 
sentencing can be seen in Model 1 in Table 3.4, showing that the second condition necessary for 
establishing mediation is met. The effect of the mediating variables, post-event impressions of 
status, potency, and power, on participant recommended prison sentencing, the dependent 
variable, when the focal independent variable, deference scores, is controlled can be seen in 
Models 2-4 in Table 3.4. These results confirm that the third condition necessary for establishing 
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mediation is met for post-event impressions of potency and power. Results show that post-event 
impressions of potency and power are significantly related to the recommended prison sentence 
that participants assign to offenders when deference scores are controlled (see models 3 and 4); 
however, the third condition is only met for post-event impressions of potency when the other 
mediator variables are not controlled.  
Finally, any decrease in the effect of deference scores on participant recommended prison 
sentencing, after the mediators are controlled, can be observed by comparing differences in 
significance levels and deference score coefficients in Model 1 to Models 2-4 in Table 3.4. 
Again, results show that only post-event impressions of the offender’s potency and power meet 
the fourth condition necessary for establishing mediation, as the effect of deference scores on 
recommended prison sentencing decreases once post-event impressions of offender potency 
(decreases from b = .173, p = .040 to b = .129, p = .122) and power (decreases from b = .173, p = 
.040 to b = .028, p = .738) are controlled, but, again, this effect only holds for post-event 
impressions of potency when the other mediating variables are not controlled in the analyses. 
The results of a Sobel test, as seen in Table 3.4, confirm these findings. Sobel test results show 
that participants’ post-event impressions of potency mediate approximately 25 percent of the 
effect of deference scores on recommended prison sentencing when the other mediating variables 
are not controlled (p = .011). Sobel test results for post-event impressions of power also show 
that participants’ post-event impressions of power mediate approximately 84% of the effect of 
deference scores on participant recommended prison sentencing when the other mediators are not 
controlled (p = .000) and approximately 51% of the effect when the other mediators are 
controlled (p = .000). 
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Correlation tests show that evaluation and status (r = .112, p = .000) and power and 
potency (r = .288, p = .000) are not highly correlated but that they are significantly correlated. As 
seen in Table 3.4, results in model 5 and Sobel test results suggest that post-event impressions of 
status exhibit a significant suppression effect for deference scores on prison sentencing when 
post-event impressions of potency and power are controlled. Overall, results suggest that the 
effect of an offender’s occupational status on participants’ punitive attitudes are driven by post-
event impressions of an offender’s power or potency but not post-event impressions of an 
offender’s evaluation or status.    
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Although the effect of occupational status on criminal perceptions and sentencing 
outcomes from previous research is unclear, recent research shows that occupational status 
affects punitiveness through post-event criminal impressions of offenders (Kroska and Schmidt 
2018). This research used simulated post-event impressions of occupational offenders to derive 
predictions, and, as predicted, found that higher status white-collar occupational offenders 
(executives and physicians) were assigned a harsher punishment than lower status blue- and 
pink-collar offenders (handymen and shop clerks) by research participants. However, this 
research does not make clear if both dimensions of criminal impressions, post-event impressions 
of evaluation and potency, are independently related to punishment, to what degree each 
dimension is related to punishment, and if post-event impressions mediate the effect of an 
offender’s occupational status on punishment. Moreover, this research used ordinal rankings of 
occupational status, theoretically simulated post-event impressions, and a narrow convenience 
sample of all female college students.  
 60 
I clarify how dimensions of criminal impressions explain the relationship between an 
offender’s occupational status and punitiveness by keeping separate the dimensions of evaluation 
and potency, and I examine how post-event impressions mediate the effect of an offender’s 
occupational status on punishment. I also improve on this research by using deference scores 
(Freeland and Hoey 2018), a more precise way of ranking occupations, to operationalize 
occupational status. Further, I use post-event impressions of offenders from vignettes collected 
by research participants, and I use a larger research sample that includes both males and females 
and college students and Mturkers. Finally, I also operationalize post-event impressions of an 
offender’s evaluation and potency in two additional ways by including measures for post-event 
impressions of status and power, theoretical concepts from group processes work that have been 
proposed as conceptually similar to evaluation and potency.   
Consistent with my ACT-based predictions, I find that offenders whose occupations are 
associated with high degrees of deference are assigned greater punishment by participants. These 
findings align with the recent research mentioned above (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). I find 
mixed support for post-event impressions of offender evaluation and potency mediating the 
effect of deference scores on punishment. Post-event impressions of an offender’s potency and 
power mediate the effect of deference scores on punishment, but I do not find any support for my 
predictions on evaluation or status mediating the effect of deference scores on punishment. 
However, results do indicate that post-event impressions of offender status exhibit a significant 
suppression effect for deference scores on punishment, but status is only a significant suppressor 
when post-event impressions of potency and power are both or singularly controlled in models.  
Evaluating the effect of the different dimensions of criminal impressions separately 
allowed me to parse out if both dimensions of criminal impressions affect punishment. 
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Additionally, measuring the dimensions of criminal impressions using similar theoretical 
concepts strengthens the finding that post-event impressions of power or potency, rather than 
evaluation or status, is what drives the relationship between an offender’s occupational status and 
punishment. Findings indicate that the relationship between deference scores and recommended 
punishment is explained by post-event impressions of an offender’s power or potency. These 
findings suggest that criminal perceptions for occupational offenders increase punishment 
because of how powerful offenders seem after perpetrating a crime.  
Since greater post-event impressions of higher occupational status offenders as powerful 
increase punishment for these types of offenders, post-event impressions of offender power are 
likely correlated with other measures shown to increase offender criminal perceptions and crime 
concern more generally. Perceptions of an offender as dangerous, likely to commit the same or a 
similar crime in the future, as blameworthy, and as a threat to the community are theorized by 
the focal concerns perspective and the uncertainty avoidance perspective, the two major 
sentencing theories, to increase criminal perceptions and sentencing outcomes (Albonetti 1991; 
Steffensmeier and Demuth 2006; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer1998). High occupational 
status offenders who appear more powerful after committing a crime may also appear as more 
dangerous because they are in occupations that provide them with future opportunities to commit 
the same crime through legitimized opportunity structures. Additionally, certain occupations, 
like doctors, nurses, and accountants, may appear more powerful and dangerous after 
perpetrating an occupational crime because victims are reliant upon these sorts of offenders for 
the offender’s expertise and services. Victims likely have limited familiarity with certain 
practices when soliciting services from professionals who provide specialized services or have 
specialized knowledge and are, therefore, unlikely to challenge or question these sorts of 
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professionals. Further, these impressions may be related to expectations of trust that are 
connected to certain occupations (e.g., physicians, see Thom, Hall, and Pawlson 2004), and 
violating expectations of trust may also increase post-event impressions of power. Thus, post-
event impressions of power for high status offenders may be, in part, shaped by the type of 
service offenders provide, how victims are dependent upon these professionals for their services, 
and the potential damage a powerful offender who utilizes legitimized opportunity structures to 
commit crime can do to unsuspecting victims if left unchecked. Therefore, harsher punishments 
for offenders who are viewed as more powerful after a crime may be, in part, guided by these 
considerations. Future research, as discussed below, should further examine how these 
considerations are related to post-event impressions of offender power and recommended 
punishment. Finally, relatedly, high post-event impressions of power may also increase 
participant perceptions of offender blameworthiness, as offenders who are viewed as more 
powerful after their crime may also be viewed as in more control of their actions and their 
actions’ outcomes. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This research was limited in that it only tested the effect of deference scores on 
punishment from five occupations. Future work in this area should test more occupations and 
should select for a wider range of deference scores, and future work should also explore crimes 
of offenders outside of the medical and financial services fields. This research was also limited in 
that it only explored certain types of crimes and certain types of victims. Further work in this 
area should explore how other types of white-collar crime, like embezzlement, insider trading, or 
identity theft affect post-event impressions of offender power and how perceptions of offender 
power vary by level of crime victimization. For instance, research could explore how crimes with 
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wide scale societal victimization, like environmental white-collar crimes, affect post-event 
impressions of offender power. Future work in this area should also more carefully evaluate how 
post-event impressions of power are related to factors described in sentencing theories as likely 
to increase criminal perceptions and affect sentencing outcomes. Future research should also 
evaluate if greater trust expectations for high status occupational offenders predict greater post-
event impressions of power and how violations of trust expectations are related to punitive 
attitudes. Future work in this area should also examine how post-event impressions of offender 
power affect participant fear of crime more generally and fear of crime victimization. This work 
and future work in the area of criminal perceptions could also be improved by integrating 
measures that account for how responsibility is attributed to offenders. Research from the 
attribution of responsibility literature, for instance, suggests that responsibility is differentially 
attributed to offenders based on both the offender’s role in the offense and the offender’s social 
status (Hamilton 1978, 1986; Hamilton and Sanders 1981). Future work in this area should also 
vary offender characteristics that are shown to affect criminal perceptions and sentencing 
outcomes for street crimes that have not been explored for white-collar crimes, like race, age and 
gender. Finally, future work in this area should also include measures of seriousness and crime 
severity to determine if the effect of occupational status on sentencing decreases as perceptions 
of offense seriousness or crime severity increase.
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Tables for Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Occupations from Vignettes by Deference 
Scores 
Occupational Identity  Deference Score 
Doctor  9.83 
Nurse  8.77 
CEO  7.57 
Accountant  5.36 
Receptionist  5.24 
Note: Deference scores are taken from Freeland and Hoey 
(2018) 
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  Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Analyses (N = 1,170) 
    Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable     
 Recommended prison sentence 4.42 4.24 0 25 
Focal Independent Variable     
 Deference scores 6.95 1.75 5.24 9.38 
Conditions     
 Overcharge .51  0 1 
 Steal from (omitted) .49  0 1 
 Female offender .49  0 1 
 Male offender (omitted) .51  0 1 
 Health care vignette .51  0 1 
 Financial services vignette (omitted) .49  0 1 
Mediating Variables     
 Post-event Evaluation 1.99 1.86 -4.3 4.3 
 Post-event Status 6.73 1.60 0 10 
 Post-event Potency .85 1.54 -4.3 4.3 
 Post-event Power 6.18 1.68 0 10 
Participant Attributes     
 College student .61  0 1 
  University sample .59  0 1 
  Community college sample .02  0 1 
 Mturk (omitted) .39  0 1 
 Female .57  0 1 
 Gender non-conforming .00  0 1 
 Male (omitted) .43  0 1 
 
 66 
 
Table 3.3 OLS Regressions of Post-event Mediators on Deference Scores for Offenders from Vignettes, Conditions, Post-event 
Mediators as Controls, and Participant Attributes (N = 1,170) 
Post-event Mediators as 
Dependent Variables 
 Post-event 
Evaluation 
 
Post-event Status  Post-event Potency 
 
Post-event Power 
Models  1 2  3 4  5 6  7 8 
Focal Independent 
Variable 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 Deference scores  .039 
(.036) 
.068† 
(.038) 
 .378*** 
(.029) 
.271*** 
(.028) 
 
.194*** 
(.030) 
.021 
(.029) 
 .302*** 
(.031) 
.179*** 
(.031) 
Conditions             
 Overcharge (0 = steal 
from) 
 .064 
(.108) 
.113 
(.105) 
 .188* 
(.086) 
.109 
(.079) 
 
.207* 
(.088) 
.136† 
(.079) 
 .105 
(.092) 
.013 
(.087) 
 Female offender (0 = 
male) 
 -.300** 
(.107) 
-.304** 
(.104) 
 .002 
(.086) 
.009 
(.079) 
 
-.057 
(.088) 
-.088 
(.079) 
 -.052 
(.092) 
-.000 
(.087) 
 Health care vignette (0 
= medical vignette) 
 .057 
(.126) 
-.115 
(.126) 
 -.764*** 
(.101) 
-.630*** 
(.093) 
 
-.398*** 
(.104) 
-.140 
(.095) 
 -.023 
(.109) 
.210* 
(.105) 
Post-event Mediator 
Variables as Controls 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 Post-event Evaluation  
 
   
 
-.062** 
(.022) 
 
 
 
-.134*** 
(.022) 
  
 
.131*** 
(.024) 
 Post-event Status  
 
-.110** 
(.039) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
.322*** 
(.028) 
  
 
.196*** 
(.032) 
 Post-event Potency  
 
-.233*** 
(.038) 
  
 
.317*** 
(.028) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
.227*** 
(.032) 
 Post-event Power  
 
.189*** 
(.035) 
  
 
.159*** 
(.026) 
 
 
 
.187*** 
(.026) 
  
 
 
 
R2  .031 .089  .153 .302  .042 .235  .122 .224 
Adjusted R2  .025 .082  .148 .296  .036 .228  .117 .217 
Mean VIF  1.12 1.22  1.12 1.16  1.12 1.19  1.12 1.19 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Participant attributes are controlled for but not 
displayed in table. 
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Table 3.4 OLS Regressions of Recommended Prison Sentence on Deference Scores, Conditions, Post-event Mediators, and 
Controls and Sobel Test Results (N = 1,170) 
   
Recommended Prison Sentence  
Single mediator 
controlled 
 
All mediators 
controlled 
 
Models 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
% 
Mediated 
p  
% 
Mediated 
p 
Focal Independent 
Variable 
            
 Deference scores  .173* 
(.082) 
.202* 
(.088) 
.129 
(.084) 
.028 
(.084) 
.093 
(.088) 
      
Conditions             
 Overcharge (0 = 
steal from) 
 -.700** 
(.246) 
-.685** 
(.246) 
-.746** 
(.246) 
-.750** 
(.242) 
-.739** 
(.242) 
      
 Female offender (0 
= male) 
 -.804** 
(.245) 
-.804** 
(.246) 
-.791** 
(.245) 
-.779** 
(.242) 
-.767** 
(.241) 
      
 Health care 
vignette (0 = 
medical vignette) 
 -.214 
(.288) 
-.273 
(.295) 
-.125 
(.289) 
-.203 
(.284) 
-.343 
(.290) 
      
Post-event Mediating 
Variables 
            
 Post-event Status   
 
-.078 
(.083) 
  -.286** 
(.090) 
 
-17.00 .353  -470.90 .002 
 Post-event Potency   
 
 
 
.223** 
(.081) 
 .195* 
(.088) 
 
25.06 .011  2.52 .680 
 Post-event Power    
 
 .479*** 
(.077) 
.497*** 
(.080) 
 
83.66 .000  50.68 .000 
Participant Attributes             
 Student (0 = 
Mturk) 
 -.506* 
(.254) 
-.469† 
(.257) 
-.533* 
(.254) 
-.381 
(.251) 
-.264 
(.254) 
      
 Female (0 = male)  -.501* 
(.251) 
-.488† 
(.252) 
-.515* 
(.251) 
-.744** 
(.250) 
-.718** 
(.249) 
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 Gender non-
conforming (0 = 
male) 
 -2.304 
(2.433) 
-2.305 
(2.434) 
-2.188 
(2.427) 
-2.362 
(2.395) 
-2.265 
(2.385) 
      
Intercept  4.678 
(.587) 
4.990 
(.676) 
4.786 
(.586) 
2.790 
(.652) 
3.964 
(.735) 
      
R2  .028 .028 .034 .059 .068       
Adjusted R2  .022 .022 .027 .053 .060       
Mean VIF  1.12 1.17 1.12 1.14 1.22       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 
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Chapter 4: Social Roles and Standard Operating Procedures: Attributions of 
Responsibility and Punishment for Financial Crime 
 
Numerous criminological studies attempt to explain how people attribute responsibility 
for wrongdoing (e.g., see Applegate et al. 2000; Blatier 2000; Carroll 1978; Cochran, Boots and 
Chamlin 2006; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; Cullen et al. 1985; Grasmick and McGill 1994; 
Hawkins 1981; Michel 2017; Unnever et al. 2010; Young 1991). However, few of these studies 
account for how responsibility is attributed for workplace crimes (Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 
2005b, 2008; Hamilton and Sanders 1995, 1996; Hans and Erman 1989; Sanders et al. 1996; 
Sanders, Yuasa and Hamilton 1998) and how the organizational context in which these crimes 
occur affect these attributions (Gailey 2013).  
Attribution theory (Heider 1958) explains that individuals attribute responsibility for 
wrongdoing to either the actors involved in an event or to the context in which the event occurs. 
Research on responsibility attributions in organizational settings shows that an offender’s social 
role (i.e., if offenders are described as autonomous, obedient, or conformist offenders) and an 
offense’s description as an atypical or typical organizational practice (i.e., a standard operating 
procedure) affect individuals’ assessments of responsibility. However, this research focuses on 
non-representative workplace crimes and, more specifically, does not examine how 
responsibility is attributed to offenders who commit dangerous financial crimes. It also tends to 
utilize single-item measures of responsibility, inconsistent measures of responsibility across 
studies, and does not examine how facets of organizational offending and attributions of 
responsibility affect recommended punishment for offenders. Thus, it is unclear if findings 
regarding attribution of responsibility processes persist when considering financial crimes and 
when using improved measurements of responsibility, and it is unclear how organizational facets 
of offending and attributions of responsibility affect recommended punishment. 
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Drawing on attribution theory and past research, I use a vignette experiment to examine 
how the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures (SOPs) affect both 
attributions of responsibility and the recommended monetary fine participants assign to offenders 
who commit financial crimes. Further, I examine how attributions of responsibility mediate the 
relationship between an offender’s social role and SOPs and recommended punishment. My 
vignette experiment varies: 1) the social role of the offender; 2) whether offenders are described 
as offending by either following or acting against SOPs; 3) the offender’s gender; and 4) the 
extent of financial losses that result from the crime. I go beyond past research by measuring 
responsibility as a multidimensional concept, and I partially test a modified version of a 
proposed integrated model of the attribution of responsibility for wrongdoing in organizations 
(Gailey and Lee 2005a). Additionally, I more comprehensively control for participant attributes 
than past research, and I include a more expansive sample that goes beyond the college student 
samples used in previous research (e.g., Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 2005b; Gailey and Lee 
2008; Hans and Ermann 1989; Hamilton and Hagiwara 1992). I begin by describing attribution 
theory, the theory that underlies my hypotheses and undergirds previous research in this area. 
Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory explains how individuals attribute responsibility for themselves and 
others (Heider 1944, 1958). The central premise of the theory is that attributions of responsibility 
depend on whether individuals view causes of behavior as a result of internal or external factors 
(Heider 1944, 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967). When observers determine that a 
behavior is a result of internal factors (i.e., actor personality characteristics or actor disposition), 
they attribute the behavior to the actor (Heider 1944, 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967; 
Sabini, Siepmann and Stein 2001; Sims 2003; Skitka et al. 2002). Conversely, when observers 
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determine that a behavior is due to external or environmental factors (i.e., social structure or 
organizational context), they attribute the behavior to the situational context in which the 
behavior occurs, thus absolving the actor of responsibility or blame (Cullen et al. 1985; Heider 
1944, 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967; Sims 2003; Woolfolk, Doris and Darley 2006). 
The determination of how to identify the causes of behavior is based on how individuals 
combine and analyze facts they know about the behavior, actor, and situation (i.e., what they are 
able to observe and their pre-existing knowledge on subjects and situations), and how individuals 
then sort this information through their pre-existing frameworks of understanding (i.e., their 
cultural understandings of events and actions and how they understand the world more broadly). 
Based on individuals’ combination and analyses of these conceptions and facts in their cognitive 
frameworks, they then internally or externally attribute guilt, blameworthiness, and responsibility 
(Heider 1944, 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967, 1973).  
Attribution theorists have integrated the ideas of “roles and deeds” and “respondent 
characteristics and influences” (Hamilton 1978, 1986; Hamilton and Sanders 1981) into 
attribution models to explain how an actor’s social role, social status, and perceptions of the 
actor’s intentions affect individuals’ attributions of responsibility. Roles are conceived of as both 
the actor’s hierarchical position within an organization (social status) (i.e., if they are a superior 
or a subordinate in an organizational setting or structure) and their level of involvement in the act 
itself (social role) (i.e., if offenders are described as offending in autonomous, obedient, or 
conformist roles). Deeds account for what actors actually did and their intentions. Respondent 
characteristics and influences refer to the fact that people from different social backgrounds 
interpret and understand events, and attribute causes of those events, differently (Hamilton and 
Hagiwara 1992). For instance, research shows that gender, cultural background, and educational 
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attainment all differentially affect attributions of responsibility (Hamilton and Hagiwara 1992; 
Hamilton and Sanders 1996; Gailey 2013; Sanders and Hamilton 1987; Sanders et al. 1996). 
Attribution theorists have also proposed an integrated model for how attributions of 
responsibility are assigned for wrongdoing in organizations (Gailey and Lee 2005a), and I draw 
on this model. This proposed model synthesizes past work (i.e., Hamilton 1978, 1986; Hamilton 
and Sanders 1981; Shaver 1985) and incorporates the idea of social or organizational context. 
The model uses Shaver’s (1985) multidimensional conceptualization of responsibility, which 
accounts for both legal culpability and morality. Shaver explains that there are at least five 
dimensions of responsibility: 1) causality (i.e., did the actor directly or tangentially cause the 
act); 2) knowledge (i.e., was the actor aware or could the actor foresee the consequences of his or 
her actions); 3) intentionality (i.e., was the action intentional or accidental) 4); coercion (i.e., was 
free will inhibited); and 5) moral wrongfulness (i.e., how morally wrong was the action).The 
integrated model also suggests the inclusion of media frames, standard operating procedures 
(SOPs), mental schemas, and outcome severity. Drawing on this model, I include SOPs, 
perceptions of offense seriousness, and a number of control variables in my models. The limited 
work that partially tests the integrated model (e.g., see Gailey 2013) finds support for SOPs on 
multiple dimensions of responsibility. Next, I briefly review limitations in previous attribution of 
responsibility research, and how I address these limitations.  
Limitations of Past Research 
Previous attribution of responsibility research suffers from three major weaknesses: 1) a 
lack of interdisciplinary work across attribution studies in sociology and psychology, 2) 
inconsistent and underdeveloped measurement of responsibility across studies, and 3) the 
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majority of studies use the same vignettes that describe crimes that are non-representative of 
most workplace crimes.  
The first two weaknesses in past research are both related to differences across studies in 
sociology and psychology. I address the first major limitation by using an integrated model that 
draws on sociological and psychological studies to test the attribution of responsibility within 
organizations (Gailey and Lee 2005a). The second major limitation of past research is the 
inconsistent and inadequate measurement of responsibility across studies. Psychologists have 
employed a number of different measures, including blame, causation, fault, guilt, morality, 
responsibility, and others (Critchlow 1985; Gebotys and Dasgupta 2001; Harvey and Rule 1978; 
Krulewitz and Nash 1979). Sociologists have been more consistent in measuring responsibility; 
however, sociologists’ measurements do not account for the multidimensional nature of 
responsibility. For instance, much research relies on studies that use single item measures of 
responsibility or liability (e.g., see Ackerman et al. 1984; Gailey and Lee 2005b; Harrison and 
Esqueda 2000; Hamilton and Sanders 1981, 1995, 1996; Hans and Erman 1989; Sanders and 
Hamilton 1987; Sanders et al. 1996) or a single item to measure the likelihood that subjects 
would employ a similar explanation for wrongdoing (see Hamilton and Hagiwara 1992). This is 
problematic, because attribution theory suggests (Gailey and Lee 2005a; Shaver 1985) and 
empirical work shows (Gailey and Falk 2008; Gailey 2013) that responsibility is 
multidimensional. To address measurement issues in past research, I use a multi-dimensional 
measure of responsibility (Shaver 1985). 
Finally, much past research uses vignettes that describes crimes that are non-
representative of most workplace or white-collar crimes and likely to elicit strong reactions (e.g., 
injecting terminally ill patients with high doses of plutonium without consent, exposing 
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prisoners’ testicles to large amounts of X-ray radiation, feeding small doses of radioactive 
oatmeal to developmentally disabled children, large scale faulty auto design defects, toxic waste 
spills or dumping, suppression of news stories, or the side effects of inadequately tested and 
defective prescription drugs) (Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 2005b; Gailey and Lee 2008; 
Hamilton and Sanders 1995, 1996; Hans and Erman 1989; Sanders et al. 1996). Moreover, none 
of this research examines financial crimes (i.e., crimes that are a result of the manipulation of 
financial instruments or markets and primarily result in financial losses to victims) or crimes 
perpetrated by offenders in the financial services industry (i.e., individuals or organizations 
whose primary business is financial advising, management, and investment of clients’ monies). 
Thus, this research ignores many organizational crimes and white-collar crimes, crimes that a 
large portion of which are financial in nature and many of which are committed by offenders in 
the financial services industry (Huff, Desilets, and Kane 2010; Kane and Wall 2006; Reiman and 
Leighton 2013). To address this weakness, I utilize vignettes that describe a financial crime 
committed by offenders in the financial services industry.  
Next, I review literature on the way that attributions are affected by the social role of 
offenders and standard operating procedures, the two facets of organizational offending that I 
focus on in this research. I also explain my predictions for how these facets of organizational 
offending affect responsibility attributions and punishment. 
Attributions of Responsibility for Social Roles and Standard Operating Procedures 
Social roles. Offenders who commit crimes in an organizational setting can offend 
autonomously by acting of their own volition, they can offend as conformists in a group context 
where everyone else is also offending, or they can offend in an obedient role by following the 
direct orders of superiors. Autonomous offenders are consistently rated as most responsible for 
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their actions (Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 2005b, 2008; Hamilton and Sanders 1995, 1996; 
Sanders et al. 1996). 
Only one study, of which I am aware, examines the effect of conformist offending on 
attributions of responsibility. This research finds that participants assign more responsibility to 
autonomous than conformist or obedient offenders and greater responsibility to conformist 
offenders than obedient offenders (Hamilton and Sanders 1995). Crimes that occur at an 
organizational or industry level may not be directly ordered by superiors. Rather, crimes may be 
directly or indirectly facilitated through corporate or industry cultures that permit or encourage 
risky or unethical business practices in the pursuit of profits or goals, and wherein there is a 
belief that everyone at an organization or within a particular industry is also engaged in the same 
illegal practices (Clinard and Yeager 1980; Geis 1967; Shover 2007; Shover and Hochstetler 
2002; Vaughan 1996, 2007). In these environments, employees may feel that they must 
participate in illegal or unethical practices to keep their job, further their career, or so that an 
organization remains competitive, and, in these situations, other employees may teach or initiate 
offenders into these illegal or unethical practices. In order to examine the impact of social roles 
on attributions of responsibility for a financial crime, I describe offenders as autonomous (i.e., as 
acting on their own) or as conformists (i.e., offending with peers). Following past research 
showing that autonomous offenders are attributed more responsibility than conformist offenders 
(Hamilton and Sanders 1995), I expect that participants will assign greater attributions of 
responsibility to autonomous offenders than to conformist offenders:  
Social Role Hypotheses: Participants will attribute greater (1) causality, (2) 
knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and less (5) coerciveness 
to autonomous offenders than to conformist offenders. 
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Standard operating procedures. SOPs account for the fact that organizations develop 
behavioral scripts that guide employees’ actions and institutional practices (DiMaggio 1997; 
Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 2005a; Frieland and Alford 1991; Jackall 1988; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991; Simon 1996). As other researchers note, even when actors act autonomously 
and think they are acting of their own free will, there are always institutional logics at play that 
guide behaviors and limit choices (Gailey and Lee 2005a). Further, unethical and illegal 
practices become so embedded in organizations and industries, and so normalized and routinized, 
that many times offenders are not even fully cognizant of their offending, or consider their 
actions wrongful, even if what they are doing is unethical or technically illegal (Ashforth and 
Vikas 2003; Ashforth et al. 2008; Gottschalk 2012). 
The only study, of which I am aware, that directly tests the effect of SOPs on attributions 
of responsibility finds that respondents assign more causality, intentionality, and moral 
wrongfulness to organizations where offenses were committed in which the offense is described 
as typical within the organization (i.e., as a SOP) (Gailey 2013). Like much attribution research, 
this study asks about attributions for the specific actor described in the vignette and the 
organization in separate questions, and this research does not find any effect for SOPs on any 
responsibility outcomes for individual offenders within the organization. The lack of findings for 
SOPs on attributions of responsibility for individual offenders in this research may reflect 
participants’ assumptions that SOPs are likely institutional or industry issues. Therefore, 
participants, in this instance, may have absolved individual actors of blame. This explanation is 
consistent with previous attribution work, which suggests that individuals view employees as 
less responsible than organizations, because employees are only partial moral agents in the 
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offending decision-making process who are ultimately limited in their responsibility and any 
liability for an offense (Sanders et al. 1996). 
The description of SOPs in this research, though, may undercut the role of organizational 
culture and institutional logics that guide SOPs, as this research describes the actor as only being 
aware of past practices by the organization (i.e., “Dave knew from past experience that using 
patients in this manner was typical [not typical] of AEC-funded research.”) (Gailey 2013:9). In 
this instance, the act described may appear to research participants as a practice that is engaged 
in infrequently or rarely and only loosely supported by an organization. This is in contrast to a 
SOP being described as something that is normally or routinely engaged in as a standard 
business practice that is supported by or embedded in organizational guidelines or institutional 
culture, so much so that the actor does not have to think about his or her actions (Ashforth and 
Vikas 2003; Ashforth et al. 2008). 
To test the effect of SOPs on attributions of responsibility, I describe the offense in the 
context of a corporate culture that encourages (or discourages) illegal actions as part of normal 
business practices, and I describe the idea as coming from (or not coming from) those who are in 
the highest positions of authority at the organization. Describing the idea of offending in this 
manner should indicate to participants that the wrongdoing committed by offenders is a common 
(or atypical) practice that is (or is not) normal within this particular setting, and that the 
organizational culture present in the institution described supports (or does not support) this 
practice. This manipulation is not the same as previous attribution research on obedience, 
because I do not describe the action as being ordered by superiors, but as embedded (or not) in 
the institutional logics within the organization that guides actors’ decisions.  
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Contrary to previous findings on organizational responsibility for SOPs, and in 
consideration of non-findings from this research on attributions of individual responsibility 
(Gailey 2013), I expect that offending against SOPs will increase attributions of responsibility to 
offenders. I expect greater attributions of responsibility to offenders who act against SOPs, 
because, like autonomous offenders, I expect participants to view offending as a result of the 
individual offender’s decision to offend rather than the context of the offense compelling the 
offender to act. Further, I expect that participants will view offenses that violate SOPs as 
occurring as a result of the disposition of the offender, as the offender is not just acting of his or 
her own accord but also acting against organizational guidelines that discourage offending. Thus, 
I expect participants to assign offenders described as offending against SOPs greater 
responsibility than offenders who offend by following SOPs: 
SOPs Hypotheses: Participants will attribute greater (1) causality, (2) knowledge, 
(3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and (5) less coerciveness to offenders 
who offended against SOPs than those who offend by following SOPs. 
 
Responsibility Attributions and Punitiveness  
Previous research examines how responsibility attributions predict punitive attitudes 
(e.g., see Applegate et al. 2000; Blatier 2000; Carroll 1978; Cochran, Boots and Chamlin 2006; 
Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; Cullen et al. 1985; Grasmick and McGill 1994; Hawkins 1981; 
Michel 2017; Unnever et al. 2010; Young 1991). However, this research focuses on how 
participants’ beliefs regarding the causes of crime (i.e., if participants take a dispositional view 
on crime, attributing the crime to personal characteristics or a situational view attributing it to 
circumstance) predict their support for more general rehabilitative or retributive sentencing 
philosophies. For instance, this research shows how situational attributions increase support for 
rehabilitative punishment (Applegate et al. 2000), how political conservatives dispositional 
 79 
attributions increase support for capital punishment (Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003), and how 
dispositional attributions increase perceived seriousness and punitiveness for violent corporate 
offenders (Michel 2017). This research suggests that attributions of responsibility affect punitive 
attitudes and philosophies more generally, with dispositional or internal attributions (i.e., person 
rather than context attributions) increasing punitiveness, but it leaves open questions concerning 
how responsibility attributions shape recommended punishment for specific offenders and 
offenses. Further, it is unclear from this research how facets of organizational offending and 
attributions of responsibility for organizational offenders predict punishment outcomes. 
Following the logic of attribution theory and drawing on previous research that shows social 
roles and SOPs affect responsibility attributions, though, I expect that greater attributions of 
responsibility will also increase recommended punishment. Thus, I expect that autonomous 
offenders and offenders described as offending against SOPs (i.e., offenders whom I expect will 
be assigned greater responsibility) will be recommended greater monetary fines by participants. I 
also expect that attributions of responsibility will decrease the positive effect of autonomous and 
atypical SOPs offending on participant recommended punishment. 
Social Role Punishment Hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater 
monetary fine to autonomous offenders than they do to conformist offenders. 
 
SOPs Punishment Hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater monetary 
fine to offenders who offended against SOPs than those who offend by following 
SOPs. 
 
Social Role Mediation Hypotheses: Participants’ attributions of offender (1) 
causality, (2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and (5) non-
coerciveness will mediate the relationship between exposure to an autonomous 
offender and their recommended monetary fine. 
 
SOPs Mediation Hypotheses: Participants’ attributions of offender (1) causality, 
(2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and (5) non-
coerciveness will mediate the relationship between exposure to an offender 
offending against SOPs and their recommended monetary fine. 
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Methods 
Sample 
I collected data from three samples during the fall of 2017: (1) a sample of college 
students at a large southern university, (2) a sample of college students at a southern community 
college, and (3) a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) users. University student 
participation was incentivized by offering participants the opportunity to be included in a lottery 
drawing for one of nine twenty-five-dollar Amazon gift cards. The university student sample 
includes both undergraduates and graduate students. Community college student participation 
was incentivized by offering class credit or extra credit to subjects for their participation. Mturk 
is an online service provided by Amazon that recruits users to fill out surveys for pay, and Mturk 
users were paid one dollar each for their participation 
Experimental Design 
 I use a vignette experiment that varies four factors: (1) the social role of the offender 
(autonomous vs. conformist), (2) whether the offender was described as offending by following 
or acting against SOPs, (3) the offender’s gender (male or female), and (4) the extent of financial 
losses that result from the crime (a few dozen clients losing $3,000 each resulting in a total loss 
of about $100,000 vs. a few hundred clients losing $3,000 each resulting in a total loss of about 
$1,000,000). This creates a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial vignette design. 
[Figure 4.1 here] 
The vignette describes a financial crime in which those at the company (National 
Finance) illegally use clients’ money from personal investment accounts to cover business losses 
for an unspecified period of time. Clients’ personal money is used to cover business losses 
without the knowledge of clients, and money brought in from newly recruited clients is also used 
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to cover losses to long-term clients. The vignette keeps constant the crime’s description and it 
explicitly states that the practice being described in the vignette is illegal. The names of the 
vignette characters, Todd or Emily, are two of the most common names given to white boys and 
girls born between 1974 and 1979 (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004). The full vignette is as 
follows: 
Emily/Todd Smith works in the financial services industry for National Finance, which 
is a private financial planning and investments firm that primarily works with clients to 
diversify their financial investments. Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and 
her co-workers has/have full control over many of her/his/their clients’ investment 
accounts. Her/His/Their control includes the ability to transfer money to and from 
personal investment accounts without approval of clients. People in positions of authority 
at National Finance have created a corporate culture that encourages/discourages 
pushing the limits in investments with clients’ money as part of their normal business 
practices. National Finance has had a rough past five years, having lost significant client 
money through bad investments. As a result, Emily/Todd/Todd and his co- 
workers/Emily and her co-workers has/have felt compelled to work together to 
illegally use investment money from newly recruited clients to cover losses to long term 
clients. Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers know(s) that 
it is illegal to use her/his/their clients’ personal money to cover business losses, but that 
no one will know as long as long-term investors are still seeing returns on their 
investments. This idea to cover long term losses with money from new investors comes 
from/does not come from those who are in the highest positions of authority at National 
Finance. Eventually, Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers 
was/were unable to cover the losses made on older accounts with money from new 
investors; consequently a few dozen clients lost $3,000 each, resulting in a total loss of 
about $100,000/a few hundred clients lost $3,000 each, resulting in a total loss of 
about $1,000,000. 
 
Condition Variables  
Autonomous offender (manipulated using “Emily/Todd’ or “her/his”) and conformist 
offender (manipulated using “Emily/Todd” and “her/his co-workers,” or “their,” and “work 
together”) are dummy variables for the social role of offenders in vignettes, and conformist 
offender is the omitted category. Against standard operating procedures (manipulated using 
“discourages” and “does not come from”) and following standard operating procedures 
(manipulated using “encourages” and “comes from”) are dummy variables for the organizational 
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offending context that participants were exposed to (i.e., one in which the offender participating 
in the business practice described was offending by either following SOPs or acting against 
SOPs), with following standard operating procedures as the omitted category.   
Condition controls.  Gender of the offender (female = 1, male = 0) and financial losses 
(high financial loss ($100,000,000) = 1, low financial loss ($100,000) = 0) also vary across 
conditions, so they are controlled in all models.        
[Table 4.1 here] 
Dependent Variables 
Dimensions of responsibility. I use the five individual components of responsibility 
outlined in previous research (Shaver 1985) as dependent variables to measure responsibility, 
and I later examine these same variables as mediators between the social role of offenders and 
punishment and between SOPs and punishment. The measures I use for the different dimensions 
of responsibility are modified versions of items used by previous researchers (Gailey and Falk 
2008). Participants were asked in separate questions about these measures. All questions used 
101-point semantic differential slider scales with “Strongly disagree” as an anchor point on the 
left side of the scale and “Strongly agree” as an anchor point on the right side of the scale. I 
divided each item by 10, so all items range from 1-10, with higher scores indicating higher 
ratings on each item and greater internal attributions. The causality dimension of responsibility 
was measured with four items: (1) Todd/Emily is responsible for what happened; (2) Todd/Emily 
is at fault for what happened; (3) Todd/Emily could have avoided what happened; and (4) The 
crime described in the pre-sentencing report was preventable. The knowledge dimension was 
measured with three items: (1) Todd/Emily was aware of the potential consequences for what 
happened; (2) Todd/Emily was able to foresee the harm of his/her actions; and (3) Todd/Emily 
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recognized the seriousness of his/her actions. The intentionality dimension was measured with 
four items: (1) Todd/Emily intended to commit the crime; (2) Todd/Emily intended to harm 
clients of National Finance; (3) Todd’s/Emily’s actions were an accident (reverse coded); and (4) 
Todd/Emily planned his/her actions in advance. The coercion dimension was measured with four 
items: (1) Todd/Emily acted of his/her own will; (2) Other people influenced Todd/Emily to act 
(reverse coded); (3) Todd/Emily was coerced in his/her actions (reverse coded); and (4) 
Someone else besides Todd/Emily was responsible for the crime (reverse coded). Higher scores 
on coercion indicate less coerciveness for the actor who commits the offense, and less 
coerciveness indicates more responsibility for the actor compared to the situational context (an 
internal attribution). And, finally, the moral wrongfulness dimension is measured with four 
items: (1) What Todd/Emily did was wrong; (2) Todd/Emily was acting morally (reverse coded); 
(3) Todd/Emily was deceitful in his/her actions; and (4) Todd/Emily was justified in his/her 
actions (reverse coded). 
Each of these five measures were individually combined into composites using principal-
factor analysis, and each measure respectively comprised a single factor (see Table 4.1). I drop 
two items that measure intentionality because of low loadings, an actor’s intention to harm 
clients (.31) and perceptions of the actor’s actions as an accident (.38) (loadings for dropped 
items not shown in Table 4.1). Alpha reliability scores for knowledge (.69) and intentionality 
(.66) fall below the ordinary threshold of .70. However, previous attribution research also 
indicates low alpha scores (e.g., see Gailey 2013; Michel 2017) and still retains all dimensions of 
responsibility, as theoretical reasoning suggests their inclusion. Moreover, other work suggests 
the limitations of relying solely on alpha levels in creating composites (Cronbach 2004; 
McDonald 1985). Following previous research (Gailey 2013; Gailey and Falk 2008) and the 
 84 
proposed integrated model I draw on (Gailey and Lee 2005a), I also keep the five dimensions of 
responsibility as separate factored variables, rather than combining them. 
 [Table 4.2 here] 
Monetary fine is the recommended monetary fine that participants assign to the offender 
in the vignette, and I use this dependent variable to measure punishment. Participants were asked 
how large a fine they would recommend if Emily/Todd from the vignette were to be punished 
with a fine and only a fine. Participants used a slider scale with “No fine” on the left and 
“$1,000,000” on the right as anchor points. Responses to monetary fine were divided by ten 
thousand to create a scale that ranges from zero to one hundred.   
Control Variables 
Appropriate legal punishment control variables. Community service, monetary fine, 
probation, and imprisonment are dummy variables for the type of punishment that participants 
indicate is the most appropriate legal response to the crime they read in the vignette. Participants 
were instructed to choose all that apply.  
Perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics. Drawing on Gailey and Lee’s (2005a) 
integrated model, I also wanted models, within data limitations, to account for behavioral 
consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus. So, I include controls for the participants’ perception 
of the likelihood that the offender would commit the same crime again, that the offender 
committed the same crime in the past, that the offender is usually law abiding, and perceptions of 
the offender’s behavior as bad. I also include a control for participants’ perceptions of the 
offender’s status and for participants’ perceptions of the offender’s behavior as serious. Each of 
these measures were captured using 101-point semantic differential slider scales and each 
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measure was divided by 10. In the interest of space, the full wording of these items and their 
anchors can be found in Appendix A. 
Participant attributes. I also include controls for participant demographics, cultural 
background, religion, and educational attainment. Age is continuous, and I also include a squared 
version of this variable. Participant education collapses six categories into a dichotomous 
variable with those who have less than a bachelor’s degree omitted. Student is a dummy variable 
that controls for differences between Mturk users and student participants. Female and gender 
non-conforming control for participants’ gender, with male omitted. Parental education averages 
together participants’ mother’s and father’s highest levels of education, with values ranging from 
1 (no high school degree) to 6 (a graduate or professional degree). Personal income was 
measured with the question “What is your estimated yearly income?,” and participants were 
given ten categories with $20,000 ranges and a final category of $200,000 or greater. Political 
leaning was measured with a 101-point semantic differential slider scale that asked participants 
to respond to the prompt “Politically, I am:,” with “Extremely Liberal” on the left and 
“Extremely Conservative” on the right. This variable was divided by 10, and higher scores 
indicate greater conservatism. Race and ethnicity is comprised of six categories, with white as 
the omitted category. Religious affiliation allowed participants to choose from seventeen 
categories or enter their own answer. I follow a modified version of Steensland and colleagues’ 
(2000) categorization scheme and collapsed these categories into those shown in Table 2. 
Finally, religious attendance frequency was measured with “How frequently do you attend 
religious services?,” with participants given the response options: never, once or twice a year, 
several times a year, monthly, weekly, multiple times a week, or daily. I do not show the results 
for participant’s attributes in Tables 4.3-4.5, but the full models can be found in Appendix A.    
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 [Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 here] 
RESULTS 
 
Responsibility Attributions for the Social Role of Offenders and Standard Operating Procedures 
Tables 4.3 and 4.5 show the OLS regression results for the effect of all variables on the 
five dimensions of responsibility. Model 1 only includes condition variables, Model 2 adds 
dimensions of responsibility (omitting the dimension of responsibility that is the dependent 
variable in each respective model), and Model 3 displays the full models that also control for 
appropriate legal punishment, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant 
attributes. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 only show coefficients for autonomous offenders, SOPs, and 
dimensions of responsibility, but the full models can be found in Appendix A3. 
Consistent with social role attribution hypotheses, participants attributed more causality 
and less coerciveness to autonomous than conformist offenders. However, contrary to social role 
attribution hypotheses, participants attributed less intentionality and moral wrongfulness to 
autonomous than conformist offenders. I did not find any significant effect of offender’s social 
role on knowledge attributions. I also find, consistent with SOPs attribution hypotheses, that 
participants attributed more causality and less coerciveness to offenders described as offending 
against SOPs than those described as offending by following SOPs. Contrary to SOPs attribution 
hypotheses, I find that participants attributed less knowledge and moral wrongfulness to 
offenders described as offending against SOPs than those described as offending by following 
                                                 
3 I also examined interaction effects between the social role of the offender and SOPs context. I 
do not show offender gender, financial losses, or the interaction between the social role of the 
offender and SOPs context in Tables 4.3-4.5, but the full models can be found in Appendix A. 
The full models also include coefficients for appropriate legal punishment, perceptions of actor 
and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. Controls for participant demographics are 
not needed in a study with random assignment to conditions; however, the proposed integrated 
model I draw on (Gailey and Lee 2005a) suggests their inclusion.   
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SOPs. I did not find any significant effect of SOPs on intentionality attributions. I also examined 
interaction effects between conditions on each dimension of responsibility. Participants 
attributed less coerciveness to autonomous offenders who also offend against SOPs (b = 0.463, 
se = 0.085, p = 0.000) than conformist offenders who offend by following SOPs; however, this 
is the only interaction effect that ever reaches significance. Models in Table 4.3 and 4.4 suggest 
possible suppression or mediation effects for social roles and SOPs on attributions for different 
dimensions of responsibility. I examine these relationships, but I do not show results of these 
tests in tables. Suppression and mediation analyses show: causality suppresses the effect of SOPs 
on moral wrongfulness and knowledge attributions, and causality suppresses the effect of 
autonomous offending on intentionality and moral wrongfulness attributions; coerciveness is a 
suppressor for autonomous offending on intentionality attributions and for autonomous offending 
and SOPs on moral wrongfulness attributions; intentionality exhibits a suppression effect for 
autonomous offending on moral wrongfulness attributions; and, moral wrongfulness mediates 
the effect of autonomous offending on intentionality attributions.  
[Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 here] 
Punishment Hypotheses 
 Table 4.5 shows OLS results for the recommended monetary fine that participants assign 
to offenders. All models in Table 4.5 include controls for all conditions, appropriate legal 
punishment, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. Model 1 
provides support for both the social role and SOPs punishment hypotheses. As predicted in the 
social role punishment hypothesis, participants recommended greater monetary fines for 
autonomous offenders than conformist offenders. And, consistent with the SOPs punishment 
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hypothesis, participants recommended greater monetary fines to offenders described as offending 
against SOPs than those who offend by following SOPs. 
Social Role and SOPs Mediation Hypotheses   
 Models 2-6 in Table 4.5 add the five dimensions of responsibility necessary to test the 
social role and SOPs mediation hypotheses. Model 7 displays the full model, which also includes 
all of the dimensions of responsibility. Consistent with mediation hypotheses, causality and 
coerciveness both mediate the effect of autonomous offending on recommended monetary fine 
and offending against SOPs on recommended monetary fine. Differences between Model 1 and 2 
in Table 4.5 shows participants’ assessments of causality mediate the effect of autonomous 
offending on the monetary fine participants recommend to offenders (b = 8.635, p = 0.000 to b = 
7.196, p = 0.001). Sobel test results in Table 4.6 confirm the mediation effect, showing that 
causality mediates approximately 17% (p = .022) of the effect of autonomous offending on 
recommended monetary fine when only one mediator is controlled and approximately 20% of 
the effect when all mediators are controlled (p = .020). I also find that causality mediates the 
effect of offending against SOPs on the recommended monetary fine participants assign to 
offenders (b = 4.311, p = 0.044 to b = 2.715, p = 0.225). Sobel test results show that causality 
mediates approximately 37% (p = .021) of this effect when only one mediator is controlled and 
approximately 113% of the effect when all mediators are controlled (p = .027). Changes from 
Model 1 to Model 5 in Table 4.5 show that the effect of autonomous offending (b = 8.635, p = 
0.000 to b = 6.510, p = 0.005) on recommended monetary fine and offending against SOPs (b = 
4.311, p = 0.044 to b = 1.277, p = 0.613) on recommended monetary fine are mediated by 
participants’ assessments of coerciveness. Sobel test results show that coerciveness only acts as a 
significant mediator when it is the only mediator in the model. When coerciveness is the only 
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mediator in the model, it mediates 25% of the effect of autonomous offending (p = .025) on 
recommended monetary fine and approximately 70% of the effect of SOPs (p = .024) on 
recommended monetary fine. I do not find support for mediation effects for the knowledge, 
intentionality, or moral wrongfulness dimensions of responsibility. However, results do suggest 
that participants’ assessments of moral wrongfulness suppress the effect of autonomous 
offending on recommended monetary fine and offending against SOPs on recommended 
monetary fine, but only when the other dimensions of responsibility are also controlled in the 
model. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Limited research examines how responsibility is attributed to offenders who commit 
crimes in the workplace and how facets of organizational offending affect responsibility 
attributions. Prior research finds that the social role of offenders (Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 
2005b, 2008; Hamilton and Sanders 1995, 1996; Sanders et al. 1996) and SOPs (Gailey 2013) 
affect attributions of responsibility. However, prior research mostly utilizes inconsistent 
measures that do not account for the multidimensional nature of responsibility, vignettes that 
describe non-representative workplace crimes, and convenience samples of college students. 
Further, this research does not connect responsibility attributions to recommended punishment. 
Theoretical work proposes an integrated model to evaluate attributions of responsibility in the 
workplace (Gailey and Lee 2005a), yet only limited research partially tests this model (Gailey 
2013). 
To address weaknesses in prior research and further examine how aspects of 
organizational workplace crimes affect responsibility attributions, I used a vignette experiment in 
which participants were exposed to a crime committed by offenders in the financial services 
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industry. I drew on and partially tested the proposed integrated model for the attribution of 
responsibility within organizations (Gailey and Lee 2005a). I measured responsibility as a 
multidimensional concept, I more comprehensively controlled for participant attributes than past 
research, and I included a more expansive sample than past research. Additionally, I examined 
how the social role of offenders and SOPs affected the recommended monetary fine participants 
assigned to offenders and how dimensions of responsibility mediate this relationship.   
Consistent with predictions, results show that participants assigned more causality and 
less coerciveness to autonomous offenders and offenders who offended against SOPs than 
conformist offenders and those who offended by following SOPs. Findings on more causality 
and less coerciveness for autonomous offenders are consistent with past attribution research 
(Hamilton and Sanders 1995). Findings on causality for offenders who offended against SOPs 
differ somewhat from past research, which found more causality assigned to organizations and 
non-findings for individuals (Gailey 2013). However, prior research asked about causality for 
individuals and the organization in separate questions and manipulated SOPs by indicating that 
the actor knew that the practice described was either typical or atypical of past practices by the 
organization. I manipulated SOPs by describing the type of organizational culture in place where 
the offense occurred, and I described the practice as either being embedded (or not) in 
institutional logics as part of normal business practices, a description that is closer to how the 
organizational studies and institutional logics literature describes SOPs (Ashforth and Vikas 
2003; Ashforth et al. 2008). Thus, my findings on causality for offenders who offend against 
SOPs are not surprising, given that these offenders’ actions are less likely than those who offend 
by following SOPs to be viewed as a result of the situation or circumstance in which the offense 
occurs, since offenders who offend by following SOPs are merely following practices that are 
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normal or encouraged in the place where they work. Gailey (2013) does not include measures of 
coerciveness for SOPs; thus, it is unclear from past research how SOPs should affect 
coerciveness. However, following attribution theory, and logically, coerciveness should not be 
attributed to offenders who offend against SOPs, because actors in this context are actually 
discouraged from offending by the environment in which the offending occurs, and my results 
support this supposition. 
Inconsistent with my predictions, participants attributed less intentionality to autonomous 
offenders than conformist offenders, and participants attributed less knowledge to offenders who 
offended against SOPs than those who offended by following SOPs. Also inconsistent with my 
predictions, participants attributed less moral wrongfulness to autonomous offenders and to 
offenders who offended against SOPs than conformist offenders or those who offended by 
following SOPs. I believe these unexpected findings may be related. These findings may be, in 
part, a result of questions only asking about attributions for offenders from vignettes and not 
organizations. Since participants are not asked about attributions of responsibility for the 
organization, participants may actually be trying to indicate greater external attributions of 
intentionality, knowledge, and moral wrongfulness rather than wanting to make internal 
attributions to individual actors. Participants may have also viewed conformist offenders’ actions 
as more intentional and offenders who offend by following SOPs as more knowledgeable, 
because describing offenses in this manner makes it clear that these are actions being engaged in 
by multiple people with some level of coordinated effort, planning, or decision to engage in the 
actions described. Therefore, participants, on these respective dimensions of responsibility, may 
view the actions of groups of offenders as more deliberate and offenders who offended in 
corporate cultures that encourage risk taking as more aware of what they are doing. Additionally, 
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greater external attributions may be more likely, because vignettes gave no indication that 
offenders directly personally benefitted or profited from their actions, which should suggest to 
participants that offenders’ actions, instead, were intended to benefit the organization. Similarly, 
participants may have viewed the offenses of conformists and those who offended by following 
SOPs to be worse because of the presumed organizational or institutional nature of their 
offending or the seemingly larger scope of their crimes. Again, in this instance, participants may 
be attributing more moral wrongfulness to the situation as a whole (i.e., externally), compared to 
offenders who acted alone or against organizational guidelines. Findings on greater external 
attributions of moral wrongfulness for SOPs would also align with findings in previous research 
(Gailey 2013). Thus, although these findings are contrary to my predictions, given that questions 
only asked about individual offenders, it is possible that participants viewed intentionality, 
knowledge, and moral wrongfulness as more attributable to the organization or situation as a 
whole rather than an individual offender. 
Although previous research does not suggest how the social role of offenders or SOPs 
should affect punishment, I predicted that autonomous offenders and offenders who offend 
against SOPs would be recommended a greater monetary fine by participants. Consistent with 
my predictions, results showed that autonomous offenders are recommended a greater monetary 
fine than conformist offenders and offenders who offended against SOPs are recommended a 
greater monetary fine by participants than offenders who offended by following SOPs. Thus, the 
current research establishes a clearer relationship between these two aspects of organizational 
offending and punitiveness. From a policy perspective, and in terms of practical implications, 
these findings suggest that citizens may be in favor of charging and fining individual offenders, 
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in addition to or rather than organizations, even when offenders commit offenses on behalf of or 
for the benefit of an organization.    
 Previous research also does not suggest how attributions of responsibility for facets of 
organizational offending are related to punishment. So, I examined if dimensions of 
responsibility mediated the effect of autonomous offending and offending against SOPs on 
recommended punishment, and I found limited support for mediation effects. Participants’ 
assessments of causality and coerciveness both mediate the effect of autonomous offending and 
offending against SOPs on recommended punishment; however, none of the other dimensions of 
responsibility act as significant mediators. These findings suggest that assessments of 
responsibility for aspects of organizational offending are only somewhat related to recommended 
punishment. High assessments of causality and coerciveness mediating the effect of autonomous 
offending on recommended monetary fines and offending against SOPs on recommended 
monetary fines suggests punitiveness is driven by assessments of how directly involved 
offenders were in the offense and how much offenders made a free decision to act. Punitiveness, 
in this case, is unrelated to how much actors actually knew what it was that they were doing, the 
aim or goal of their actions, or any assessment of how moral their actions were. Shaver’s (1985) 
multidimensional measure of responsibility accounts for both legal and moral culpability, and 
results suggest that punitive attitudes for organizational financial crimes are guided more so by 
assessments of what offenders did, and less so by assessments of why or how offenders did what 
they did. Although intention and full knowledge may contribute to both legal assessments and 
moral assessments, findings on these dimensions affecting recommended punishment are non-
significant, while findings on causality and coerciveness are significantly related to punishment 
recommendations. And, participants’ assessments of moral wrongfulness, though exhibiting a 
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significant suppression effect in the full models when the other dimensions of responsibility are 
also controlled, do not mediate the effect of autonomous offending on recommended monetary 
fines or offending against SOPs on recommended monetary fines. Thus, these findings suggest 
that punitiveness for autonomous offenders and offenders who offend against SOPs and commit 
financial crimes are more related to participants assessments of dimensions of responsibility 
concerned with legal considerations than moral considerations.   
The current study improved on past research by providing a more comprehensive 
evaluation of how aspects of organizational crime contribute to attributions of responsibility and 
how responsibility attributions relate to punishment. Using a multidimensional measure of 
responsibility allowed me to more thoroughly examine which dimensions of responsibility drive 
responsibility assessments. And, using vignettes that described a financial crime provided a more 
representative evaluation of how responsibility is assigned to offenders who commit workplace 
or organizational crimes. Below, I review limitations of this study and suggest future research. 
Limitations and Future work 
 This research was limited in that it did not fully test Gailey and Lee’s (2005a) integrated 
model. It was further limited because it only asked about attributions of individual offenders 
rather than both the offender and the organization that the offender works for. Future work in this 
area should fully test the integrated model and should also ask about responsibility attributions 
for both organizations and offenders. Further work testing this model should also use a structural 
equation modeling approach to examine how different dimensions of responsibility contribute to 
the overall concept of responsibility and affect recommended punishment outcomes. This 
research was also limited in that it only explored one type of financial crime. Future work in this 
area should explore other financial crimes as well as other types of white-collar crime. Future 
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work in this area should also vary the social status of offenders by varying both occupational 
prestige and the offender’s position within the organizational structure. Finally, future work 
should also examine other aspects of organizational offending, for instance, findings on 
responsibility and punitiveness may also vary by the type and size of the organization in which 
the offense occurs.
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 4 
Figure 4.1 Experimental Vignette Design 
  Following Standard Operating 
Procedures 
 
Against Standard Operating 
Procedures 
Autonomous vs. 
Conformist 
Offenders 
 
Greater 
Financial Losses 
Lesser Financial 
Losses 
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Financial Losses 
Lesser Financial 
Losses 
Autonomous 
male  
 
Condition 1 Condition 2  Condition 3 Condition 4 
Conformist male 
 
Condition 5 Condition 6  Condition 7 Condition 8 
Autonomous 
female 
 
Condition 9 Condition 10  Condition 11 Condition 12 
Conformist 
female 
 
Condition 13 Condition 14  Condition 15 Condition 16 
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Table 4.1 Factor Loadings, Explained Variance, and Alpha Reliability Scores for Measures of Responsibility using 
Principal-Factor Analysis after Varimax Rotation (N = 870) 
 
 
Factor 
Loadings 
  
Causality    
 Todd/Emily is responsible for what happened  .834 Alpha .818 
 Todd/Emily is at fault for what happened .856 Explained Variance  2.187 
 
Todd/Emily could have avoided what happened  .706 
Proportion of Explained 
Variance 
.994 
 The crime described in the pre-sentencing report was preventable .512   
Knowledge    
 Todd/Emily was aware of the potential consequences for what 
happened   
.615 Alpha .688 
 Todd/Emily was able to foresee the harm of his/her actions .709 Explained Variance  1.192 
 
Todd/Emily recognized the seriousness of his/her actions .557 
Proportion of Explained 
Variance 
1.347 
Intentionality    
 Todd/Emily intended to commit the crime .604 Alpha .657 
 Todd/Emily planned his/her actions in advance .604 Explained Variance  .730 
 
  
Proportion of Explained 
Variance 
1.520 
     
Coercion    
 Todd/Emily acted of his/her own will .472 Alpha .768 
 Other people influenced Todd/Emily to act .765 Explained Variance  1.758 
 
Todd/Emily was coerced in his/her actions .708 
Proportion of Explained 
Variance 
1.224 
 Someone else besides Todd/Emily was responsible for the crime .670   
Moral Wrongfulness    
 What Todd/Emily did was wrong .614 Alpha .757 
 Todd/Emily was acting morally .684 Explained Variance  1.679 
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Todd/Emily was deceitful in his/her actions .608 
Proportion of Explained 
Variance 
1.250 
 Todd/Emily was justified in his/her actions .682   
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Analyses (N = 870) 
         Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
 Dimensions of Responsibility  
  Causality .00 .92 -4.61 .87 
  Knowledge .00 .80 -3.57 .90 
  Intentionality .00 .76 -2.41 .74 
  Coercion .00 .86 -1.98 1.52 
  Moral wrongfulness  .00 .85 -4.90 .70 
 Punishment     
  Monetary fine 39.38 35.90 0 100 
Independent Variables 
 Conditions 
  Autonomous offender .49  0 1 
  Conformist offender (omitted) .51  0 1 
  Against standard operating procedures .49  0 1 
  Following standard operating 
procedures (omitted) 
.51  0 1 
  Female offender .51  0 1 
  Male offender (omitted) .49  0 1 
  High financial loss .51  0 1 
  Low financial loss (omitted) .49  0 1 
 Appropriate Legal Punishment     
  Community service .29  0 1 
  Monetary fine .54  0 1 
  Probation .39  0 1 
  Imprisonment .53  0 1 
 Perceptions of Actor and Behavior Characteristics 
  Offender will commit the same crime 
again 
4.38 2.95 0 10 
  Offender committed same crime in the 
past 
5.26 2.86 0 10 
  Offender as law abiding  5.65 2.36 0 10 
  Offender status 5.76 2.25 0 10 
  Bad behavior 1.93 1.84 0 10 
  Behavior seriousness  7.33 2.20 0 10 
 Participant Attributes 
  Age 29.34 11.52 18 77 
  Age squared 
993.29 864.38 324 
5,92
9 
  Participant education      
   Less than bachelor’s degree 
(omitted) 
.48  0 1 
   Bachelor’s degree or higher .42  0 1 
  Student .63  0 1 
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  Mturk (omitted) .37  0 1 
  Gender     
   Female .59  0 1 
   Gender non-conforming .003  0 1 
   Male (omitted) .41  0 1 
  Parental education 3.86 1.45 1 6 
  Personal income 2.14 1.66 1 11 
  Political leaning 4.10 2.71 0 10 
  Race and ethnicity      
   African American .05  0 1 
   American Indian .04  0 1 
   Asian American, Hawaiian, or 
Pacific Islander 
.09  0 1 
   Hispanic .06  0 1 
   Mixed race, international, or other .03  0 1 
   White (omitted) .73  0 1 
  Religious affiliation      
   Catholic .13  0 1 
   Evangelical Protestant a .32  0 1 
   Mainline Protestant b (omitted) .08  0 1 
   No affiliation, agnostic, or atheist  .39  0 1 
   Other c .08  0 1 
  Religious attendance frequency 2.70 1.71 1 7 
Notes: a Assembly of God, Baptist, Born Again Christian, Evangelical, Non-
denominational Christian, Pentecostal, Seventh-day Adventist. b Episcopalian, 
Lutheran, Methodist, or Presbyterian. c Buddhist, Hindu, Jew, Mormon Muslim, 
other, or multiple affiliations.  
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Table 4.3 OLS Regressions of Causality, Knowledge, and Intentionality on Conditions and Controls (N = 870) 
  Causality  Knowledge  Intentionality 
  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
Conditions            
 Autonomous offender 
(0 = conformist 
offender) 
.374*** 
(.059) 
.281*** 
(.050) 
.306*** 
(.048) 
 .013 
(.054) 
-.056 
(.052) 
-.031 
(.053) 
 -.046 
(.047) 
-.140** 
(.045) 
-.120** 
(.046) 
 Against standard 
operating procedures (0 
= following standard 
operating procedures) 
.483*** 
(.059) 
.230*** 
(.053) 
.250*** 
(.052) 
 .031 
(.054) 
-.150** 
(.055) 
-.133* 
(.057) 
 .155** 
(.047) 
.006 
(.048) 
.022 
(.047) 
Dimensions of 
Responsibility 
           
 
Causality 
     
 
.204*** 
(.034) 
.158*** 
(.037) 
  .170*** 
(.030) 
.138*** 
(.031) 
 
Knowledge 
 .194*** 
(.033) 
.136*** 
(.032) 
      .248*** 
(.028) 
.225*** 
(.028) 
 
Intentionality 
 .216*** 
(.038) 
.170*** 
(.038) 
  .332*** 
(.038) 
.322*** 
(.040) 
    
 
Coercion 
 .216*** 
(.038) 
.198*** 
(.034) 
  .028 
(.036) 
.025 
(.037) 
  .061† 
(.031) 
.064* 
(.031) 
 
Moral Wrongfulness 
 .383*** 
(.030) 
.336*** 
(.037) 
  .132* 
(.034) 
.100* 
(.041) 
  .108*** 
(.029) 
.107** 
(.035) 
Intercept 
-.432 
(.066) 
-.222 
(.056) 
-.991 
(.304) 
 -.017 
(.061) 
.131 
(.058) 
-.100 
(.329) 
 -.099 
(.053) 
.029 
(.050) 
-.010 
(.275) 
R2 .110 .484 .551  .004 .268 .301  .016 .290 .367 
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Adjusted R2 .106 .479 .531  -.001 .261 .270  .011 .284 .339 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Models 1-2 also control all conditions. 
Models 3 controls: all conditions, appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, 
and participant attributes.  
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Table 4.4 OLS Regressions of Coercion and Moral Wrongfulness on Conditions and Controls (N = 870) 
  Coercion  Moral Wrongfulness 
  1 2 3  1 2 3 
Conditions        
 Autonomous offender (0 = 
conformist offender) 
.571*** 
(.047) 
.504*** 
(.046) 
.504*** 
(.046) 
 -.073 
(.057) 
-.290*** 
(.052) 
-.181*** 
(.044) 
 Against standard operating 
procedures (0 = following 
standard operating 
procedures) 
.841*** 
(.048) 
.722*** 
(.046) 
.721*** 
(.046) 
 .067 
(.057) 
-.259*** 
(.055) 
-.143** 
(.047) 
Dimensions of Responsibility        
 
Causality 
 .207*** 
(.032) 
.197*** 
(.034) 
  .406*** 
(.032) 
.270*** 
(.030) 
 
Knowledge 
 .025 
(.032) 
.021 
(.032) 
  .108** 
(.034) 
.069* 
(.029) 
 
Intentionality 
 .072† 
(.037) 
.078* 
(.038) 
  .146*** 
(.039) 
.106** 
(.034) 
 
Coercion 
  
 
   .124*** 
(.036) 
.064* 
(.031) 
 
Moral Wrongfulness 
 .109** 
(.032) 
.080* 
(.039) 
    
Intercept 
-.722 
(.053) 
-.618 
(.050) 
-.434 
(.305) 
 -.062 
(.064) 
.219 
(.058) 
-.720 
(.273) 
R2 .347 .453 .491  .007 .348 .571 
Adjusted R2 .344 .447 .467  .003 .342 .552 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Models 1-2 also control all 
conditions. Models 3 controls: all conditions, appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and 
behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. 
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Table 4.5 OLS Regressions of Recommended Monetary Fine on Conditions, Dimensions of Responsibility, and Controls       
(N = 870) 
  
Recommended Monetary Fine 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conditions        
 Autonomous offender (0 
= conformist offender) 
8.635*** 
(2.128) 
7.196** 
(2.206) 
8.619*** 
(2.129) 
8.674*** 
(2.128) 
6.499** 
(2.320) 
8.562*** 
(2.127) 
4.971* 
(2.383) 
 Against standard 
operating procedures (0 = 
following standard 
operating procedures) 
4.311* 
(2.141) 
2.715 
(2.237) 
4.306* 
(2.142) 
4.050† 
(2.155) 
1.277 
(2.517) 
4.425* 
(2.142) 
-.119 
(2.552) 
Dimensions of 
Responsibility 
       
 
Causality  
3.494* 
(1.465) 
    
4.185* 
(1.676) 
 
Knowledge   
.442 
(1.443) 
   
-.490 
(1.559) 
 
Intentionality    
1.801 
(1.706) 
  
1.206 
(1.865) 
 
Coercion     
3.672* 
(1.612) 
 
3.141† 
(1.681) 
 
Moral Wrongfulness      
-2.290 
(1.708) 
-4.937** 
(1.871) 
Intercept 
-14.350 
(14.533) 
-7.785 
(14.751) 
-14.008 
(14.583) 
-13.168 
(14.575) 
-10.736 
(14.583) 
-17.588 
(14.725) 
-9.965 
(14.788) 
R2 .291 .296 .291 .292 .296 .293 .305 
Adjusted R2 .263 .267 .263 .263 .267 .264 .273 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Models 1-7 control: all conditions, appropriate 
legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. 
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Table 4.6 Sobel Test Results (N = 870) 
  Recommended Monetary Fine 
  Autonomous offending  Atypical operating procedure 
  Single mediator 
controlled 
 
All mediators 
controlled 
 
Single mediator 
controlled 
 
All mediators 
controlled 
  % 
Mediated 
 
p  
% 
Mediated 
 
p  
% 
Mediated 
 
p  
% 
Mediated 
 
p 
Dimensions of 
Responsibility 
               
 Causality 16.67  .022  20.48  .020  37.02  .021  112.84  .027 
 Knowledge .19  .777  .31  .781  .11  .862  -121.20  .756 
 Intentionality -.45  .652  -3.01  .529  6.05  .314  -28.19  .709 
 Coercion 24.74  .025  24.16  .066  70.37  .024  105.56  .064 
 Moral 
Wrongfulness 
.85  .517  15.23  .026  -2.64  .383  120.34  .046 
Notes: † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 
 106 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation examined how offender and case attributes affect criminal perceptions, 
responsibility attributions, and recommended sentencing outcomes for occupational and 
organizational crimes. All chapters used online vignette experiments administered to community 
college students in the South, students at a large southern university, and Amazon Mechanical 
Turk users. Chapter 2 assessed how an offender’s occupational status, gender, and the word used 
to describe an offender’s crime affected the recommended prison sentence and monetary fine 
that participants assigned to offenders. Chapter 3 further assessed how an offender’s 
occupational status affects recommended punitiveness by examining the mediation effects of 
post-crime impressions of offenders on the recommended prison sentence that participants 
assigned to offenders. Finally, chapter 4 explored how aspects of organizational offenses 
contribute to responsibility attributions and the recommended monetary fine that participants 
assigned to offenders. Below, I briefly describe each of these studies and I summarize findings 
from each of the studies in greater detail. Table 5.1 also shows the summary of all hypotheses 
tested. I conclude by discussing the implications of findings from this dissertation. 
[Table 5.1 here] 
Summary of Studies and their Findings 
 Chapter 2: Criminal Sentiments and Occupational Crime: How Occupation, Crime 
Description, and Offender Gender Affect Punitive Attitudes. The first study, described in chapter 
2, examined the effect of an offender’s occupational status, an offender’s gender, and the word 
used to describe an offender’s crime on the recommended monetary fine and prison sentence that 
participants assigned to offenders. Following previous research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018), this 
study used affect control theory’s (Heise 1979, 2007) computer program, Interact (Heise 1995), 
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to run simulations and then used results from theoretical simulations to calculate criminality 
scores for each of the manipulations in its vignettes. Criminality scores were calculated by 
combining post-event negative and potent impressions of offenders and the word used to 
describe their crime, and criminality scores showed that high status occupational offenders, male 
offenders, and offenders described as stealing were viewed more negatively and as more 
powerful after their offense than lower occupational status offenders, female offenders, and 
offenders described as overcharging clients. Thus, I predicted that greater criminal impressions 
of offenders would correspond with greater recommended punishment for these offenders. 
Consistent with my ACT-derived predictions, I found: (1) that high status occupational offenders 
(CEOs and doctors) were punished more harshly than medium status offenders (nurses and 
accountants) and low status offenders (receptionists); (2) that male offenders were punished 
more harshly than female offenders; and (3) that offenders described as stealing from clients, a 
crime description associated with street crime, were given a greater prison sentence but not a 
greater monetary fine by research participants than offenders described as overcharging clients, a 
crime description associated with white-collar crime. Thus, consistent with previous research, 
these findings suggest that high occupational status increases punishment, and that describing a 
crime using a word associated with street crime, rather than a white-collar crime, increases 
punishment. These findings also suggest that the leniency afforded female street offenders 
persists for female offenders who commit occupational crimes.    
 Chapter 3: Why Does Occupational Clout Affect Sentencing Outcomes?: Exploring the 
Perceptual Mediators. The second study, described in chapter 3, extended recent research 
(Kroska and Schmidt 2018) by examining the independent and mediating effects of negative and 
potent post-crime impressions of occupational offenders. This study used ACT calculated 
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deference scores (Freeland and Hoey 2018), a more precise measurement of occupational status 
than that used in previous research, to operationalize an offender’s occupational status. This 
study also used status and power, measures from other group processes research that are 
proposed as conceptually similar to evaluation and potency from ACT, as additional ways of 
operationalizing post-event impressions of evaluation and potency. Following previous research 
(Kroska and Schmidt 2018), I predicted that high occupational status, operationalized using 
deference scores, would increase the recommended prison sentence that participants assigned to 
offenders. I also predicted that post-event impressions of an offender’s evaluation or status and 
potency or power would mediate the effect of occupational status on punishment by reducing the 
positive effect of deference scores on the recommended prison sentence that participants 
assigned to offenders. Consistent with predictions, I found that high deference scores increased 
the recommended prison sentence that participants assigned to offenders. I found partial support 
for my mediation hypotheses, with post-event impressions of potency and power, but not 
evaluation or status, mediating the effect of deference scores on recommended prison sentencing. 
Findings from this research suggest that post-event impressions of an offender as powerful, 
rather than bad or having a high status, are what explains the relationship between an offender’s 
occupational status and recommended punitiveness. 
 Chapter 4: Social Roles and Standard Operating Procedures: Attributions of 
Responsibility and Punishment for Financial Crime. The third study, described in chapter 4, used 
attribution theory (Heider 1985) to examine how two facets of organizational offending, the 
social role of offenders and standard operating procedures, affected responsibility attributions 
and participant recommended punishment for offenders who committed financial crimes while 
working in the financial services industry. I drew on and partially tested an integrated model for 
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the attribution of responsibility in organizational settings (Gailey and Lee 2005a), and I used a 
multi-dimensional measure of responsibility (Shaver 1985). Following past research (Hamilton 
and Sanders 1995), I predicted that offenders who offended autonomously would be assigned 
greater attributions of responsibility than offenders who were described as offending as 
conformists. Only limited research has tested the effect of standard operating procedures on 
responsibility attributions (e.g., Gailey 2013). Contrary to this research, I asked about 
attributions of responsibility for the offender and not the offender and the organization in which 
the offense occurred. I also manipulated standard operating procedures differently by describing 
the corporate culture and institutional logics in place in the institution in which the offense 
occurred. Thus, I predicted that offenders who were described as offending against standard 
operating procedures would be assigned greater attributions of responsibility for their offenses by 
participants than offenders who were described as offending by following standard operating 
procedures. 
Previous research also does not suggest how facets of organizational offending should 
affect punishment outcomes and how responsibility attributions are related to punishment. 
However, following the logic of attribution theory, and drawing on research that suggests how 
responsibility is attributed to offenders, I predicted that autonomous offenders and offenders who 
offended against standard operating procedures, offenders who I predicted would also be 
attributed greater responsibility for their offenses, would be assigned greater monetary fines by 
participants. I also predicted that greater responsibility attributions would mediate the 
relationship between the social role of offenders on punishment and standard operating 
procedures on punishment. 
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Consistent with predictions, I found that participants attributed more causality and less 
coerciveness to autonomous offenders and offenders described as offending against standard 
operating procedures for their offenses than conformist offenders and offenders who offend by 
following standard operating procedures. However, contrary to my predictions, I found that 
participants attributed less intentionality to autonomous offenders than conformist offenders, and 
I found that participants attributed less knowledge to offenders who offended against standard 
operating procedures than offenders who offended by following standard operating procedures. 
Also contrary to my predictions, I found that participants attributed less moral wrongfulness to 
autonomous offenders and offenders described as offending against standard operating 
procedures than conformist offenders and those offenders described as offending by following 
standard operating procedures.  
Consistent with punishment hypotheses, participants recommended greater monetary 
fines for autonomous offenders and offenders described as offending against standard operating 
procedures than conformist offenders and those offenders described as offending by following 
standard operating procedures. And, finally, in partial support of mediation hypotheses, I found 
that causality and coercion both mediated the effect of the social role of offenders on punishment 
and standard operating procedures on punishment. However, I did not find significant mediation 
effects for any of the other dimensions of responsibility.                
 Implications of Findings 
 
 The results of findings from the three studies that comprise this dissertation shed 
significant light on criminal impressions and punitiveness for occupational crimes. Findings on 
occupation, offender gender, differences in punitiveness by the word used to describe a crime, 
and how facets of organizational offending affect responsibility attributions and punishment all 
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have significant implications for research, courtroom proceedings, and the criminal justice 
system and the application of the law.     
Significantly, past research does not clearly link an offender’s occupational status to 
criminal perceptions or show how an offender’s occupational status affects sentencing outcomes. 
Findings from this dissertation show that, rather than a high-status occupation having a 
protective effect for offenders that decreases perceptions of criminality, high occupational status 
increases perceptions of criminality and high-status occupational offenders are recommended 
greater sentences for their crimes. Further, I find that high-status occupational offenders are 
punished more harshly for their crimes using two different operationalizations of occupational 
status. Thus, this dissertation contributes to a growing body of literature that shows that 
occupational status increases recommended punitiveness. Criminologists began studying white-
collar crimes because they believed that high status offenders were more likely to get away with 
their crimes and they believed that an offender’s high status decreased criminal impressions of 
white-collar offenders (Sutherland 1940, 1983). However, findings from this dissertation support 
the idea that we are in a period of transformed attention concerning white-collar crimes (Cullen, 
Hartman, and Johnson 2009). Therefore, citizens may be more in favor of harsher punishments 
for white-collar criminals than in the past, and judges and criminal justice officials may also be 
more willing to assign harsher punishments for white-collar offenders than in the past. However, 
despite these findings and findings in recent research, higher status occupational offenders still 
benefit from their high-status position in multiple ways when interacting with the criminal justice 
system (Shaprio 1990), and judges still have significant leeway in assigning sentences. Thus, in 
the future, policy makers and criminal justice officials may need to take into account the greater 
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public desire to punish high-status offenders while also assuring offenders are punished 
according to the law.    
Findings from this dissertation, though, also show that occupational status affects 
punitiveness because of how powerful high-status occupational offenders appear after 
committing a crime. This finding is important, because it suggests that punitiveness for 
occupational offenders is not related to the offender’s occupational status itself but post-event 
impressions of power. This finding is further buttressed by the lack of support for post-event 
impressions of evaluation or status of an offender affecting recommended punishment. Further 
research in this area should examine what it is about high-status occupational offenders that 
makes them appear more powerful after committing a crime than lower status offenders and if 
this effect decreases as the severity of low occupational status offender’s crimes increase. 
Moreover, future research should examine if post-event impressions of power increase 
punitiveness for non-occupational identities and non-occupational crimes to determine if this 
effect is unique to occupational identities and occupational crimes. Further research in this area 
should also examine if the crimes of high-status occupational offenders increase fear of crime 
more generally and fear of being a victim of white-collar crime in particular.  
Notably, this dissertation also finds that participants recommend a lighter punishment for 
female offenders than male offenders. Although previous research shows that female offenders 
are punished less harshly for street crimes than male offenders, it was unclear if this effect 
persisted for occupational crimes. Female offenders being punished less harshly for occupational 
crimes suggests that the leniency afforded females in the sentencing process is unrelated to the 
type of crimes they commit. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that there was no 
significant interaction effect found between offender gender and crime word conditions. Thus, 
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these finding suggest that judicial decision makers and sentencing guidelines may need to better 
account for sentencing discrepancies related to an offender’s gender. Future research in this area 
should also examine what factors influence the lenient treatment found for female offenders 
across crime types. 
Differences in the recommended prison sentence assigned to offenders by the verb used 
to describe an offender’s offense are particularly alarming. Using vignettes allowed me to control 
any differences across crimes and crime types, and offenses only varied by referring to the crime 
as either “stealing from” or “overcharging” clients. The vignettes described the crimes in such a 
manner that it was clear that the overcharging of clients was systematic and purposeful; thus, it is 
highly unlikely that participants believed the overcharging was accidental. This difference in 
findings points to the significant impact that the way in which a crime or an offender is 
presented, including the language used to describe a crime, can have on crime impressions. For 
instance, other research shows that the ways in which defendants present themselves in a court 
setting affects how their crimes are viewed and subsequent punishment. For example, research 
shows that offenders appearing as remorseful in court reduces punishments assigned to them 
(Robinson, Smith-Lovin, and Tsoudis 1994; Tsoudis and Smith-Lovin 1998). Thus, the word 
used to describe a crime may have a similar effect on punishment outcomes, because it allows 
for a crime to be framed in ways that may also affect how offenders are viewed and, 
subsequently, the punishment assigned to them. Additionally, these findings also allude to the 
significant role and power attorneys and other criminal justice officials have in shaping how a 
crime is viewed by the language they use in a courtroom when talking about a crime or an 
offender. Moreover, although crimes in this research were not evaluated by judges, judges are 
not immune to cognitive biases and how the affective meanings of words can affect these biases, 
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as well as, as mentioned above, judges have significant authority to depart from established 
sentencing guidelines. Thus, future research should more carefully evaluate how the affective 
meanings of words used in a court context to describe both offenders and their crimes affect 
sentencing outcomes. 
Finally, findings on attributions of responsibility for the social role of offenders and 
standard operating procedures and how responsibility attributions affect punishment outcomes 
have significant implications for research on the attribution of responsibility. I find that the social 
role of offenders and standard operating procedures are both significantly related to multiple 
dimensions of responsibility, but that they both vary on the respective dimensions to which they 
are related and the direction of the effect (see Table 5.1). If responsibility is a multidimensional 
concept as suggested by attribution theory (Gailey and Lee 2005a; Shaver 1985) and empirical 
work (Gailey and Falk 2008; Gailey 2013), and differences in findings from this dissertation, 
previous research that uses single item measures of responsibility may have incorrectly assessed 
the degree to which responsibility was attributed to offenders and organizations. Findings also 
suggest that responsibility attributions only partially affect punishment outcomes. Both 
autonomous offenders and offenders who offended against standard operating procedures were 
assigned greater punishment by participants. However, neither autonomous offenders or 
offenders who offended against standard operating procedures were assigned greater attributions 
of responsibility on all dimensions of responsibility, and only two dimensions of responsibility, 
causality and coerciveness, mediated the effect of the social role of offenders on punishment and 
standard operating procedures on punishment. High assessments of causality and coerciveness 
mediating the effect of autonomous offending on recommended monetary fines and offending 
against SOPs on recommended monetary fines suggests punitiveness is driven by assessments of 
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how directly involved offenders were in the offense and how much offenders made a free 
decision to act. Punitiveness, in this case, was unrelated to how much actors actually knew what 
it was that they were doing (knowledge), the aim or goal of their actions (intent), or any 
assessment of how moral their actions were (moral wrongfulness). These findings could suggest 
that responsibility attributions are only partially predictive of punishment outcomes, even 
though, intuitively, all responsibility attributions should predict punitiveness. Or, findings could 
also suggest that facets of organizational offending that I did not examine or account for explain 
the lack of findings on all dimensions. For instance, attribution theory also suggests that an 
offender’s social status (Hamilton 1978, 1986; Hamilton and Sanders 1981) within an 
organizational structure affects how their offenses are viewed, and empirical work on 
responsibility attributions suggests that employees are only viewed as partial moral agents 
(Sanders et al. 1996) because they are limited in their decision-making to offend. Therefore, the 
lack of findings on the other three dimensions affecting punishment may vary according to 
different components of organizational offending. For instance, it is possible that, in the case of 
organizational offending, an offender’s social status (i.e., if they are a superior or a subordinate 
in an organizational setting or structure) may drive assessments on the knowledge, intent, or 
morality dimensions of responsibility, which, in turn, then affect punishment. Thus, future work 
should more carefully examine the relationship between the different facets of organizational 
offending, responsibility attributions, and punitive attitudes to determine how and when 
responsibility attributions are related to punitiveness.
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Table for Chapter 5 
Table 5.1 Summary of Hypotheses Results 
Hypothesis Result 
 Chapter 2  
  Occupational status recommended prison sentence hypothesis: Participants will recommend a 
greater prison sentence to high status offenders than they do to medium status offenders, and they 
will recommend a greater prison sentence to medium status offenders than they do to lower status 
offenders (i.e., CEO and doctor > accountant and nurse > receptionists). 
Supported 
  Occupational status recommended monetary fine hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater 
monetary fine to high status offenders than they do to medium status offenders, and they will 
recommend a greater monetary fine to medium status offenders than they do to lower status 
offenders (i.e., CEO and doctor > accountant and nurse > receptionists). 
Supported 
  Crime word recommended prison sentence hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater prison 
sentence for offenders who are described as “stealing from” rather than “overcharging” their clients. 
Supported 
  Crime word recommended monetary fine hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater 
monetary fine for offenders who are described as “stealing from” rather than “overcharging” their 
clients. 
Rejected 
  Offender gender recommended prison sentence hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater 
prison sentence to male offenders than female offenders. 
Supported 
  Offender gender recommended monetary fine hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater 
monetary fine to male offenders than female offenders. 
Supported 
 Chapter 3  
  Deference score hypothesis: High deference scores will increase the recommended prison sentence 
that participants assign to offenders. 
Supported 
  Evaluation and status mediation hypotheses 1-2: Post-event impressions of (1) actor evaluation and 
(2) actor status will mediate the positive effect of deference scores on recommended prison 
sentencing. 
Rejected 
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  Potency and power mediation hypotheses 1-2: Post-event impressions of (1) actor potency and (2) 
actor power will mediate the positive effect of deference scores on recommended prison sentencing. 
Supported 
 Chapter 4  
  Social Role Hypotheses: Participants will attribute greater (1) causality, (2) knowledge, (3) 
intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and less (5) coerciveness to autonomous offenders than to 
conformist offenders. 
 
   Causality Supported 
   Knowledge Rejected 
   Intentionality Rejected* 
   Moral wrongfulness Rejected* 
   Coercion Supported 
  Standard Operating Procedure Hypotheses: Participants will attribute greater (1) causality, (2) 
knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and less (5) coerciveness to offenders who 
offended against standard operating procedures than those who offend by following standard 
operating procedures. 
 
   Causality Supported 
   Knowledge Rejected* 
   Intentionality Rejected 
   Moral wrongfulness Rejected* 
   Coercion Supported 
  Social Role Punishment Hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine to 
autonomous offenders than they do to conformist offenders. 
Supported 
  Standard Operating Procedure Punishment Hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater 
monetary fine to offenders who offended against standard operating procedures than those who 
offend by following standard operating procedures. 
Supported 
  Social Role Mediation Hypotheses: Participants’ attributions of offender (1) causality, (2) 
knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and (5) non-coerciveness will mediate the 
relationship between exposure to an autonomous offender and their recommended monetary fine. 
 
   Causality Supported 
   Knowledge Rejected 
   Intentionality Rejected 
   Moral wrongfulness Rejected 
   Coercion Supported 
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   Standard Operating Procedure Mediation Hypotheses: Participants’ attributions of offender (1) 
causality, (2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and (5) non-coerciveness will 
mediate the relationship between exposure to an offender offending against standard operating 
procedures and their recommended monetary. 
 
   Causality Supported 
   Knowledge Rejected 
   Intentionality Rejected 
   Moral wrongfulness Rejected 
   Coercion Supported 
Note: *Relationship was significant but in opposite direction of what hypothesis predicted 
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Appendix A: Measures and Full Tables for Chapter 4 
 
Table A1. Measures and Anchors for Perceptions of Actor and Behavior 
Characteristics 
Variable Name Wording and Anchors 
 Offender will commit the 
same crime again 
How likely do you think it is that Todd/Emily will 
commit this same crime in the future? (Extremely 
unlikely/Extremely likely) 
 Offender committed the 
same crime in the past 
How often do you think Todd/Emily has committed 
this same crime in the past? (Very rarely/Very 
often) 
 Offender as law abiding In your opinion, how likely is it that Todd/Emily 
generally obeys the law? (Extremely 
unlikely/Extremely likely) 
 Offender status In your opinion, how much status does Todd/Emily 
generally possess? (Extremely low status/Extremely 
high status) 
 Bad Behavior In your opinion, what Todd/Emily did was… 
(Good, nice/Bad, awful) 
 Behavior seriousness Emily’s/Todd’s crime is a serious crime. (Strongly 
disagree/Strongly agree) 
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Table A2. OLS Regressions of Causality, Knowledge, and Intentionality on Conditions and Controls (N = 870) 
   Causality Knowledge Intentionality 
   1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Conditions          
 Autonomous offender (0 = 
conformist offender) 
.374*** 
(.059) 
.306*** 
(.048) 
.308*** 
(.062) 
.013 
(.054) 
-.032 
(.053) 
-.050 
(.068) 
-.073 
(.052) 
-.120** 
(.044) 
-.069 
(.056) 
 Against standard operating 
procedures (0 = standard 
operating procedure) 
.483*** 
(.059) 
.250*** 
(.052) 
.252*** 
(.065) 
.031 
(.054) 
-.131* 
(.057) 
-.151* 
(.070) 
.173*** 
(.052) 
.022 
(.047) 
.072 
(.059) 
 Female offender (0 = male 
offender) 
-.028 
(.059) 
-.005 
(.048) 
-.005 
(.045) 
-.059 
(.054) 
-.082† 
(.048) 
-.082† 
(.048) 
.045 
(.052) 
.079† 
(.040) 
.078† 
(.042) 
 High Financial Loss (0 = 
low financial loss) 
.051 
(.059) 
-.045 
(.044) 
-.045 
(.044) 
.058 
(.054) 
.014 
(.047) 
.014 
(.048) 
.066 
(.052) 
-.020 
(.040) 
-.020 
(.040) 
 Autonomous offender x 
against standard operating 
procedures 
  
 
-.005 
(.089) 
  .041 
(.095) 
  -.116 
(.080) 
Dimensions of Responsibility          
 
Causality 
    .158*** 
(.037) 
.158*** 
(.037) 
 .138*** 
(.031) 
.137*** 
(.031) 
 
Knowledge 
 .136*** 
(.032) 
.136*** 
(.032) 
    .225*** 
(.028) 
.225*** 
(.028) 
 
Intentionality 
 .170*** 
(.036) 
.170*** 
(.036) 
 .322*** 
(.040) 
.323*** 
(.040) 
   
 
Coercion 
 .198*** 
(.034) 
.198*** 
(.035) 
 .025 
(.037) 
.022 
(.038) 
 .064* 
(.031) 
.072** 
(.032) 
 
Moral Wrongfulness 
 .336*** 
(.037) 
.333*** 
(.037) 
 .100* 
(.041) 
.100* 
(.041) 
 .107** 
(.035) 
.105** 
(.035) 
Appropriate Legal 
Punishment 
         
 
Community service 
 -.016 
(.054) 
-.016 
(.054) 
 .096† 
(.058) 
.096† 
(.058) 
 .023 
(.048) 
.024 
(.048) 
 Monetary fine  -.014 -.014  -.088† -.087†  .059 .057 
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(.049) (.049) (.052) (.052) (.044) (.044) 
 
Probation 
 .092† 
(.051) 
.090† 
(.052) 
 .041 
(.055) 
.042 
(.055) 
 -.100* 
(.046) 
-.102* 
(.046) 
 
Imprisonment 
 .085 
(.056) 
.088 
(.056) 
 .004 
(.060) 
.005 
(.060) 
 -.026 
(.050) 
-.030 
(.050) 
Perceptions of Actor and 
Behavior Characteristics 
         
 Offender will commit the 
same crime again 
 -.001 
(.009) 
-.001 
(.009) 
 .012 
(.009) 
.012 
(.009) 
 .015† 
(.008) 
.015† 
(.008) 
 Offender committed same 
crime in the past 
 .012 
(.009) 
.011 
(.009) 
 -.006 
(.009) 
-.006 
(.009) 
 .023** 
(.009) 
.022** 
(.008) 
 
Offender as law abiding 
 -.004 
(.010) 
-.004 
(.010) 
 .003 
(.011) 
.003 
(.011) 
 .011 
(.009) 
.011 
(.009) 
 
Offender status 
 .030** 
(.010) 
.030** 
(.010) 
 .019† 
(.011) 
.019† 
(.011) 
 .017† 
(.009) 
.017† 
(.009) 
 
Bad behavior 
 -.005 
(.016) 
-.005 
(.016) 
 -.003 
(.017) 
-.003 
(.017) 
 .001 
(.015) 
.002 
(.015) 
 
Behavior seriousness 
 .076*** 
(.012) 
.076*** 
(.012) 
 .025† 
(.013) 
.025† 
(.013) 
 .017 
(.011) 
.017 
(.011) 
Participant Attributes          
 
Age 
 .013 
(.012) 
.013 
(.012) 
 -.014 
(.013) 
-.014 
(.013) 
 -.012 
(.011) 
-.012 
(.011) 
 
Age squared 
 -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
 .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
 .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
 Bachelor’s degree or higher 
(0 = less than bachelor’s 
degree) 
 -.149** 
(.052) 
-.149** 
(.052) 
 -.047 
(.057) 
-.046 
(.057) 
 .067 
(.047) 
.065 
(.047) 
 
Student (0 = Mturk) 
 -.086 
(.059) 
-.086 
(.060) 
 -.099 
(.064) 
-.101 
(.064) 
 -.093† 
(.053) 
-.088† 
(.053) 
 
Female (0 = Male) 
 -.113* 
(.046) 
-.113* 
(.046) 
 .084† 
(.050) 
.083† 
(.050) 
 -.103* 
(.042) 
-.101* 
(.042) 
 Gender non-conforming (0 
= Male) 
 -.237 
(.377) 
-.238 
(.378) 
 -.254 
(.406) 
-.252 
(.406) 
 .518 
(.339) 
.510 
(.339) 
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Parental education 
 -.000 
(.016) 
-.000 
(.016) 
 .002 
(.018) 
.002 
(.018) 
 -.016 
(.015) 
-.016 
(.015) 
 
Personal income 
 -.002 
(.016) 
-.002 
(.016) 
 .038* 
(.017) 
.038* 
(.017) 
 -.008 
(.014) 
-.008 
(.014) 
 
Political leaning 
 -.001 
(.009) 
-.001 
(.009) 
 -.005 
(.010) 
-.005 
(.010) 
 -.006 
(.008) 
-.006 
(.008) 
 
Race and Ethnicity 
  
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
  
African American 
 -.011 
(.101) 
-.011 
(.101) 
 .010 
(.108) 
.008 
(.108) 
 -.146 
(.090) 
-.140 
(.090) 
  
American Indian 
 .084 
(.113) 
.084 
(.114) 
 .082 
(.122) 
.080 
(.122) 
 -.178† 
(.102) 
-.172† 
(.102) 
  Asian American, 
Hawaiian, or Pacific 
Islander 
 -.042 
(.087) 
-.042 
(.087) 
 -.055 
(.093) 
-.055 
(.093) 
 -.114 
(.078) 
-.115 
(.078) 
  
Hispanic 
 -.016 
(.095) 
-.016 
(.096) 
 .067 
(.102) 
.067 
(.103) 
 -.169* 
(.086) 
-.169* 
(.085) 
  Mixed race, 
international, or other 
 .143 
(.139) 
.143 
(.139) 
 .155 
(.149) 
.157 
(.149) 
 -.525*** 
(.124) 
-.528*** 
(.124) 
 
Religious affiliation  
  
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
  
Catholic 
 -.015 
(.099) 
-.015 
(.099) 
 .195† 
(.106) 
.195† 
(.106) 
 -.085 
(.089) 
-.086 
(.089) 
  
Evangelical Protestant  
 .013 
(.087) 
.013 
(.087) 
 .204* 
(.093) 
.205* 
(.093) 
 -.149† 
(.078) 
-.152† 
(.078) 
  No affiliation, agnostic, 
or atheist 
 -.169† 
(.096) 
-.169† 
(.096) 
 .068 
(.103) 
.068 
(.103) 
 -.050 
(.086) 
-.051 
(.086) 
  
Other 
 -.036 
(.115) 
-.036 
(.115) 
 .183 
(.123) 
.183 
(.123) 
 -.026 
(.103) 
-.024 
(.103) 
 Religious attendance 
frequency 
 .005 
(.018) 
.005 
(.018) 
 -.019 
(.019) 
-.019 
(.019) 
 .009 
(.016) 
.009 
(.016) 
 
Intercept 
-.432 
(.066) 
-.991 
(.304) 
-.991 
(.304) 
-.017 
(.061) 
-.100 
(.329) 
-.095 
(.329) 
-.105 
(.058) 
-.010 
(.275) 
-.025 
(.275) 
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 R2 .110 .551 .551 .004 .301 .301 .018 .367 .369 
 Adjusted R2 .106 .531 .531 -.001 .270 .269 .014 .339 .340 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Models 1only include conditions. Model 2 includes 
all conditions, appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. 
Model 3 includes all variables in Model 2 and an interaction effect between autonomous offenders and offending against standard 
operating procedures. 
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Table A3. OLS Regressions of Coercion and Moral Wrongfulness on Conditions and Controls (N = 870) 
   Coercion Moral Wrongfulness 
   1 2 3 1 2 3 
Conditions       
 Autonomous offender (0 = 
conformist offender) 
.571*** 
(.047) 
.504*** 
(.046) 
.284*** 
(.061) 
-.073 
(.057) 
-.181*** 
(.044) 
-.150** 
(.056) 
 Against standard operating 
procedures (0 = standard 
operating procedures) 
.841*** 
(.048) 
.721*** 
(.046) 
.496*** 
(.062) 
.067 
(.057) 
-.143** 
(.047) 
-.112† 
(.058) 
 Female offender (0 = male 
offender) 
.043 
(.048) 
.044 
(.045) 
.044 
(.044) 
.027 
(.057) 
-.004 
(.040) 
-.005 
(.040) 
 High Financial Loss (0 = low 
financial loss) 
.016 
(.047) 
-.016 
(.044) 
-.013 
(.043) 
.102† 
(.573) 
.038 
(.040) 
.038 
(.040) 
 Autonomous offender x against 
standard operating procedures 
  .460*** 
(.085) 
  -.071 
(.079) 
Dimensions of Responsibility       
 
Causality 
 .197*** 
(.034) 
.190*** 
(.033) 
 .270*** 
(.030) 
.270*** 
(.030) 
 
Knowledge 
 .021 
(.032) 
.018 
(.032) 
 .069* 
(.029) 
.070* 
(.029) 
 
Intentionality 
 .078* 
(.038) 
.086* 
(.038) 
 .106** 
(.034) 
.105** 
(.034) 
 
Coercion 
  
 
  .064† 
(.031) 
.069* 
(.032) 
 
Moral Wrongfulness 
 .080* 
(.038) 
.083* 
(.038) 
   
 
Appropriate Legal Punishment       
 
Community service 
 -.091† 
(.054) 
-.089† 
(.053) 
 .037 
(.048) 
.038 
(.048) 
 
Monetary fine 
 .029 
(.049) 
.033 
(.048) 
 -.009 
(.044) 
-.009 
(.044) 
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Probation 
 .005 
(.051) 
.017 
(.050) 
 .023 
(.046) 
.021 
(.046) 
 
Imprisonment 
 .109† 
(.056) 
.119* 
(.055) 
 .010 
(.050) 
.008 
(.050) 
Perceptions of Actor and Behavior 
Characteristics 
      
 Offender will commit the same 
crime again 
 .005 
(.009) 
.004 
(.009) 
 -.016* 
(.008) 
-.016* 
(.008) 
 
Offender committed same crime 
in the past 
 -.009 
(.009) 
-.005 
(.009) 
 .007 
(.008) 
.006 
(.008) 
 
 
Offender as law abiding 
 -.030** 
(.010) 
-.027** 
(.010) 
 .001 
(.009) 
.001 
(.009) 
 
Offender status 
 -.007 
(.010) 
-.007 
(.010) 
 -.016† 
(.009) 
-.016† 
(.009) 
 
Bad behavior 
 -.013 
(.016) 
-.014 
(.016) 
 -.191*** 
(.013) 
-.190*** 
(.013) 
 
Behavior seriousness 
 -.031* 
(.012) 
-.031* 
(.012) 
 .009 
(.011) 
.009 
(.011) 
Participant Attributes 
      
 
Age 
 .008 
(.012) 
.008 
(.012) 
 .044*** 
(.011) 
.044*** 
(.011) 
 
Age squared 
 -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
 -.000** 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
 Bachelor’s degree or higher (0 = 
less than bachelor’s degree) 
 -.052 
(.052) 
-.043 
(.052) 
 .039 
(.047) 
.037 
(.047) 
 
Student (0 = Mturk) 
 .067 
(.059) 
.048 
(.058) 
 .222*** 
(.053) 
.224*** 
(.053) 
 
Female (0 = Male) 
 -.032 
(.046) 
-.039 
(.046) 
 .127** 
(.041) 
.128** 
(.041) 
 Gender non-conforming (0 = 
Male) 
 -.748* 
(.375) 
-.696† 
(.369) 
 -.167 
(.338) 
-.171 
(.338) 
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Parental education 
 -.019 
(.016) 
-.018 
(.015) 
 .044** 
(.015) 
.044** 
(.015) 
 
Personal income 
 .021 
(.016) 
.018 
(.015) 
 -.009 
(.014) 
-.009 
(.014) 
 
Political leaning 
 .015 
(.009) 
.015 
(.009) 
 .001 
(.008) 
.001 
(.008) 
 
Race and Ethnicity 
   
 
   
 
 
 African American 
 .090 
(.100) 
.064 
(.099) 
 .033 
(.090) 
.037 
(.090) 
 
 American Indian 
 .065 
(.113) 
.040 
(.111) 
 -.091 
(.101) 
-.087 
(.102) 
 
 
Asian American, Hawaiian, or 
Pacific Islander 
 -.242** 
(.086) 
-.227** 
(.085) 
 -.259*** 
(.077) 
-.260*** 
(.077) 
 
 Hispanic 
 -.022 
(.095) 
-.023 
(.094) 
 .004 
(.085) 
.005 
(.085) 
 
 
Mixed race, international, or 
other 
 -.098 
(.139) 
-.077 
(.136) 
 .060 
(.125) 
.057 
(.125) 
 
 
Religious affiliation  
   
 
   
 
  
Catholic 
 .224* 
(.098) 
.219* 
(.097) 
 -.081 
(.089) 
-.081 
(.089) 
  
Evangelical Protestant  
 .151† 
(.086) 
.158† 
(.085) 
 -.061 
(.078) 
-.063 
(.078) 
  No affiliation, agnostic, or 
atheist 
 .177† 
(.096) 
.173† 
(.094) 
 .109 
(.086) 
.109 
(.086) 
  
Other 
 .280* 
(.114) 
.265* 
(.112) 
 -.081 
(.103) 
-.080 
(.103) 
 
Religious attendance frequency 
 -.024 
(.018) 
-.024 
(.017) 
 .018 
(.016) 
.018 
(.016) 
 
Intercept 
-.722 
(.053) 
-.434 
(.305) 
-.357 
(.300) 
-.062 
(.064) 
-.720 
(.273) 
-.729 
(.273) 
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 R2 .347 .491 .507 .007 .571 .572 
 Adjusted R2 .344 .467 .485 .003 .552 .552 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Models 1only include conditions. 
Model 2 includes all conditions, appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior 
characteristics, and participant attributes. Model 3 includes all variables in Model 2 and an interaction effect between 
autonomous offenders and offending against standard operating procedures. 
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Table A4. OLS Regressions of Recommended Monetary Fine on Conditions, Dimensions of Responsibility, and Controls     
(N = 870) 
  
Monetary Fine 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conditions        
 Autonomous 
offender (0 = 
conformist offender) 
8.635*** 
(2.128) 
7.196** 
(2.206) 
8.619*** 
(2.129) 
8.674*** 
(2.128) 
6.499** 
(2.320) 
8.562*** 
(2.127) 
4.971* 
(2.383) 
 Against standard 
operating procedures 
(0 = standard 
operating 
procedures) 
4.311* 
(2.141) 
2.715 
(2.237) 
4.306* 
(2.142) 
4.050† 
(2.156) 
1.277 
(2.517) 
4.425* 
(2.142) 
-.119 
(2.552) 
 Female offender (0 
= male offender) 
-4.145† 
(2.169) 
-4.188† 
(2.163) 
-4.121† 
(2.172) 
-4.274* 
(2.173) 
-4.332* 
(2.165) 
-4.131† 
(2.168) 
-4.439* 
(2.163) 
 High Financial Loss 
(0 = low financial 
loss) 
23.714*** 
(2.149) 
23.880*** 
(2.144) 
23.714*** 
(2.150) 
23.761*** 
(2.149) 
23.807*** 
(2.144) 
23.760*** 
(2.148) 
24.126*** 
(2.138) 
Dimensions of 
Responsibility 
       
 
Causality  
3.494* 
(1.465) 
    
4.185* 
(1.676) 
 
Knowledge   
.442 
(1.443) 
   
-.490 
(1.559) 
 
Intentionality    
1.801 
(1.706) 
  
1.206 
(1.865) 
 
Coercion     
3.672* 
(1.612) 
 
3.141† 
(1.681) 
 
Moral Wrongfulness      
-2.290 
(1.708) 
-4.937** 
(1.871) 
Intercept -14.350 -7.785 -14.008 -13.168 -10.736 -17.588 -9.965 
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(14.533) (14.751) (14.583) (14.575) (14.583) (14.725) (14.788) 
R2 .291 .296 .291 .292 .296 .293 .305 
Adjusted R2 .263 .267 .263 .263 .267 .264 .273 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Models 1-7 control for: all conditions, 
appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. 
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Appendix B: Survey Instrument 
 
I am participating in this research  
  As a student at the University of Oklahoma 
  As a student at Oklahoma City Community College 
  As a Mechanical Turk User 
 
[If OU student or Mturk user, ask 18 or older question. If OCCC participant 
as 18 or older question with parental consent option.] 
[Only if answered OU or Mturk on where] Are you 18 or older? 
Yes 
No 
 
[If Yes, ask what year born question. If no, send to end of survey and present 
with not 18 or older message.] 
 
What year were you born? Please write it in the box below. 
(text box) 
 
***Only display assent form if OCCC participant has indicated that they have turned in a 
signed parental consent form. *** 
 
Signed Assent (Over 12) to Participate in Research 
 
Would you like to be involved in research at the University of Oklahoma? 
I am Marshall from the University of Oklahoma and I invite you to participate in my research 
project entitled Mock Jurors’ Reactions to Crime. This research is being conducted at The 
University of Oklahoma. You were selected as a possible participant because you are enrolled in 
classes at Oklahoma City Community College. In order to participate in this research, you must 
give your assent and your parent/s must give their permission. 
Please read this document and contact me to ask any questions that you may have 
BEFORE agreeing to take part in my research. 
What is the purpose of this research? The purpose of this research is to understand attitudes 
and opinions on crime. 
How many participants will be in this research? About 2,000 people will take part in this 
research. 
What will I be asked to do? If you agree to be in this research, you will take an online 15-
minute survey one time. 
How long will this take? Your participation will take about 15 minutes one time. 
What are the risks and/or benefits if I participate? There are no more than minimal risks and 
no benefits from being in this research. 
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Will I be compensated for participating? You will be reimbursed for your time and 
participation in this study with course credit or extra credit. The points you receives are 
determined by your course instructor.  You must complete the survey to receive any credit.  
Some of the questions require a response to advance to the next screen. So, to complete the 
survey and receive credit, you must answer those questions. 
Who will see my information? In research reports, there will be no information that will make 
it possible to identify you. Research records will be stored securely and only approved 
researchers and the OU Institutional Review Board will have access to the records. 
You have the right to access the research data that has been collected about you as a part of this 
research. However, you may not have access to this information until the entire research has 
completely finished and you consent to this temporary restriction. 
Do I have to participate? No. If you do not participate, you will not be penalized or lose 
benefits or services unrelated to the research. If you decide to participate, you don’t have to 
answer any question and can stop participating at any time. 
Will my identity be anonymous or confidential? Your name will not be retained or linked with 
your responses.  
Who do I contact with questions, concerns or complaints? If you have questions, concerns or 
complaints about the research or have experienced a research-related injury, the researchers 
conducting the study can be contacted at:  
Marshall Schmidt (Principal Investigator) 
Email: marshall.r.schmidt-1@ou.edu 
Phone: (405) 325-1751 
 
Dr. Amy Kroska (Faculty Sponsor) 
Email: amykroska@ou.edu 
Phone: (405) 325-1751 
You can also contact the University of Oklahoma – Norman Campus Institutional Review Board 
(OU-NC IRB) at 405-325-8110 or irb@ou.edu if you have questions about your rights as a 
research participant, concerns, or complaints about the research and wish to talk to someone 
other than the researcher(s) or if you cannot reach the researcher(s). 
 
You may print out a copy of this consent form to keep.  
 
Statement of Consent 
 
I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received satisfactory 
answers. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to indicate so below. 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Oklahoma, Norman Campus IRB.  
 
IRB Number: 8098 
Approval Date: 05/25/2017  
(radio button) I agree to participate 
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(radio button) I decline to participate 
 
***Only display informed consent form if participant indicates that they are 18 or 
older.*** 
 
University of Oklahoma 
Institutional Review Board 
Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
  
Project Title: Mock Jurors’ Reaction to Crime 
Principal Investigator: Marshall Schmidt 
Department: Sociology 
  
You are being asked to volunteer for this research study. This study is being conducted at the 
University of Oklahoma. You were selected as a possible participant because you are registered 
as a current student at OU, you are registered as a current student at Oklahoma City Community 
College, or as a Mechanical Turk user. You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this 
study.   
 
 
Please read this form before agreeing to take part in this study. 
  
Purpose of the research study 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate perceptions of crime. 
  
Number of participants 
 
About 2,000 people will participate in this experiment.  
 
Procedures 
 
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire on-line. 
 
Length of participation 
 
The study should take about 15 minutes. 
 
The risks of being in this study are 
 
There are no more than minimal risks associated with this study.  
 
Compensation 
  
University of Oklahoma students will be compensated by their entry into a lottery drawing for 
one of six $25 Amazon gift cards. Oklahoma City Community College students will be 
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compensated for their time and participation with class credit. If you are taking this survey as a 
Mechanical Turk user you will be compensated $1.00 for your participation in the study. You 
must complete the survey to receive any form of compensation. Some of the questions require a 
correct response to advance to the next screen. So, to complete the survey and receive credit, you 
must answer those questions.  
 
Confidentiality 
 
In published reports, there will be no information included that will make it possible to identify 
you. Research records will be stored securely and only approved researchers will have access to 
the records. 
 
The University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board may inspect and/or copy research 
records for quality assurance and data analysis. 
 
Voluntary nature of the study 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary.  If you withdraw or decline participation, you will not be 
penalized or lose benefits or services unrelated to the study.  If you decide to participate, you 
may decline to answer any question and may choose to withdraw at any time. 
 
Contacts and questions 
 
If you have concerns, complaints, or questions, the researchers conducting this study can be 
contacted at: 
 
Marshall Schmidt (Principal Investigator) 
Email: marshall.r.schmidt-1@ou.edu 
Phone: (405) 325-1751 
 
Dr. Amy Kroska (Faculty Sponsor) 
Email: amykroska@ou.edu 
Phone: (405) 325-1751 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, concerns, or complaints 
about the research and wish to talk to someone other than individuals on the research team, or if 
you cannot reach the research team, you may contact the University of Oklahoma – Norman 
Campus Institutional Review Board (OU-NC IRB) at 405-325-8110 or irb@ou.edu. 
 
You may print out a copy of this consent form to keep.  
 
Statement of Consent 
 
I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received satisfactory 
answers. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to indicate so below. 
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This study has been approved by the University of Oklahoma, Norman Campus IRB.  
 
IRB Number: 8098 
Approval Date: 05/25/2017 
 
I agree to participate 
I decline to participate 
 
 
Instructions for Logging Off and Resuming Work Later 
If you need to log off before you have completed the survey, you can save your work and pick up 
where you left off as long as: (1) you resume work on the same computer using the same web 
browser, and (2) you do not clear your browser history or cookies before resuming work.  If you 
do not follow these steps, you will lose your work and have to start the survey again from the 
beginning. 
Perceptions of Crime 
 
Instructions: Please give your honest personal opinions and feelings when answering questions. 
 
We would like to start by collecting some information about you. 
 
What is your age? Please write it in the box below. 
(text box) 
What is your gender? Please write it in the box below. 
(text box) 
 
What is your ethnic or racial background? 
 African American 
American Indian 
Asian 
Hispanic 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
White/Caucasian 
International student (you will be asked to specify country) 
Other, please specify: (text box) 
 
 (If international student) What country? (text box) 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Did not graduate from high school/did not earn a GED 
High school graduate/GED 
Some college but no degree 
Associate’s degree (e.g., AA, AS, AAS) 
Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, BS) 
Graduate or professional degree (e.g., MA, MS, PhD, MD, DDS, JD) 
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Are you currently enrolled in college (undergraduate)? 
Yes 
No 
I am enrolled in a combined BA/MA or BS/MS program 
 
[If yes, ask question on undergraduate status. If no, skip to question on 
graduate school] 
 
[Only if yes to under] What is your undergraduate status? 
  Freshman 
  Sophomore 
  Junior 
  Senior 
  Combined BA/MA or BS/MS (e.g., a program that combines a BA 
   or BS with an MA or MS degree) (you will be asked other 
   questions) 
  Other (please specify): (text box) 
 
[If respondent indicated BA/MA, ask question on program. If no, skip to 
question on graduate school] 
 [Only if answered combined on undergyr] Where are you in your progress toward your 
BA/MA or BS/MS? (please explain) 
    (text box) 
[Only if answered combined on undergyr] Are you taking predominately undergraduate or 
graduate level classes? (please explain) 
    (text box) 
[Ask if answered no on under.] Are you currently enrolled in graduate or professional school? 
Yes 
No 
 
[If yes, ask question on graduate school status and question on program of 
study. If no and no on under, skip to question on marital status. If no but yes 
on under then ask question on major] 
 
[Ask if answered yes on grad.] What year are you in graduate school? 
  First year 
  Second year 
  Third year 
  Fourth year 
  Fifth year 
  Sixth year or higher 
 [Ask if answered yes on grad.] What is your program of study? (please write it in the box 
below) 
  (text box) 
[If yes to undergraduate and no to graduate school ask major question.] 
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[Ask if answered yes on under.]  What is your academic major? (please choose only one) 
  Business (Accounting, Economics, Finance, Management etc.) 
  Computer Science, Engineering  
  Education 
  Humanities (Art, Communications, English, Foreign Languages, History, 
  Journalism, Music, Philosophy, etc.) 
  Natural/Physical Sciences (Agriculture, Biology, Chemistry, Geology, 
  Mathematics, Medicine, Natural Resources, Nursing, Pharmacy, Physics, 
  Pre-Med. etc.) 
  Social/Behavioral Sciences (Anthropology, Political Science, Psychology, 
  Sociology, Social Work, etc.) 
  Undecided 
   Other (Please Specify): (text box) 
 
What is your marital status? 
Never Married  
Cohabiting with significant other but not married 
Married  
Married but separated 
Widowed 
Divorced 
 
Do you have children? 
Yes 
No 
[if yes to child ask question on how many] 
[if yes on child, ask] How many children do you have? 
(text box)   
 
How many hours per week do you usually work for pay? 
0 
1-5 
6-10 
11-15 
16-20 
21-30 
31-35 
36-40 
41-45 
46-50 
51-60 
61 or more 
 
What is your occupation? (please type it in the box below) 
    (text box) 
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What is the highest level of education your father achieved?  
Did not graduate from high school/did not earn a GED 
High school graduate/GED 
Some college but no degree 
Associate’s degree (e.g., AA, AS, AAS) 
Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, BS) 
Graduate or professional degree (e.g., Master’s, PhD, MD, DDS, JD) 
Don't know 
 
What is the highest level of education your mother achieved?  
 Did not graduate from high school/did not earn a GED 
 High school graduate/GED 
 Some college but no degree 
 Associate’s degree (e.g., AA, AS, AAS) 
 Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, BS) 
 Graduate or professional degree (e.g., Master’s, PhD, MD, DDS, JD) 
 Don't know 
 
[Only ask if answered yes on under or yes on grad] What is your parents' combined 
estimated yearly income? 
 $0-19,999 
 $20,000-39,999 
 $40,000-59,999 
 $60,000-79,999 
 $80,000-99,999 
 $100,000-119,999 
 $120,000-139,999 
 $140,000-159,999 
 $160,000-179,999 
 $180,000-199,999 
 $200,000-or greater 
 
What is your estimated yearly income? 
 $0-19,999 
 $20,000-39,999 
 $40,000-59,999 
 $60,000-79,999 
 $80,000-99,999 
 $100,000-119,999 
 $120,000-139,999 
 $140,000-159,999 
 $160,000-179,999 
 $180,000-199,999 
 $200,000-or greater 
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With which of the following do you most affiliate? (please choose one) 
No religion/secular 
Agnostic 
Atheist 
Assembly of God 
Baptist 
Born-again Christian 
Buddhism 
Catholic 
Christian, non-denominational 
Episcopalian/Anglican 
Evangelical Christian 
Islam/Muslim 
Jewish 
Lutheran 
Methodist/Wesleyan 
Pentecostal/Charismatic 
Presbyterian 
Other (please specify): (text box) 
 
How frequently do you attend religious services? 
Never 
Once or twice a year 
   Several times a year 
   Monthly 
   Weekly 
   Multiple times a week 
   Daily 
  
 
About how many hours a week do you think you spend reading news articles (both online and in 
print)? 
 0 hours_______100 hours 
 
 
Below are two scales on which the political views that people might hold are arranged. Click and 
drag the slider to indicate where you see yourself along each continuum: 
 
Politically, I am: 
Extremely Liberal ____________ Extremely Conservative 
 
I see myself as: 
100%  Democrat ____________ 100% Republican 
 
If the continuum from Democrat to Republican does not fit how you see yourself, you can use 
this box to more fully describe how you see yourself politically. 
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   (textbox) 
 
Instructions: Now please carefully read the information below from a pre-sentencing case 
summary report. Imagine that you are a juror who is being asked to weigh in on this court case. 
After reading the pre-sentencing case summary report, you will be asked to give your own 
opinion about features of the case. We will also ask you memory questions to be sure that you 
read the pre-sentencing case summary report carefully. As previously stated, you are eligible for 
compensation for your time and participation in the study via class credit or entry into a gift card 
lottery as a student participant, or payment as Mechanical Turk user. However, if you fail to 
answer at least 2 out of the 3 memory questions correctly, this will indicate that you have not 
read the pre-sentencing case summary report carefully, and you will not be permitted to complete 
the survey or be eligible for compensation.   
 
(Bolded words with slashes indicate different conditions within vignettes. Respondents will 
only be exposed to one condition). 
Medical vignette:  
Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white female/male 
receptionist/nurse/doctor who has worked at a small private senior retirement community for 
the last twelve years. The retirement community offers both independent and assisted living 
accommodations for residents and also makes available medical services to residents. 
Emily/Todd is well liked by residents in the community, and is also one of the longest tenured 
and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization’s 
billing systems. Emily/Todd is also seen by many in the retirement community as an advocate 
for residents, and many residents have entrusted her/him with access to their private health care 
and financial information. Emily/Todd knows that her/his work will only be checked if a major 
issue arises and that neither residents nor insurers are likely to question her/his work, because 
residents receive a lot of medical paperwork, and insurers process too many claims to check if all 
the claims are legitimate. For the last eight years Emily/Todd has been able to steal 
from/overcharge residents and insurers by adding extra fees and services to residents’ bills and 
by charging these false claims to insurers. Emily/Todd has been able to personally profit about 
$100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, residents suffer financial losses, though 
each loses no more than $200. Insurance companies lose money from false claims, but yearly 
premium increases cover those losses.  
Financial services vignette:  
Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white female/male 
receptionist/accountant/CEO who has worked at a small private financial planning and 
investments firm for the last twelve years. The firm works with clients to develop financial plans 
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for their future, including estate planning, retirement planning, insurance dealings, and portfolio 
investing. Emily/Todd is well liked by clients of the firm, and is also one of the longest tenured 
and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization’s 
billing systems. Emily/Todd is also seen by many clients and those in her/his company as 
someone who is meticulous and careful in her/his work, so she/he knows that her/his work will 
only be checked if a major issue arises and that neither the firm nor her/his clients are likely to 
question her/his work, because clients usually have many investments, and the firm processes 
too many transactions to check on prices of all investments and services sold. For the last eight 
years Emily/Todd has been able to steal from/overcharge clients by providing inflated costs on 
investments and by adding extra fees for services to clients’ accounts. Emily/Todd has been able 
to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, clients suffer 
financial losses, though each loses no more than $200 dollars. The firm does not suffer as a 
direct result of Emily’s/Todd’s actions as increases in fees cover the losses.  
According to the pre-sentencing report, what was the occupation of the person who committed 
the crime?  
 
Accountant 
CEO 
Doctor 
Nurse 
Receptionist 
 
According to the pre-sentencing report, what crime was committed?  
 
 Overcharging clients 
 Destruction of clients’ property  
 Stealing from clients 
 
 
According to the pre-sentencing report, about how much total money was lost as a result of the 
crime? 
 
$100,000 
$1,000,000 
 
Vignettes and manipulations for study 2 
 
Emily/Todd Smith works in the financial services industry for National Finance, which is a 
private financial planning and investments firm that primarily works with clients to diversify 
their financial investments. Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers 
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has/have full control over many of her/his/their clients’ investment accounts. Her/His/Their 
control includes the ability to transfer money to and from personal investment accounts without 
approval of clients. People in positions of authority at National Finance have created a corporate 
culture that encourages/discourages pushing the limits in investments with clients’ money as 
part of their normal business practices. National Finance has had a rough past five years, having 
lost significant client money through bad investments. As a result, Emily/Todd/Todd and his 
co- workers/Emily and her co-workers has/have felt compelled to work together to illegally 
use investment money from newly recruited clients to cover losses to long term clients. 
Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers know(s) that it is illegal to 
use her/his/their clients’ personal money to cover business losses, but that no one will know as 
long as long-term investors are still seeing returns on their investments. This idea to cover long 
term losses with money from new investors comes from/does not come from those who are in 
the highest positions of authority at National Finance. Eventually, Emily/Todd/Todd and his 
co-workers/Emily and her co-workers was/were unable to cover the losses made on older 
accounts with money from new investors; consequently a few dozen clients lost $3,000 each, 
resulting in a total loss of about $100,000/a few hundred clients lost $3,000 each, resulting 
in a total loss of about $1,000,000.  
 
According to the pre-sentencing report, who committed the crime?  
 
No one 
An individual employee 
A group of employees 
 
According to the pre-sentencing report, did those who were in positions of authority at National 
Finance create a corporate culture that encouraged employees to push the limits in investments 
with clients’ money?  
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
According to the pre-sentencing report, about how much total money was lost as a result of the 
crime? 
 
$100,000 
$1,000,000 
 
Now, please take a moment to think about Emily’s/Todd’s crime and its consequences. 
Answer each of the following questions by either clicking and dragging the slider to the position 
or selecting the choice that corresponds to your judgment. The pre-sentencing case summary 
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report has been provided for your reference. 
 
Medical vignette:  
Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white female/male 
receptionist/nurse/doctor who has worked at a small private senior retirement community for 
the last twelve years. The retirement community offers both independent and assisted living 
accommodations for residents and also makes available medical services to residents. 
Emily/Todd is well liked by residents in the community, and is also one of the longest tenured 
and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization’s 
billing systems. Emily/Todd is also seen by many in the retirement community as an advocate 
for residents, and many residents have entrusted her/him with access to their private health care 
and financial information. Emily/Todd knows that her/his work will only be checked if a major 
issue arises and that neither residents nor insurers are likely to question her/his work, because 
residents receive a lot of medical paperwork, and insurers process too many claims to check if all 
the claims are legitimate. For the last eight years Emily/Todd has been able to steal 
from/overcharge residents and insurers by adding extra fees and services to residents’ bills and 
by charging these false claims to insurers. Emily/Todd has been able to personally profit about 
$100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, residents suffer financial losses, though 
each loses no more than $200. Insurance companies lose money from false claims, but yearly 
premium increases cover those losses.  
Financial services vignette:  
Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white female/male 
receptionist/accountant/CEO who has worked at a small private financial planning and 
investments firm for the last twelve years. The firm works with clients to develop financial plans 
for their future, including estate planning, retirement planning, insurance dealings, and portfolio 
investing. Emily/Todd is well liked by clients of the firm, and is also one of the longest tenured 
and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization’s 
billing systems. Emily/Todd is also seen by many clients and those in her/his company as 
someone who is meticulous and careful in her/his work, so she/he knows that her/his work will 
only be checked if a major issue arises and that neither the firm nor her/his clients are likely to 
question her/his work, because clients usually have many investments, and the firm processes 
too many transactions to check on prices of all investments and services sold. For the last eight 
years Emily/Todd has been able to steal from/overcharge clients by providing inflated costs on 
investments and by adding extra fees for services to clients’ accounts. Emily/Todd has been able 
to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, clients suffer 
financial losses, though each loses no more than $200 dollars. The firm does not suffer as a 
direct result of Emily’s/Todd’s actions as increases in fees cover the losses. 
 
Emily/Todd Smith works in the financial services industry for National Finance, which is a 
private financial planning and investments firm that primarily works with clients to diversify 
their financial investments. Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers 
has/have full control over many of her/his/their clients’ investment accounts. Her/His/Their 
control includes the ability to transfer money to and from personal investment accounts without 
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approval of clients. People in positions of authority at National Finance have created a corporate 
culture that encourages/discourages pushing the limits in investments with clients’ money as 
part of their normal business practices. National Finance has had a rough past five years, having 
lost significant client money through bad investments. As a result, Emily/Todd/Todd and his 
co- workers/Emily and her co-workers has/have felt compelled to work together to illegally 
use investment money from newly recruited clients to cover losses to long term clients. 
Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers know(s) that it is illegal to 
use her/his/their clients’ personal money to cover business losses, but that no one will know as 
long as long-term investors are still seeing returns on their investments. This idea to cover long 
term losses with money from new investors comes from/does not come from those who are in 
the highest positions of authority at National Finance. Eventually, Emily/Todd/Todd and his 
co-workers/Emily and her co-workers was/were unable to cover the losses made on older 
accounts with money from new investors; consequently a few dozen clients lost $3,000 each, 
resulting in a total loss of about $100,000/a few hundred clients lost $3,000 each, resulting 
in a total loss of about $1,000,000. 
 
How should Emily/Todd be punished for her/his crime? (choose all that apply) 
Community service 
A monetary fine 
Probation 
Imprisonment 
 
Imagine now that Emily/Todd will be punished with a fine and only a fine. How large should the 
fine should be? 
No fine______________ $1,000,000 
 
  
Imagine now that Emily/Todd will be punished with a prison sentence and only a prison 
sentence. How long should the sentence be? 
 
Prison Sentence In Years  
 
No Prison___5 ____10_____15______20_____25 (years displayed) 
 
Emily’s/Todd’s crime is a serious crime.  
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Stealing is a serious crime.  
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Overcharging is a serious crime.  
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Please provide your opinion on each of the following questions by clicking and dragging the 
slider to the position that corresponds to your judgment.  
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Todd/Emily is responsible for what happened. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily is at fault for what happened. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily could have avoided what happened. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
The crime described in the pre-sentencing report was preventable. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily was aware of the potential consequences for what happened. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily was able to foresee the harm of his/her actions. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily recognized the seriousness of his/her actions. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily intended to commit the crime. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily intended to harm residents at the retirement community/clients at the financial 
planning and investments firm/clients of National Finance. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd’s/Emily’s actions were an accident. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily planned his/her actions in advance. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily acted of his/her own will. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Other people influenced Todd/Emily to act. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily was coerced in his/her actions. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Someone else besides Todd/Emily was responsible for the crime. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
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What Todd/Emily did was wrong. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily was acting morally. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily was deceitful in his/her actions. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Todd/Emily was justified in his/her actions. 
Strongly disagree _______ Strongly agree 
 
Please take a moment and think about the description of Todd/Emily given in the pre-sentencing 
report. Answer each of the following questions by clicking and dragging the slider to the position 
that corresponds to your judgment of Todd/Emily. 
 
In your opinion, how much status does Todd/Emily generally possess?  
Extremely low status_________ Extremely high status 
 
In your opinion, how competent is Todd/Emily?  
Extremely incompetent_____ Extremely competent 
 
In your opinion, how intelligent is Todd/Emily?  
Extremely unintelligent_____ Extremely intelligent 
 
How likely do you think it is that Todd/Emily will commit this same crime in the future?  
Extremely unlikely______ Extremely likely 
 
How often do you think Todd/Emily has committed this same crime in the past?  
Very rarely ______ Very often 
 
In your opinion how likely is it that Todd/Emily generally obeys the law?  
Extremely unlikely______ Extremely likely 
 
In your opinion, what Todd/Emily did was… 
Good, nice_____Bad, awful 
 
In your opinion, what Todd/Emily did was… 
Powerful, nice_____ Powerless, little 
 
In your opinion, how dangerous is Todd/Emily? 
Not at all dangerous ________ Extremely dangerous 
 
In your opinion, how blameworthy is Todd/Emily? 
Not at all blameworthy ________  Extremely blameworthy 
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In your opinion, how much direct control over the lives of others does Todd/Emily have? 
No control at all ________ Total control 
 
How much power do you think Emily/Todd has to keep people from getting what they want or 
need? 
No power at all________ A great amount of power 
 
How likely do you think it is for Emily/Todd to be able to carry out his or her own will by 
overcoming the resistance of others? 
Extremely unlikely________ Extremely likely 
 
How much authority do you think Todd/Emily has to enforce decisions against powerful 
individuals and organizations? 
No authority whatsoever ________ A great amount of authority 
 
In your opinion, how valuable to society is Todd/Emily? 
Of no value whatsoever________ Extremely valuable  
 
What do you think is the social rank of Todd/Emily compared to people in other occupations? 
Extremely low rank________ Extremely high rank 
 
Recent research on judgments about crime shows that judgements are affected by context. 
Differences in how people feel, their previous knowledge and experience, and their environment 
can affect judgments about crime. To help us understand how people make judgements on crime, 
we are interested in information about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you 
actually take the time to read directions; if not, some results may not tell us very much about 
judgements on crime in the real world. To show that you have read the instructions, please select 
the “none of the above” option as your answer to the question below about feelings. Thank you. 
How would you best describe your feelings right now?  
Delighted 
Pleased 
Neutral 
Unhappy 
Miserable 
None of the above 
 
In this section of the survey, you are asked to report your understanding of different types 
of identities, people, and behaviors. 
  
Each row of circles is like a ruler for measuring how you feel. Select a circle that indicates how 
close something is to the description at one end of the ruler or the other. If something is not close 
to either description, select the middle circle. For example, if you were rating “a grandfather,” 
you might rate it like this: 
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In this example, a grandfather is rated as extremely good, quite powerful, and neutral in activity. 
  
Take note of two important features of this survey. 1.) Not all answer choices for the seven 
scales are shown in the example. Only three answer choices are shown, but there will be seven 
total scales for each item. For instance, the example only shows scales that range from "Bad" to 
"Good," "Powerless" to "Powerful," and "Active" to "Inactive." However, items will also have 
scales ranging from "Awful" to "Nice," "Little" to "Big," "Slow" to "Fast," and "Quiet" to 
"Noisy." 2.) The order of the scales also changes from item to item.  For example, sometimes the 
scale that ranges from “Bad” to “Good” is first, sometimes it is second, other times it is third, 
fourth, fifth, or even sixth.  Given the changing order of the scales, it is important that you 
carefully read each scale on the survey.  In the example below, we show you the same identity 
rated with a set of scales that are arranged differently. 
 
In this example, a grandfather is rated just as it was in the first example—as quite powerful and 
big, neutral in activity, and extremely good and nice. 
  
Now, you are going to be asked to report your understanding of different types of cultural 
identities and behaviors. Mark off how close each identity is to the description at one end of the 
ruler or the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a friend is 
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an employee is 
a group of employees are 
a group of employees who steal from clients are 
an employee who steals from clients is 
a group of employees who overcharge clients are 
an employee who overcharges clients is 
A receptionist is  
A nurse is 
A doctor is 
An accountant is 
A CEO is 
Stealing from someone is 
Overcharging someone is 
Emily/Todd from the pre-sentencing case report is 
Bad________Good 
Awful______Nice 
Powerless___Powerful 
Little_______Big 
Slow_______Fast 
Quiet______Noisy 
Inactive____Active 
 
Below are some general questions about your experiences with crime. Again, please give your 
honest personal opinions and feelings when answering questions.  
 
Do you know anyone who has been arrested for a street crime? 
   Yes 
   No 
  [If no skip to question on victimization, if yes ask who] 
 
[Only ask if yes on scares] If you answered yes to the previous question, who was this person? 
(check all that apply)  
   Yourself 
   Acquaintance 
   Friend 
   Relative 
   Other 
 
Do you know anyone who has been a victim of street crime? 
   Yes 
   No 
  [If no skip to question on white-collar crime, if yes ask who] 
 
[Only ask if yes on scvic] If you answered yes to the previous question, who was this 
person? (check all that apply) 
   Yourself 
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   Acquaintance 
   Friend 
   Relative 
   Other 
 
Do you know anyone who has been arrested for a white-collar crime? 
   Yes 
   No 
  [If no skip to question on victimization, if yes ask who] 
 
[Only ask if yes on wcarres] If you answered yes to the previous question, who was this 
person? (check all that apply) 
   Yourself 
   Acquaintance 
   Friend 
   Relative 
   Other 
 
Do you know anyone who has been a victim of white-collar crime? 
   Yes 
   No 
  [If no skip to next block of questions, if yes ask who] 
  
[Only ask if yes on wcvic] If you answered yes to the previous question, who was this 
person? (check all that apply) 
   Yourself 
   Acquaintance 
   Friend 
   Relative 
   Other 
  
STUDENTS AND MTURK USERS ARE DIRECTED TO A NEW SURVEY WITH THE 
FOLLOWING PROMPTS (Last questions in main survey) 
 
***OU Student*** 
Thank you for your participation in this study. If you wish to be eligible for the $25.00 gift card 
lottery as compensation for your participation in the study, then please follow the link below (it 
will take you to a new webpage), and enter the requested information. In order to be eligible for 
the lottery you do need to enter your email address and OU 4x4. You will not be contacted for 
any reason other than to be notified if you win a gift card. Your email address will and OU 4x4 
will not be shared with anyone, nor will it be retained after the lottery.   
 
QUALTRICS LINK: 
https://outartsandsciences.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_9FWmQaPiVA8jA9L 
***OCCC Student*** 
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Thank you for your participation in this study. If you wish to be eligible to receive class credit 
for your participation in the study, then please follow the link below (it will take you to a new 
webpage), and enter the requested information. In order to be eligible to receive class credit you 
do need to enter your name, class number, and class section number. You will not be contacted 
for any reason, and your information will not be shared with anyone, nor will it be retained after 
the class credit is assigned. 
QUALTRICS LINK: 
https://outartsandsciences.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_81b8Fqw1Q37qlXT 
***Mturk*** 
Thank you for your participation in this study! The next page will show your MTurk 
confirmation code. 
NEW ANYOMOUS SURVEYS ACCESSED FROM LINKS 
***OU Student sample anonymous survey*** 
Thank you for your participation in this study. If you wish to be eligible for a $25 Amazon gift 
card lottery as compensation for your participation in the study, please enter the requested 
information below. These responses will be kept separate from your survey, and you will only be 
contacted if you are a lottery winner.  
 
Are you currently enrolled in Medical school, Law school, or in the Master of Business 
Administration program? 
Yes 
No 
[If yes, ask question on which school. If no, skip to question on email] 
In which school or program are you currently enrolled? 
Medical school 
Law school 
MBA program 
Joint Law and MBA program (e.g., JD/MBA) 
Other (please specify): (text box) 
 
Please enter your email address in the box below. Your email address will not be shared with 
anyone, nor will it be retained after the research has been completed:  
(textbox) 
 
Please enter your 4x4 in the box below: 
(textbox) 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research! 
***OCCC Student sample anonymous survey*** 
Thank you for your participation in this study. If you wish to receive credit for your time and 
participation in the study, please enter the requested information below. These responses will be 
kept separate from your survey, and your information will only be used to assign credit for your 
participation.  
 
Please enter your name in the box below: 
(textbox) 
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Please enter your course number in the box below: 
(textbox) 
 
Please enter your course section number in the box below: 
(textbox) 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research! 
 
***Failure of attention checks message*** 
Thank you for taking this survey. As previously stated in the directions, there are certain 
requirements that must be met in order to participate and receive compensation. 
 
You are receiving this message because you are not eligible to complete the study and receive 
compensation. This is because you failed to answer multiple questions correctly that checked to 
see if you read and understood the instructions.  
 
If you are an Amazon Mechanical Turk user, this follows Amazon Mechanical Turk policy, 
which states that a "Requester may reject your work if the HIT was not completed or the 
instructions were not followed." You may close this window or use your explorer bar to navigate 
back to the Amazon Mechanical Turk site. 
 
If you are a student taking this survey you are ineligible for class credit or entry into the gift card 
lottery, because you did not answer the memory questions correctly, which indicates that you did 
not follow directions. You may close this window. 
 
***Not 18 or older*** 
 
You must 18 years of age or older to participate in this research. 
 
***Not 18 or older OCCC*** 
 
You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this research, or have turned in a signed 
parental consent form. 
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Appendix C: IRB Approval Letter 
 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects
Approval of Initial Submission – Exempt from IRB Review – AP01
Date: May 25, 2017 IRB#: 8098
Principal Approval Date: 05/24/2017
Investigator: Mr Marshall R Schmidt
Exempt Category: 2
 
Study Title: Mock Jurors’ Reactions to Crime
On behalf of the Institutional Review Board (IRB), I have reviewed the above-referenced research study and 
determined that it meets the criteria for exemption from IRB review. To view the documents approved for this 
submission, open this study from the My Studies option, go to Submission History, go to Completed Submissions 
tab and then click the Details icon.
As principal investigator of this research study, you are responsible to:
• Conduct the research study in a manner consistent with the requirements of the IRB and federal 
regulations 45 CFR 46.
• Request approval from the IRB prior to implementing any/all modifications as changes could affect the 
exempt status determination.
• Maintain accurate and complete study records for evaluation by the HRPP Quality Improvement Program 
and, if applicable, inspection by regulatory agencies and/or the study sponsor.
• Notify the IRB at the completion of the project.
If you have questions about this notification or using iRIS, contact the IRB @ 405-325-8110 or irb@ou.edu.
Cordially,
Fred Beard, Ph.D.
Vice Chair, Institutional Review Board
 
